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Abstract 
The two topics addressed in this dissertation are both related to surface water quality. 
Reservoir sedimentation and water quality trading are examined from economic and 
environmental perspectives. Each topic and the resulting policy implications are relevant to 
stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels. 
 
Reservoir Sedimentation 
Reservoir sedimentation has been recognized as a major environmental, social, and 
economic issue in much of the Midwestern US. There is an effort to focus public and private 
funds to achieve the greatest return on the investment from soil erosion and sediment reduction 
strategies. How can physiographical and economic relationships within the watershed be 
quantified in such a way to provide insights into the selection of alternative management 
strategies? This study focuses on answering that question by integrating a physically-based 
watershed model with an economic analysis of alternative sedimentation reduction strategies for 
the case of Tuttle Creek Lake located in northeastern Kansas. 
Several key finding of this study are that both physiographical and economic factors must 
be considered for cost-effective conservation to occur. Considering these factors and targeting 
BMP implementation from 8 to 23 times more cost-effective than random implementation. If 
targeting cannot be done effectively or if “intangible” costs of BMP implementation are too 
large, dredging is likely to be more cost-effective. While this research compares the cost-
effectiveness of various BMP implementation approaches in Kansas with dredging, the benefits 
associated with each of these strategies is not addressed. 
 
  
Water Quality Trading 
While there is substantial evidence that nonpoint sources have lower nutrient reduction 
costs than point sources, experience with water quality trading (WQT) reveals a common theme: 
little or no trading activity. These outcomes suggest the presence of obstacles to trading that were 
not recognized in the design of existing programs. 
To examine the ways that various market imperfections may impact the performance of a 
WQT market, an agent-based model is constructed, which simulates a hypothetical point-
nonpoint market. This study first presents an overview of the concepts and simulation modeling 
technique used and then analyzes the effects of two prominent market impediments identified in 
the WQT literature: information levels and trading ratios.  
The results imply that if market designers feel that only a limited number of trades will be 
consummated, creating an institution that provides accessible information about buyers’ prices is 
preferred to providing information about sellers’ prices. Overall, more information is always 
better, but it becomes less important with higher trading ratios. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Overview 
“…and when all the flocks were gathered there, the shepherds would roll the 
stone from the mouth of the well and water the sheep, and put the stone back in its 
place over the mouth of the well.” 
Genesis 29:3 (English Standard Version), approx. 1850 B.C. 
 
“When the well is dry, we learn the worth of water.” 
Benjamin Franklin, 1746 
  
“Gone are the days when water is taken for granted by city or rural residents, by 
recreational users, by agriculture or any other group who utilizes water.” 
Steve Irsik, Chair of Kansas Water Authority, 2004-present. 
 
Water is the one of the primary foundations for life on Earth. Civilizations throughout 
history have risen and fallen, advanced and regressed, and prospered and suffered due to the 
availability of, or absence of, adequate quality water supplies. From Biblical times up through 
the present age, human civilizations have developed an appreciation, albeit of varying degrees, 
for the value of preserving and protecting our water resources.  
Though the predominantly blue planet in which we live is three-fourths covered by 
oceans, rivers, and lakes, 98 percent of that water is too salty to drink. Of the 2 percent that is 
fresh, only half is found in rivers, lakes, or groundwater and readily available for human 
2 
 
consumption.
1
 Of this relatively tiny fraction of readily available fresh water, much is polluted to 
the point that it is unfit for drinking (Cech 2005). Though contaminated water and water 
shortages are often thought of as being “developing” country issues, even a casual follower of 
current events across the United States would recognize that we are continually confronted with 
these same types of issues here.  
Increases in global demands for food, feed, and fuel over the past five years has given 
agricultural producers sufficient market signals (i.e., higher prices) to increase commodity 
production. Increased production requires additional land, nutrients, water, and other cropping 
inputs to be used to produce greater overall yields. If not done carefully, these changes in 
agricultural production can create the potential for greater sediment and nutrient runoff resulting 
in poorer surface water quality. Thus, the potential tradeoff between agricultural production and 
environmental quality has renewed urgency (Claassen 2009).  
In an attempt to increase environmental quality, environmental regulations related to 
water quality in most areas across the country are trending toward more stringency. In addition, 
many of the new laws and regulations are pointing more fingers towards unregulated nonpoint 
sources of pollution, particularly agriculture. Many of these new regulations won’t be passively 
accepted by all stakeholders involved. In the Chesapeake Bay, for example, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau have filed suit against the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for the issuance of a Chesapeake Bay total maximum daily load 
(TMDL). Nonpoint source pollution, and particularly agriculture, have been identified as major 
causes of TMDL non-compliance The farmer groups contend that the TMDL violates the Clean 
Water Act and the EPA’s own regulations (US District Court 2011). There also may be the 
                                                 
1
 The majority is locked up in ice caps. 
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feeling among the farmer groups that if the TMDL is enforced in the Chesapeake Bay it may be 
just a matter of time before TMDLs are enforced nationwide. 
At this same time, federal and many state and local budgets are not expanding, and in 
many cases, shrinking. It is fairly safe to say that public money spent on soil and water 
conservation will not be increasing in many areas around the country as we look towards the near 
future. Because of the tight budget situations, more effort (or at the very least, lip-service) is 
being exerted to ensure that dollars are spent in cost-effective ways in all areas of government. 
Thus, we need to get as much conservation as possible out of every dollar spent. 
Cost-effective conservation is smart economics and is a way of getting the biggest “bang 
for the buck,” but it may not be the most politically or socially palatable approach. Cost-effective 
conservation requires the frugal use of funding and does not pay individuals for practices they 
are already doing. Payments that do not leverage a change in conservation behavior deplete 
budget resources without improving environmental quality (Claassen 2009). Cost-effective 
conservation also targets funding to farmers who can generate the most environmental 
improvement at the lowest cost. This non-uniform approach may benefit some farmers, and 
consequently, has the potential to indirectly “harm” other neighboring farmers.2 This unintended 
consequence has been recognized in previous policy programs (e.g., Conservation Security 
Program, CSP). So, there are obvious tradeoffs between cost-effectiveness and equity and an 
inverse relationship between the two appears to exist.  
Competitive bidding is another approach for achieving cost-effective conservation. One 
strategy recently used in several watersheds across the country is known as a best management 
practice (BMP) auction. In a BMP auction, bids are submitted to the “agency” and then ranked 
                                                 
2
 Farmers who get conservation payments may be able to afford higher bids for cash renting cropland compared to 
neighboring farmers who did not receive the payments. 
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based upon the quantity of pollutant (e.g., soil, nutrients) reduction generated per dollar. Winning 
bids are awarded to producers that can provide the most pollution reduction for the least cost. 
The auction allows the buyer to identify and purchase the most cost-effective environmental 
improvements for a specified budget. The buyer could be a governmental entity, as is often the 
case, or a private firm seeking to achieve a reduction in emissions. The latter would be more akin 
to water quality trading. Auction research is ongoing and the potential of auctions to improve 
conservation program cost-effectiveness could be large (Claassen 2009). Attaining cost-effective 
conservation is not a simple or easy proposition. However, it will be necessary in order to 
achieve greater soil and water conservation in the years ahead. 
The two topics addressed in this dissertation are both related to surface water quality. 
Reservoir sedimentation and water quality trading are examined from economic and 
environmental perspectives. Each topic and the resulting policy implications are relevant to 
stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels. The remaining chapters are briefly described, 
in turn, below. 
Chapter 2 focuses on reservoir sedimentation in the context of a Kansas reservoir. The 
research question being addressed is: How can physiographical and economic relationships 
within the watershed be quantified in such a way to provide insights into the selection of 
alternative management strategies? This chapter focuses on answering that question by 
integrating a physically-based watershed model with an economic analysis of alternative 
sedimentation reduction strategies. This will offer decision-makers better insight into the cost 
implications associated with achieving various water quality levels and sedimentation reduction 
goals within a large watershed.  
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Chapter 3 serves as a transition from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. Chapter 4 brings point 
sources of pollution into the discussion and analysis. Other similarities and differences between 
the two analyses are discussed. 
Chapter 4 also covers surface water, but incorporates point sources of pollution into the 
policy analysis through a market-based approach. Specifically, this chapter attempts to answer 
the following research question: How can water quality trading markets be designed in ways that 
take into account different levels of information among buyers and sellers and what are the 
implications for the determination of “optimal” trading ratios? To examine the ways that these 
market imperfections may interact to impact the performance of a WQT market, an agent-based 
model is constructed, which simulates a hypothetical point-nonpoint market. 
Chapter 5 serves as a concluding “wrap-up” of this entire dissertation. The author’s 
overall thoughts and lessons learned related to watershed management are presented. 
Additionally, reflections stemming from nearly 10 years of water resources research and related 
work are offered in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 - From the Dust Bowl to the Mud Bowl: The 
Economics of Reservoir Sedimentation 
 Introduction 
With the primary purposes of flood control, electricity generation, water supply, and the 
creation of jobs, many water reservoir impoundments were built in the US from 1930-1960. As 
most reservoirs were produced by the construction of dams on rivers and streams, there was the 
obvious and inevitable realization that sediment deposition and accumulation would occur 
behind dams. With this in mind, the majority of these structures were built to operate for a 
projected 50 to 200 years before various designated uses would be negatively impacted by excess 
sediment accumulation. For many of these reservoirs, the volume of water storage has been 
reduced by sedimentation. Sedimentation is the process by which sediment particles settle by 
gravity and deposit on the bottom of slow-moving waters. In some cases sediment accumulation 
has occurred slower than or on pace with projections, but in other cases sedimentation rates have 
greatly exceeded original estimates (Hargrove et al. 2010; Juracek 2007). Regardless of how 
closely actual rates match the original projections, the fact that 50 to 80 years have passed since 
dam closure on many US reservoirs indicates that reservoir sedimentation has and will become 
more of an environmental, social, and economic issue of concern going forward. 
Erosion of cropland and streambanks have been identified as two culprits that not only 
cause significant damage to fields and lead to degraded aquatic ecosystems, but also result in 
sediment accumulations in downstream reservoirs. This poses environmental and economic 
concerns for stakeholders living in and around the watersheds and reservoirs affected by 
sedimentation. Sedimentation reduces reservoir storage capacity, negatively impacting public 
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water supply, flood control capability, and water availability for downstream navigation. Both 
suspended and settled soil particles can affect the viability of aquatic life, reduce the recreational 
value of lakes and waterways, and increase operational costs to power plants, city water supplies, 
and navigation. Soil erosion also causes loss of cropland, particularly along stream and 
riverbanks, and lost soil productivity on crop and pasture land (Williams and Smith 2008).  
 Focus of this research 
Reservoir sedimentation has been recognized as a major issue in much of the Midwestern 
US, including the state of Kansas. While there are many technical, environmental, and economic 
management problems associated with sediment sources and solutions to reservoir 
sedimentation, the state of Kansas has proactively recognized the need to protect, secure, and 
restore the life of its reservoirs (KWO 2010a). Because budgets are limited, every effort should 
be made to focus public and private funds to achieve the greatest return on the investment from 
soil erosion, sediment, and nutrient reduction strategies. This dissertation provides an evaluation 
of a large watershed and reservoir severely impacted by erosion and sedimentation. The results 
from this study will be useful to stakeholders and decision-makers at the field, watershed, state, 
and national level. 
This study focuses on the Tuttle Creek Lake (TCL) watershed located in northeast 
Kansas. In the 47 years that have passed since dam closure, TCL has lost over 42 percent of its 
total (multi-purpose and sediment) storage capacity due to sediment accumulation (KWO 
2010b). TCL exhibits, perhaps, one of the most critical cases of reservoir sedimentation in 
Kansas and throughout the Midwest. As of 2009, the Kansas Water Office estimated that the 
8 
 
lake’s sediment pool (Figure 2.1) had reached about 77 percent of design capacity (KWO 
2010b).
3
  
Figure 2.1 Reservoir design with Tuttle Creek Lake specifications 
 
For several reasons, the loss of storage capacity and an overall degradation of reservoir 
quality are of importance to a variety of stakeholders. At the state level, the state of Kansas owns 
the rights to nearly 115,000 acre-feet (or nearly 60 percent of the multi-purpose pool) of water 
storage in TCL which it uses for augmenting flows in the Kansas River to ensure adequate 
supplies of surface water for downstream industries and municipalities (e.g., Topeka, Lawrence, 
and the greater Kansas City area). The US Army Corps of Engineers holds the rights to the 
remaining water in the multi-purpose pool, which it uses for water quality and navigational 
                                                 
3
 In construction, a sediment pool is some fraction of the total storage capacity reserved for sediment accumulation. 
Once the sediment pool is 100 percent full, the lake still exists but additional accumulation reduces the multi-
purpose pool storage. It is at this point that owners of water storage are negatively impacted (although one could 
argue that they are impacted well before this point is reached as well). 
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purposes downstream, particularly in the Missouri River. The lake and surrounding parks also 
are important to the local economies. Smith and Leatherman (2008) estimated that TCL visitor 
expenditures generated $3.73 million (2007$) in direct economic activity (sales) within the 
regional (seven-county) economy, $1.74 million (2007$) in all types of income associated with 
the production of economic activities, and 82 area full- and part-time jobs. In another report, the 
US Army Corps of Engineers reported that the average annual economic benefits of TCL are $55 
million (2000$) (USACE 2001). The breakdown given is $46.0 million in annual flood control 
benefits, $2.5 million in downstream navigation benefits, and $6.5 million in recreation and other 
benefits. In 1993 alone, the damages prevented from flooding equaled $1.25 billion. Clearly, this 
lake and the surrounding park areas provide many valuable benefits to stakeholders.  
Some of the above uses and activities will be negatively affected by poor water quality 
and/or sediment accumulation. In response to past and current water quality degradation, the lake 
has been listed on the state of Kansas’s “303(d) list” for water quality impairment due to 
excessive levels of phosphorus, sulfate, pH, lead, biology, copper, and total suspended solids 
(EPA 2010).
4
 Because of the importance of this resource, stakeholders from the national to the 
state to the local level have made the protection of TCL a priority.  
 To preserve and/or restore the reservoir and watershed, a reasonable approach may be to 
slow the trend of sediment accumulation and reduce nutrient depositions. In order to do that, 
corrective action is needed and this action would ideally be based on a better understanding of 
watershed and stream sediment loading characteristics as well as the costs of alternative 
reservoir/watershed management strategies. How can physiographical and economic 
relationships within the watershed be quantified to provide insights into the selection of cost-
                                                 
4
 The term, “303(d) list,” is short for the list of impaired waters that the Clean Water Act requires all states to submit 
for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval every two years. 
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effective alternative management strategies? This study focuses on answering that question by 
integrating a geographic information system (GIS) based watershed model, reservoir 
rehabilitation management strategies, statistical analyses of historic watershed and water quality 
data, with an economic analysis of alternative sedimentation reduction strategies. This will offer 
decision-makers better insight into the cost implications associated with achieving various water 
quality criteria and sedimentation reduction goals within a large watershed. 
 Overview of Analysis Approach 
This comprehensive study is unique because this is the first time that the information 
obtained regarding reservoir sediment inflows along with sediment removal strategies will be 
incorporated within an economic framework. Additional uniqueness is due to the large scale, of 
both the watershed and reservoir, on which this analysis focuses. An economic analysis used in 
combination with physically-based watershed modeling can provide valuable insights into the 
evaluation of alternative reservoir sedimentation management scenarios. The following is an 
outline of the general approach that is used to evaluate alternative strategies for sediment 
reduction and reservoir rehabilitation: 
1. Data Collection 
a. Identify watershed characteristics. 
b. Identify the extent and types of best management practices (BMPs) and other 
management systems currently in place.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Best management practices (BMPs) are defined as practical, cost-effective actions that producers can take to 
conserve water, nutrients, and/or soil. Descriptions of specific BMPs will be discussed in detail later in this paper. 
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c. Identify potential BMPs from TCL Watershed Restoration and Protection 
Strategy (WRAPS) group and expert opinion. 
2. Decision Support System Development 
a. Identify critical source areas using a physically-based watershed model.  
b. Develop comprehensive cost-return analyses of BMPs to optimize economic 
returns (or minimize costs) to agricultural production and improve watershed 
scale water quality. 
c. Prescribe appropriate BMPs for each critical area (based on the corresponding 
diagnosis). 
3. Economic Analysis 
a. Determine costs and returns of alternative BMPs modeled at field and watershed 
scale – including dredging of TCL. 
b. Evaluate sediment reduction cost-effectiveness using optimization and spatial 
targeting approaches. 
c. Estimate the amount of additional conservation funding that would be needed to 
achieve various levels of annual sedimentation reduction and compare the costs of 
watershed management scenarios to dredging (and various combinations of each) 
to a “do-nothing” scenario. 
A visual depiction of the economic analysis used is displayed in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Approach used to analyze sedimentation reduction strategies for Tuttle Creek 
Lake 
 
 Relevant Literature 
Identifying the land to target in a watershed is crucial for reducing the amount of 
sediment and nutrients entering a reservoir or exiting the watershed outlet. There have been 
several attempts to target and/or optimize BMP placement in agricultural watersheds (Yang et al. 
2003; Yang et al. 2005; Khanna et al. 2003; Yuan et al. 2002; Rodriguez et al. 2011; Veith et al. 
2004). While most of these analyses have occurred on much smaller watershed scales than the 
TCL watershed studied here, the methods and conclusions from these previous works are 
Establish watershed characteristics and 
BMPs including sedimentation rates and 
sources
Develop baseline physically-based 
watershed model 
Identify alternative BMPs for each 
subwatershed unit
Evaluate sedimentation change under 
alternative BMP scenarios
Estimate cost-effectiveness of BMPs that 
meet a budget constraint
Estimate cost savings from reduced 
dredging due to BMP application
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beneficial for the development of analysis techniques that will be used. Nevertheless, very little 
work has examined the economics of reservoir sedimentation in the context of dredging versus 
BMP implementation and that which had did not have a calibrated physically-based watershed 
model underlying the analysis. It is primarily these two elements (size/scale of the analyzed 
watershed and the inclusion of the economics of reservoir sedimentation) and the inclusion of 
multiple BMPs into the analysis that comprise the unique contributions to existing literature. 
 Yang et al. (2003) 
Yang et al. (2003) developed an integrated framework of economic, environmental, and 
GIS modeling to examine alternative land retirement strategies in 12 contiguous agricultural 
watersheds in Illinois totaling 965 square miles. A main objective of this study was to analyze 
the cost effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), which has a 
key goal of reducing sediment loadings by 20 percent in the Illinois River.  
In order to examine the cost effectiveness of CREP, the authors estimated sediment losses 
from land parcels, each 300ft x 300ft, using the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution 
(AGNPS) model. A GIS interface was modified to prepare parcel-specific input data for the 
simulation model. Crop budgets were obtained and applied to each parcel of cropland and quasi-
rents were estimated for each parcel. The quasi-rents were equal to total revenues minus total 
variable costs and represented a producer’s opportunity cost for taking the land out of 
production. 
For the simulation model, the authors defined all land eligible for enrollment in CREP 
(required to be in the 100-year floodplain) to be equal to 900 feet along all streams and 
tributaries. The authors noted that for small streams the 900 ft buffer generally exceeded the 100-
year floodplain boundaries, while for major tributaries and the Illinois River, this buffer could be 
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narrower than the floodplain. For the most part, the 900 ft buffer included most of the land 
eligible for CREP enrollment, but it also included highly sloping land adjacent to streams that is 
typically outside of the 100-year floodplain. 
The authors concluded that cropland selected for retirement in all watersheds was closer 
to water bodies, more sloping, more erosive, and more likely to receive larger volumes of upland 
sediment flows than cropland not selected for retirement. Many of the cropland parcels selected 
for retirement were located outside of the 100-year floodplain. Much of the floodplain cropland 
tended to be flatter and more productive than highly sloped land outside of the floodplain. 
Therefore, it would be much more cost effective to focus the CREP program on these highly 
sensitive lands to get the “biggest bang for the buck.” For example, the least cost-effective 
subwatershed yielded marginal sediment reduction costs of $256 per ton whereas the most cost-
effective subwatershed had costs of just $42 per ton (2003$). 
 Yang et al. (2005) 
Building upon previous work, Yang et al. (2005) first examined the cost-effectiveness of 
CRP and CREP in the Illinois River watershed. These two programs differed greatly in their 
eligibility requirements and selection mechanisms. In short, CRP eligibility included most 
cropland located in the watershed. Selection was based on the environmental benefits index 
(EBI) score and the producer’s bid price. CREP, on the other hand, had to be located in either the 
100-year floodplains, on wetlands, or on sloping land adjacent to established riparian buffers. 
Note that the EBI was not used in selecting CREP enrollments, because it was assumed that any 
land parcel that met the restrictions of CREP automatically generated EBI scores above the 
typical cutoff level used in CRP. 
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Using a similar technique as described in Yang et al. (2003), Yang et al. (2005) found 
that in the absence of any land retirement in the watershed, 28,644 tons of sediment would enter 
streams in the watershed during a typical five-year storm event. Under CRP, 1,763 tons of 
sediment loss would be prevented at a cost of $109,767 per year for an average cost of abatement 
of $62 per ton. Under the status quo CREP, there were 5,889 cropland acres retired resulting in 
6,485 tons of sediment abatement at a cost of $583,286 per year for an average cost-effectiveness 
of just under $90 per ton. Further analysis found that CREP parcels consisted of flatter, less 
erodible soils than the land enrolled in CRP. Through the use of Lorenz curves
6
,
 
it was found that 
environmental benefits (sediment loading reduction) were more variable across parcels than 
costs in both programs. These results suggested that there was considerable potential to improve 
on the performance of CREP. 
The second objective of the Yang et al. (2005) study was to investigate if and how the 
cost-effectiveness of CREP could be improved upon. Three targeting strategies were tested. The 
first strategy was one in which all parcels (all of equal size) were ranked from low to high in 
terms of cost and the least expensive parcels were enrolled first until 5,889 acres of cropland 
were retired. The second approach involved ranking the parcels based on their potential 
environmental benefits and selecting the parcels, which offer the highest benefits until 5,889 
acres of cropland were retired. The third targeting method took into account both benefits and 
costs and selected those parcels, which had the highest benefit to cost ratio until 5,889 acres of 
cropland were retired. It should be noted that when the opportunity cost of enrollment and the 
potential for sediment abatement benefits were compared across parcels in the CREP eligible 
                                                 
6
 A Lorenz curve shows the degree of inequality that exists in the distributions of two variables. Here, the curves 
depict the percentage of potential environmental benefits as a function of the percentage of acreage enrolled. 
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area, a negative correlation coefficient of -0.42 was calculated suggesting that all three targeting 
strategies should yield somewhat similar results. 
The authors found that using the benefit or benefit/cost targeting schemes could have 
achieved abatement levels more than two times higher than the status quo CREP and at about 86 
percent of the cost. Further, the benefit/cost targeting scenario could be just as cost-effective as 
CRP by reducing sediment loading at $84 per ton. It could possibly be more cost-effective if 
there weren’t such stringent enrollment restrictions. 
Yang et al. (2005) provided evidence that because sediment abatement benefits are more 
heterogeneous than costs across land parcels, the preferred selection criteria should at the very 
least be based on a measure of these benefits. A competitive selection process which takes into 
account benefits and costs can significantly improve the performance of CREP in Illinois relative 
to the status quo method of enrolling parcels on a first-come basis. 
 Khanna et al. (2003) 
Working in the same geographic area as Yang et al. (2003), Khanna et al. (2003) 
developed a framework to determine cost-effectiveness of sediment reduction using land 
retirement within the CREP. A hydrologic model (AGNPS) with GIS data and an economic 
model were applied to a 61,717-acre Illinois watershed. Of this area, 8,172 acres were eligible 
for targeting, assuming that sloping cropland adjacent to a stream and riparian buffer within 900 
feet of a stream were also considered eligible for land retirement using CREP. They found that to 
achieve a 20 percent sediment reduction for a 5-year storm, 11 percent of these acres would need 
to be in CREP with an average abatement cost of $31 per ton. With a 30 percent reduction goal 
the average cost was $47 per ton. Marginal costs rise from $29 per ton at a 10 percent reduction 
level to $117 per ton at the 30 percent reduction goal. Their results show that most of the land 
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selected for enrollment is from highly sloping and highly erodible areas rather than flat 
floodplains that are not highly erodible. 
 Yuan et al. (2002) 
Yuan et al. (2002) used a calibrated Annual AGNPS model to evaluate the effectiveness 
of BMPs for reducing sediment yield from a 30-acre subwatershed in the Mississippi Delta. The 
objectives of this study were to: 1) assess the impact of several BMPs on sediment yield from a 
typical Mississippi delta cropland watershed and 2) identify the most cost-effective BMPs for 
different tillage systems. 
This simulation was accomplished by using 50 years of weather data to predict the 
potential impacts of three BMPs on three tillage systems (conventional-tillage, reduced-tillage, 
and no-till) for both cotton and soybean crops in the study subwatershed. The BMPs 
implemented in the simulations were: grade stabilization pipes, cover crops, and grass filter 
strips. The authors used two variants of cover crops: volunteer winter weeds and planted winter 
wheat cover crops. 
BMP cost estimates were based upon 2001 data from the Mississippi Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (NRCS). Costs were divided into one-time initial fixed costs and annual 
variable costs. Finally, the annualized costs were divided by the subwatershed area (30 acres) to 
come up with “distributed costs” for each BMP. 
The distributed annualized costs assuming a 5 percent interest (discount) rate and 25 year 
time horizon were $0 per ac for volunteer winter weeds cover crop, $16.20 per ac for winter 
wheat cover crop, $6.82 per ac for a vegetative filter strip, $3.05 per ac for a slotted inlet grade 
stabilization pipe, and $9.21 per ac for a 1.25 feet deep water impoundment, which was 
essentially a box inlet water control structure into which boards were stacked to impound water 
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on the field year-round. The relative cost-effectiveness of each BMP was calculated by dividing 
the total annualized cost by the sediment yield reduction of each BMP within a tillage system. It 
should be noted that Yuan et al. (2002) assumed that the tillage system had an impact on 
predicted sediment yield, but not on profitability. 
The authors found that the marginal sediment reduction costs for all BMPs were about 
$7.00 per ton for conventional and reduced tillage and $9.60 per ton with no-till. The greater cost 
with no-till occurred because no-till alone reduces sediment yield by 50 percent and further 
reductions tend to be more difficult and expensive. 
This analysis did not find 33 feet (10m) wide filter strips to be a particularly cost-
effective BMP for any of the tillage systems. This was because filter strips required more land to 
be taken out of production than with an impoundment, and the estimated sediment reduction 
benefit was less. Filter strips could be installed at a lower initial cost, but when one factored in 
the annual land rental costs the total distributed annualized costs were higher. 
Not surprisingly, this study found that allowing volunteer winter annual weeds to grow 
following harvest was the most cost-effective BMP for all tillage systems as there was no cost 
associated with this BMP. Slotted inlet pipes and slotted board riser pipes were the next most 
cost-effective BMPs; however, these pipes did not achieve the 50 percent sediment reduction 
goal from conventional and reduced tillage systems unless combined with some type of cover 
crop. Vegetative filter strips (33 ft wide) were the least cost-effective of the BMPs considered. 
The authors suggested that narrower filter barriers (i.e., 3.3 ft wide) may be more cost-effective 
for sediment reduction.  
Yuan et al. (2002) concluded by asserting that decisions on the adoption of BMPs should 
be made after jointly considering the environmental and economic impacts. The results reported 
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in this study could be considered valid for other agricultural regions similar to the Mississippi 
delta with fields slopes of less than 1 percent and where sediment is the primary cause of water 
quality impairment. 
 Rodriguez et al. (2009) 
Rodriguez et al. (2009) used a nondominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) to 
evaluate the optimal fitness of 35 different BMPs (combinations of pasture management, buffer 
zones, and poultry litter application practices) on the basis of subfield (i.e., HRU) pollutant loads 
estimated with the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). The uniqueness of this study was 
that the authors analyzed the combined effect that pastureland, buffer zone, and poultry litter 
management could have as a phosphorus or nitrogen reduction strategy. The studied region was 
the Lincoln Lake watershed, which is a subwatershed within the Illinois River watershed. It is a 
relatively small watershed (12.36 mi
2
) located in northwest Arkansas. This watershed has been 
the focus of an interstate water quality dispute between Oklahoma and Arkansas regarding the 
role that animal agriculture, particularly poultry, contributes to excess phosphorus 
concentrations.  
The final NSGA-II optimization model generated a number of near-optimal solutions by 
selecting from the 35 BMP combinations for placement on any of the 461 pasture HRUs. Thus, 
the search space consisted of 35
461
 (or 6.54 x 10
711
) possible combinations. The authors claimed 
that the final optimization model ran for 10,000 generations and 800 populations and were 
completed in less than one hour using a supercomputer. 
 The optimization routines operated by placing BMP combinations to reduce nutrient 
loading (phosphorus or nitrogen or both) while simultaneously minimizing total cost (defined as 
the summation of standard production costs and the additional costs for each BMP combination). 
20 
 
They compared these results to the baseline or current pasture management situation. In 
compiling the results, the authors found the lowest-cost, the medium-cost, and the highest-cost 
solutions of the 800 available.  
By implementing all the BMP combinations recommended in the lowest-cost solution, 
total phosphorus could be reduced by at least 76 percent while increasing cost by less than 2 
percent in the entire watershed. This value represented an increase in cost of $2.22 per ac 
compared to the baseline. For the medium- and the highest-cost solutions, implementing all of 
the prescribed BMPs could decrease total phosphorus immensely but would increase the total 
cost by 7 and 25 percent, respectively. 
When the optimization routine focused on nitrogen reduction for all cost implementation 
solutions, the total nitrogen loads were reduced by at least 98.9 percent. The authors did not 
reveal the percentage cost increases for these scenarios or the scenarios in which both 
phosphorus and nitrogen were the focus. They did, however, state that even though the majority 
of the BMPs were recommended to reduce both nutrients, their frequencies and placement 
distributions across the HRUs will determine their effectiveness. Thus, they recommend an 
optimization (targeting) strategy similar to theirs’ be used to help guide BMP implementation in 
a watershed. 
 Veith et al. (2004) 
Veith et al. (2004) sought to determine if selection of sediment reducing BMPs through 
genetic algorithm optimization, a performance-based method, could identify more cost-effective 
BMP scenarios than targeting, a plan-based method. The comparison between the two methods 
was conducted for a 2,506 ac predominantly agricultural-based watershed in Virginia.  
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The authors defined plan-based methods as those which draw from past field studies and 
scientific theory to assign pollutant reduction efficiencies to BMPs. Performance-based methods, 
on the other hand, use simulation models to assess changes in watershed response due to 
alternative BMP scenarios.  
In this study, the baseline scenario was one with all cropland managed as conventionally 
tilled corn silage. The targeting scenario was defined as a plan-based method, which focused 
pollution control on areas within the watershed that have the greatest potential for sediment 
losses. Specifically, the targeting strategy used in this study involved converting all cropland 
with the majority of the field slope greater than 3 percent to minimum-tillage corn silage on the 
contour with a winter wheat cover crop.  
Three optimization plans were evaluated. These included the full combination of BMPs 
used by the targeting strategy along with the option of applying BMPs individually across the 
watershed. Optimization plan 1 was most similar to the targeting strategy in that there were only 
two management variations of corn silage: conventional tillage or minimum-tillage on the 
contour with a winter wheat cover crop. Optimization plans 2 and 3 allowed for many more 
management variants and thus did not allow for a fair comparison to the targeting strategy. For 
that reason, this literature review will only compare the targeting strategy to optimization plan 1. 
The optimization procedure was comprised of three components all operating within a 
Genetic Algorithm framework: optimization, NPS prediction, and economic analysis. The NPS 
component utilized the Universal Soil Loss Equation and a sediment routing routine developed 
by Veith (2002). The economic analysis component utilized enterprise budgeting from the 
Virginia Farm Management Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets.  
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The targeting strategy was first applied to the baseline scenario, and it was found that 
watershed sediment yield was reduced by 2,507 lb/ac. Because the optimization routines required 
a pollutant reduction goal, the goal was set to match the results from the targeted strategy - 2,507 
lb/ac. Cost-effectiveness of each solution was calculated by dividing the amount of additional 
costs (from adopting the BMPs) by the amount of sediment decrease. Under the targeting 
strategy, the estimated cost-effectiveness of sediment reduction was $53.93 per lb/ac, whereas in 
the optimization plan 1, the cost-effectiveness was estimated to be about $47.19 per lb/ac. 
Optimization plans 2 and 3 resulted in even higher levels of cost-effectiveness than optimization 
plan 1. 
The explanation offered for the increased cost-effectiveness of optimization plan 1 over 
targeting was that optimization plan 1 applied BMPs primarily on high-sloped fields that 
bordered streams whereas with the targeting strategy, any field with greater than 3 percent slope 
had the set of BMPs applied regardless of the proximity to the stream. 
The authors concluded by stating that targeting strategies offer the benefit of lesser data 
requirements and less computing time. However, when a complete cost-benefit analysis was 
performed for this study, which included the costs associated with additional data requirements 
and computing time for optimization models, the optimization model (plan 1) still proved to be 
more cost-effective than the targeting strategy. The optimization techniques used in this study 
also offer some flexibility in BMP implementation by providing a number of near-optimal 
solutions in contrast to the targeted approach, which offers one and only one BMP 
implementation scenario. 
 Hansen and Hellerstein (2007) 
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Hansen and Hellerstein (2007), evaluated the impact of soil conservation on reservoir 
services. To do this, it was assumed that reservoir services (flood control, recreational 
opportunities, aesthetic beauty, power generation, etc.) are a function of the level of sediment in 
the reservoir. An implication of this approach is that sediment that settles in a reservoir the year 
before the reservoir is dredged will impose little environmental cost. The authors extended the 
use of replacement cost theory, which differed from past work, which focused on sediment’s 
impact on future dredging costs; hence, sediment that settled in a reservoir the year before it was 
dredged would impose the greatest social cost.  
This framework was used to value the effect that a marginal change in soil erosion had on 
current and future reservoir benefits. They analyzed impacts across more than 70,000 reservoirs 
across 2,111 Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) areas of the 48 contiguous states. The results showed 
that marginal reductions in soil erosion provide benefits ranging from zero to $1.38 per ton. As 
expected, HUCs with no reservoirs offered no reservoir-related soil conservation benefits. And, 
those HUCs with relatively more reservoirs tended to have greater soil conservation benefits.  
There were several assumption made in order to derive estimates of the parameters in the 
benefit function. One of the more notable assumptions in their analysis, which has some 
relevance to our analysis is that dredging was assumed to be optimal once a reservoir had lost 30 
percent of its capacity. According to the authors, past studies have found that, across reservoirs, 
dredging occurs with 15-45 percent capacity loss. They tested the sensitivity of this assumption 
by re-estimating benefits based on a 20 and 40 percent loss in capacity and found that the median 
benefit estimates ranged from approximately 15 percent higher to 1 percent lower.  
 Williams and Smith (2008) 
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In 2008, Williams and Smith prepared a sedimentation white paper on the economics of 
watershed protection and reservoir rehabilitation. They noted that this was a broad topic and 
enormous task. This is partially due to there being very little literature on the economics of 
sediment control at the watershed scale and virtually no studies addressing whether dredging of 
sediment or prevention of sedimentation is more economical. The research began by giving an 
overview of the costs of soil erosion and sedimentation based on existing literature. The authors 
went on to analyze the potential savings from implementing some individual in-field erosion 
control methods in a watershed to reduce the future cost of dredging sediment from a reservoir. 
The estimates, they noted, were meant to provide some perspective on the savings that may be 
gained by using individual soil erosion management practices to reduce the need for dredging. 
They found that it may be more economical for the government to fund expenditures for 
management practices to reduce further erosion and sedimentation in a watershed than to rely on 
future use of dredging in situations where the amount of accumulated sediment has not reduced 
the usefulness of the reservoir. They qualify this by mentioning that their analysis is not 
complete due to the lack of critical data. Specifically, the study identified the following items as 
necessary information: the source of the sediment, how suitable the management practices will 
be for various locations in a watershed, and the number of acres that actually need application of 
these practices from a technical and economic perspective. 
The research performed here provides and applies much needed data and builds upon the 
previous work of Williams and Smith (2008) as well as Yang et al. (2003) and Khanna et al. 
(2003). Again the uniqueness of this research includes the size/scale of the analyzed watershed 
along with considerations of the economics of reservoir sedimentation. Williams and Smith 
(2008) was a first attempt at this, but relied on many assumptions regarding watershed 
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characteristics and BMP effectiveness. This research extends Williams and Smith (2008) by 
incorporating estimated data from a calibrated physically-based watershed model. 
 Conceptual Framework 
Soil erosion and nutrient runoff from cropland results in decreased on-site productivity as 
well as numerous offsite consequences (Williams and Smith 2008). Offsite, surface water quality 
can become impaired and reservoir life shortened. These physical effects in turn have negative 
consequences on the environment and regional economy. Figure 2.3, which is adapted from 
Williams and Smith (2008), shows the flow of these effects. This analysis primarily focuses on 
soil erosion and nutrient runoff from cropland affecting water quality and the life of a reservoir. 
While this analysis indirectly and qualitatively considers recreation, flood control, and water 
supply effects, options for protecting and/or restoring (i.e., BMP implementation and/or 
dredging) the reservoir are quantitatively examined. 
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Figure 2.3 General effects of soil erosion and other pollutant runoff 
 
The conceptual framework can be divided into two parts. First, there is an underlying 
conceptual model for the BMP implementation scenarios on cropland within the watershed. The 
second part involves the concepts of dredging alongside or in place of BMP implementation. 
This conceptual framework section will be split into two subsections, which cover the two 
previously mentioned parts. 
 STAGE I: “BMP implementation” conceptual model description 
Environmental protection within production agriculture often relies on incentives to 
induce adoption and implementation of BMPs. The logic behind this is straightforward. 
Agricultural producers generally seek and adopt profit-enhancing practices and technologies on 
their own without compensation from outside sources. If a conservation BMP is profit-enhancing 
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(benefits outweigh expected costs), producers will recognize this over time and choose to adopt 
the practice. One has to look no further than the increasing utilization of no-till over the past two 
decades. As for some other BMPs (e.g., filter strips), the producer may not receive any financial 
benefit from adoption. The benefits might go to stakeholders downstream and society in general. 
This is the definition of an externality. If a producer’s goal is to maximize profit, there is often 
no incentive to adopt some BMPs.  
Economic considerations are a key determinant in the adoption of BMPs. Although some 
producers have already adopted such practices, an expansion in adoption will occur only if the 
practices become profitable (in the absence of regulatory mandates). Simultaneously, it is 
important to recognize that producers across a watershed face different cost and production 
conditions. Although specific production practices may be profitable for some producers in some 
locations, they are not likely to be profitable for all producers in all locations. Further, the 
benefits of some BMPs accrue mostly to society at large and farmers are not compensated for 
these external benefits. Federal, state, local agencies, and private organizations seek to provide 
incentives for environmental protection where markets have failed to do so (Claassen 2009). This 
analysis considers the financial costs that would have to be expended (e.g., from a governing 
authority) in order to entice producers to adopt a given set of BMPs across the watershed.  
The underlying conceptual model may be best represented in flow-chart organizational 
form based on (but modified to fit this analysis) work by Vellidis et al. (2009). The conceptual 
model is shown in Figure 2.4. It shows the linkages among socioeconomic factors and producers’ 
BMPs while explicitly integrating cause and effect among socioeconomic factors, producers’ 
decision making, and physically-based outcomes. The entire model is constrained by a federal, 
state, and/or regional conservation program. That is, it is assumed that all profit-enhancing BMPs 
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have been adopted at an earlier time and any additional BMP implementation will occur if and 
only if a conservation program (Box A) provides sufficient financial support. Within this 
program, there is a suite of BMPs that can be adopted by producers. Physically-based and 
agronomic factors (Box B) as well as economic and social factors (Box C) determine whether or 
not BMPs will be adopted. Maintenance constraints (Box D) as well as physically-based and 
agronomic constraints (Box E) determine the effectiveness of the BMPs post-implementation. 
Further economic and social factors (Box F) can help to ensure that the BMPs remain in place 
throughout the life of the contract. A detailed description of the 6 levels of the constraints is 
below. 
A. Conservation program constraints - The program constraints are based on funding 
availability, geographical eligibility, and resource focus.  
B. Physically-based and agronomic constraints I- The first level of physically-based and 
agronomic constraints refer to the suitability of BMPs to different soil types, climatic 
conditions and cropping patterns. For example, no-till may not be suitable for heavy clay 
soils or a continuous corn rotation. Because of such constraints, more funding may have 
to be offered to different regions. This essentially accounts for any non-economic factor 
that affects BMP implementation. 
C. Economic and social constraints I - The first level of economic and social constraints 
refer to acceptability of BMPs to producers. This may be due to social or economic 
reasons which may be related to the physically-based and agronomic constraints in part 
(B). The economic factors also may include available cost-share (i.e., one-time payments 
made to partially or fully offset initial installation costs) for given BMPs. 
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D. Maintenance constraints - Once BMPs are implemented periodic maintenance is required 
to maintain effectiveness. This also has an economic component. 
E. Physically-based and agronomic constraints II - The second level of physically-based and 
agronomic constraints occur at both the farm- and watershed-level. These constraints help 
determine the effectiveness of the BMPs. Watershed models can be used to predict the 
amount of pollution reduction achieved at the farm- or field-level all the way up to the 
watershed-level. 
F. Economic and social constraints - The second level of economic and social constraints 
include the adequacy of program payments. These include annual incentive and 
maintenance payments. The annual incentive payments must compensate the producer for 
the annual loss of production as well as any maintenance (e.g., mowing of a filter strip) 
that may be necessary to ensure longer-term BMP effectiveness. 
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Figure 2.4 Conceptual model linkages and data flow within the integrated economic model 
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the conceptual model is implemented. The SWAT physically-
based watershed model is used to evaluate the watershed’s water quality response to the different 
BMP implementation scenarios. The amount of annual conservation payments needed to induce 
implementation of BMPs to different amounts of acreage is estimated based on partial budgeting 
as well as historical rental rates. This is described in detail in the “Data” section. The final results 
or output from this part of the analysis include amounts of pollutant reduction along with the 
annual total and marginal costs of BMP implementation. A more detailed description of these 
concepts follows. 
Here, we consider the problem of a watershed manager who seeks to achieve maximum 
pollution (i.e., sediment, nitrogen, and/or phosphorus) reduction subject to an annual budget 
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constraint. The individual costs of implementing a given BMP on a given cropland parcel are 
equal to the sum of the lost revenues and the additional costs incurred (both one-time and annual 
over a 15-year time horizon) for a given farm. Nonpecuniary benefits (e.g., wildlife 
enhancement) from BMP adoption may also be a consideration for some producers/landowners, 
but these are obviously difficult to quantify and are ignored in this analysis. The annual 
aggregate cost of pollution reduction is represented by the sum of the annualized individual BMP 
implementation costs incurred. 
To model the pollutant loading from each land parcel, a watershed model is developed. 
The model estimates edge-of-field loading and also factors in a delivery ratio to predict the 
average annual amount of pollutants entering the reservoir based on the application of BMPs. 
Cost and load reduction factors are used for each BMP-farm combination to estimate individual 
cost-effectiveness values (e.g., dollars per ton of sediment reduction).  
Two types of management strategies are modeled: targeted and random BMP 
implementation. The targeted approach implements BMPs on cropland that have the most 
attractive cost-effectiveness values (e.g., the lowest dollars per ton of sediment reduction). 
Implementation continues until the budget constraint is reached. The random approach models 
the case in which BMPs are implemented in a random fashion, which spreads the BMPs 
randomly across the watershed. This approach is possibly more akin to the status quo 
conservation programs in use currently across the country (although some targeting approaches 
are used in some programs) (Nelson et al. forthcoming).  
Finally, total and marginal cost curves can be derived for pollutant reduction for each 
management strategy modeled. These costs can be compared to the marginal costs of dredging. 
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From this, the “optimal” amount of sediment reduction achieved via BMP implementation and 
via dredging can be derived given the assumptions and constraints of the model.  
 STAGE II: “Dredging versus BMP implementation” conceptual model description 
Along with BMP implementation, dredging is another method for reducing the amount of 
sediment in TCL. While dredging may also reduce the amount of nitrogen and phosphorus in the 
reservoir, analyzing these nutrient reductions with any precision requires knowledge of 
concentration levels in the dredged material. This is beyond the scope of this research and, thus, 
only sediment is considered in the “dredging versus BMP implementation” analysis.  
Because sediment accumulation in TCL (and any reservoir for that matter) is inevitable, 
dredging is likely to be needed at some point in the future to preserve TCL. As will be discussed 
later in this study, dredging can be a relatively expensive option. However, at some point it may 
become feasible if the costs of dredging are less than additional BMP implementation on a per 
unit basis of sediment reduction. The question is: at what point does this occur? The answer can 
be found by comparing the marginal costs of BMP implementation with the costs of dredging. 
As Williams and Smith (2008) point out, the decision on whether or not to dredge will 
depend on sediment source, sedimentation rate with and without management practices, 
effectiveness and cost of management practices, dredging cost inflation, the planning horizon, 
and the discount rate used to calculate present values. If accumulated sediment has not 
negatively impacted current reservoir services (e.g., recreation, flood control), then it might be 
reasonable to forego dredging in favor of investing in additional in-field and in-stream 
conservation practices to reduce the need for future dredging.  
Following Williams and Smith (2008), this analysis also examines how many acres a 
BMP can be applied to if savings generated from reduced dredging finance the implementation 
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of the BMP. Estimated future savings from dredging costs avoided because of implementing 
sediment reduction BMPs are a key component of this analysis. To determine these values, the 
reservoir sedimentation rates are estimated with and without BMP implementation over a 15-
year planning period. A 15-year period is chosen because this is approximately equal to the 
number of years until the sediment pool is 100 percent full given average annual sediment 
loading rates. The costs of dredging 15 years in the future also are estimated based on the current 
rate of sedimentation versus a reduced rate of sedimentation that will result from implementing 
BMPs. This analysis is limited to costs; therefore, any benefits resulting from reduced erosion, 
sedimentation, and/or any nutrient reduction that may occur are not considered here. The method 
used for comparing dredging with BMPs also is shown in Figure 2.4. 
 Data 
The data requirements for this study include both economic and physically-based data. 
This section begins by describing the types of BMPs considered and the economic costs (in 
2009$) of each. The physically-based data for the simulations are generated from a calibrated 
watershed model. The second part of this section focuses on the model development and the 
physiographical results that are to be incorporated into the alternative watershed management 
simulations. 
 Best Management Practices 
There are two main types of strategies for reducing the amount of sediment and nutrients 
that enter a reservoir: in-field and in-stream strategies. According to Devlin and Barnes (2008), 
in the Kansas River basin (which the Tuttle Creek watershed is a part of) unprotected croplands 
contributed the majority of sediment loads. While streambank erosion may contribute a 
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significant amount of sediment to TCL, the watershed model developed here only considers the 
control of in-field sediment and nutrient sources.
7
 The three in-field strategies analyzed are filter 
strips, no-till, and permanent vegetation. 
The simulation program developed here requires the calculations of BMP costs. Existing 
research in this area shows that the costs and returns to BMPs are highly variable. According to a 
comprehensive BMP cost study performed by Williams and Smith (2008), the costs for 
implementing no-till, for example, may range from -$37.00 to more than $37.00 per acre. In 
other words, some producers may see significant economic returns (due to lower crop input costs 
and/or higher yields) from adopting no-till while others may see increased costs and/or lower 
yields. In general, however, Williams and Smith (2008) indicated that most sediment reducing 
BMPs exhibit positive costs. A relevant study by Valentin et al. (2004) utilized actual farm-level 
economic and BMP adoption data to rigorously analyze the relationship between BMP use and 
farm income. They showed that while the adoption of nutrient BMPs had a significant positive 
effect on net farm income for wheat and corn in Kansas nearly all of the soil conservation BMPs 
had no statistically significant impact on farm income.  
In general, it is likely that cropland BMPs have already been adopted by producers, who 
stand to reap significantly increased net returns from doing so. While there may be other 
producers who have the potential to benefit economically from adopting a given BMP, for 
whatever the reason, they may resist implementing that BMP. Additionally, there are likely many 
producers who would see decreased income by the adoption of certain BMPs. An assumption 
made for this study is that in order to induce any further BMP adoption within the Tuttle Creek 
watershed, cost-share and/or incentive payments would have to be made to producers. The next 
                                                 
7
 The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) watershed model does not have the ability to analyze sediment and 
nutrient loading due to streambank erosion unless site specific data can be provided.  
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step is determining the level of costs (incentives) for inducing more BMP adoption for purposes 
of the simulation routines. 
Filter strips (also known as vegetative buffers) are land areas maintained in permanent 
vegetation that reduce nutrient and sediment losses from agricultural fields, improve runoff water 
quality, and provide wildlife habitat (Williams and Smith 2008). Generally, filter strips are 
placed at the edge of the field near or around bodies of surface water. There are several federal 
and state programs to encourage producers to adopt and maintain filter strips. In order to 
calculate the annualized costs of a filter strip, the KSU Vegetative Buffer Decision-Making Tool 
(Smith and Williams 2010) is used.  
There are several cost-related assumptions that have to be made and entered into the tool. 
It is assumed that 2009 cash rents by county would be used as the lost opportunity cost of 
converting cropland to a grass filter strip or permanent vegetation (Dhuyvetter and Kastens 2009; 
USDA-NASS 2009). These are slightly higher than current CRP rental rates and are 
representative of rates typically paid for acres enrolled through the Continuous CRP enrollment. 
The higher rates are used because it is assumed that land converted to filter strips would be high 
quality land requiring more of a rental payment than typical CRP land.  
Another assumption is that the procedure used for installing a filter strip involves the use 
of a cover crop before planting. This is based on discussion with NRCS personnel in the region. 
In addition, it is assumed that there would be $50 (5 hrs x $10 per hr) per acre one-time producer 
labor costs associated with the establishment of a filter strip and the design life (or time horizon) 
for the filter strip would be fifteen years. In line with Smith (2004) and Williams and Smith 
(2008), it is assumed that each acre of filter strip affects or treats runoff from 25 acres of 
cropland. The calculated annualized costs for an acre cropland treated by a filter strip by county 
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can be seen in Table 2.1. A comprehensive filter strip budget example can be found in Table 2.2. 
Note, that a 15-year time horizon is used for reasons stated earlier and a discount rate of 4.625 
percent is used, which is based on the year 2009 “Plan Formulation Rate for Federal Water 
Projects” (NRCS 2009).  
Table 2.1 “Original” BMP Annualized costs over a 15-year time horizon 
County, State 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Filter 
Strips per cropland 
acre treated
1
 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for No-till 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Permanent 
Vegetation 
Clay, KS $3.83 $13.00 $81.05 
Gage, NE $5.67 $20.00 $108.15 
Jefferson, NE $5.67 $20.00 $101.93 
Marshall, KS $4.71 $13.00 $89.23 
Nemaha, KS $4.79 $13.00 $92.46 
Pawnee, NE $5.47 $20.00 $105.52 
Pottawatomie, KS $4.31 $13.00 $86.58 
Republic, KS $3.88 $13.00 $76.63 
Riley, KS $4.55 $13.00 $81.87 
Washington, KS $4.56 $13.00 $83.07 
1
 Annualized cost of filter strip divided by 25 cropland acres (treated) 
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Table 2.2 Filter strip budget for Marshall Co., KS 
 
General Data For Filter Strip in Marshall Co., KS
4.63%
$76.19 per acre / year
3.07%
$6.67 per acre / year
4.00%
660
66
1.00
15
$5.00
$5.00
COSTS PAYMENTS RECEIVED
Total one-time $175.44 Total one-time $0.00
Total annual $6.67 Total annual $0.00
Net Present Value Table: Filter Strip (per acre)
Year One Time Costs Annual Costs One Time Payments Annual Payments
Net Property Tax
Impact
Year Rent
0 $175.44 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00
1 $0.00 $6.67 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 1 $76.19
2 $0.00 $6.94 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 2 $78.53
3 $0.00 $7.21 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3 $80.94
4 $0.00 $7.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 4 $83.42
5 $0.00 $7.80 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5 $85.99
6 $0.00 $8.12 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 6 $88.63
7 $0.00 $8.44 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 7 $91.35
8 $0.00 $8.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 8 $94.15
9 $0.00 $9.13 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 9 $97.04
10 $0.00 $9.49 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10 $100.02
11 $0.00 $9.87 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 11 $103.09
12 $0.00 $10.27 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 12 $106.26
13 $0.00 $10.68 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 13 $109.52
14 $0.00 $11.11 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 14 $112.88
15 $0.00 $11.55 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15 $116.35
Sum totals $175.44 $133.56 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Sum totals $1,424.34
Present Value $175.44 $91.73 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Present Value $985.69
Net Present Value ($267.17) Net Present Value $985.69
Annualized Value ($25.09) Annualized Value $92.57
Total economic cost equals annualized cost of filter strip plus annualized cropland rents forgone = $117.66
NPV Table: Cropland Rent (per acre)
Project Length (feet)
Project Width (feet)
Acres (length x width/43,560)
Length of analysis (years)
Cropland Property Tax ($/acre)
Annual Cropland Rental Growth Rate
Total Annual Costs
Inflation Rate of Annual Costs
Discount Rate
Cropland Rental Rate - not CCRP rental rate
Tame Grass Property Tax ($/acre)
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No-till is a form of conservation tillage in which herbicides are used in place of tillage for 
weed control and seedbed preparation (Williams and Smith 2008). No-till has seen increased 
adoption rates through much of the past two decades. According to Smith et al. (2007), nearly 30 
percent of producers in the central Great Plains are currently utilizing 100 percent no-till 
management strategies. According to Dhuyvetter and Kastens (2005), no-till is generally adopted 
in central and eastern Kansas due to decreased costs, but higher yields and associated revenue 
provide incentives for no-till adoption in western Kansas. As previously stated, the costs and 
returns associated with no-till adoption are highly variable and are farm specific (see Williams 
and Smith 2008). 
Currently, the EQIP program will pay a Kansas producer $13.00 per acre per year for up 
to 3 years for converting to a no-till management system (NRCS 2010). In Nebraska, a producer 
can be paid $20.00 per acre per year for 3 years for converting to no-till (Torpin 2010). Based on 
these data, it is assumed that the annualized cost for inducing producers to convert to no-till 
would be $13.00 per acre per year in Kansas and $20.00 per acre per year for those farms in 
Nebraska all over a 15-year time horizon (Table 2.1). 
Land retirement, which includes the establishment of permanent vegetation, has the 
potential to significantly reduce soil erosion. The CRP program currently provides incentives to 
make up for the value of lost production. The KSU Vegetative Buffer Decision-Making Tool 
(Smith and Williams 2010) is used to calculate the annualized costs of converting cropland field 
to permanent native grass vegetation over a 15-year time horizon. The values used represent the 
lost value of production and are set equal to the average CRP rental rates for each county in 
2009. Table 2.1 displays the annualized costs per county for land retirement. A detailed budget 
for permanent vegetation (land retirement) can be found in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 Permanent vegetation budget for Marshall Co., KS 
General Data For Permanent Vegetation in Marshall Co., KS
4.63%
$58.51 per acre / year
3.07%
$6.67 per acre / year
4.00%
660
66
1.00
15
$5.00
$5.00
COSTS PAYMENTS RECEIVED
Total one-time $101.42 Total one-time $0.00
Total annual $6.67 Total annual $0.00
Net Present Value Table: Permanent Vegetation (per acre)
Year One Time Costs Annual Costs One Time Payments Annual Payments
Net Property Tax
Impact
Year Rent
0 $101.42 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00
1 $0.00 $6.67 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 1 $58.51
2 $0.00 $6.94 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 2 $60.31
3 $0.00 $7.21 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3 $62.16
4 $0.00 $7.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 4 $64.07
5 $0.00 $7.80 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5 $66.03
6 $0.00 $8.12 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 6 $68.06
7 $0.00 $8.44 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 7 $70.15
8 $0.00 $8.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 8 $72.30
9 $0.00 $9.13 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 9 $74.52
10 $0.00 $9.49 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10 $76.81
11 $0.00 $9.87 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 11 $79.17
12 $0.00 $10.27 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 12 $81.60
13 $0.00 $10.68 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 13 $84.10
14 $0.00 $11.11 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 14 $86.69
15 $0.00 $11.55 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15 $89.35
Sum totals $101.42 $133.56 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Sum totals $1,093.82
Present Value $101.42 $91.73 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Present Value $756.96
Net Present Value ($193.15) Net Present Value $756.96
Annualized Value ($18.14) Annualized Value $71.09
Total economic cost equals annualized cost of permanent vegetation plus annualized cropland rents forgone = $89.23
Annual Cropland Rental Growth Rate
Total Annual Costs
Inflation Rate of Annual Costs
Discount Rate
Cropland Rental Rate - not CCRP rental rate
Tame Grass Property Tax ($/acre)
NPV Table: Cropland Rent (per acre)
Project Length (feet)
Project Width (feet)
Acres (length x width/43,560)
Length of analysis (years)
Cropland Property Tax ($/acre)
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 Physically-based Model and Results 
This subsection presents the physically-based model that quantifies the environmental 
impacts of practices adopted by farmers. In particular, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool 
(SWAT) model is applied to the Tuttle Creek watershed located in Kansas and Nebraska to 
predict the changes in sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus loading at the watershed outlet 
(entering TCL), in response to the adoption of the three cropland in-field BMPs.
8
 The first part 
briefly describes the study region and the input data for the SWAT model. The next part presents 
the modeling scenarios, which correspond to the three BMPs of interest plus a baseline (no 
BMPs) situation. Each scenario requires detailed inputs about tillage and other agronomic 
practices. The third part then presents the modeling results from the various scenarios and 
explains how the data needed for the simulations are assembled. The fourth and final part briefly 
summarizes the model and results. 
 Model Inputs 
A necessary component of an effective BMP implementation plan is a way to estimate 
the amount of pollution reduction achieved from the adoption of certain BMPs. In order to 
analyze the potential of various BMP management scenarios in the Tuttle Creek watershed, a 
SWAT watershed model was developed for the portion of the Tuttle Creek watershed located 
almost completely in Kansas (Figure 2.5). It should be noted that the sediment and nutrient 
contributions from the greater Nebraska portion of the watershed were included in the analysis, 
but treated as exogenous in the models. In other words, no BMP applications occurred in the 
greater Nebraska portion of the TCL watershed. The average annual amounts of pollutants 
                                                 
8
 As described later, BMP implementation only occurs in the “Kansas” portion of the watershed. The word “Kansas” 
is in quotes because very small portions of the analyzed subwatersheds actually lie in Jefferson, Gage, and Pawnee 
counties located in Nebraska. 
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coming from Nebraska streams and rivers into the Kansas portion of the TCL watershed are 
817,394 tons of sediment, 39,817,689 pounds of total nitrogen, and 9,354,214 pounds of total 
phosphorus. In terms of total pollutant loading into TCL, Nebraska contributes 30.5, 75.7, and 
75.2 percent of the annual sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus, respectively. Stated differently, 
Kansas is responsible for 1,861,031 tons of sediment, 12,765,177 pounds of total nitrogen, and 
3,084,057 pounds of total phosphorus loading into TCL each year. 
Figure 2.5 Kansas portion of the Tuttle Creek watershed with 28 subwatersheds delineated 
 
 
The SWAT (2009) model was developed and is maintained by the USDA Agricultural 
Research Service (ARS) (Arnold et al. 1998; Neitsch et al. 2005; Gassman et al. 2007; Douglas-
Mankin et al. 2010). SWAT is a watershed-scale model widely used for quantifying the impact 
of land management practices (Nejadhashemi et al. 2011; Rodriguez et al. 2011). Briefly, the 
KS portion:
2,377 mi2 total
1,015 mi2 cropland
Manhattan
Marysville
Washington
Clay Center
Westmoreland
NEBRASKA
KANSAS
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SWAT model was developed to predict the impact of land management practices on water, 
sediment, and agricultural chemical yields in large complex watersheds with varying soils, land-
use, and management conditions over long periods of time. Major model components include 
weather, hydrology, soil temperature, plant growth, nutrients, pesticide, and land management 
(Gassman et al. 2007). Each watershed is divided into subwatersheds and then into hydrologic 
response units (HRUs) based on land-use, slope, and soil distributions.  
A preliminary step in the watershed model development process was to access reliable 
landuse data. The most recent comprehensive land use data set available was the National Land 
Cover Data (NLCD) created and compiled by the United States Geological Survey in 2001.  
In addition to the 2001 NLCD landuse data, other physically-based data were acquired 
for use in the SWAT model. State Soil Geographic Database (STATSGO) soils data was 
incorporated into the model along with 31 years of relevant National Climatic Data Center 
(NCDC) weather data (i.e., daily temperatures and precipitation). A summary of the land use, 
slope, and hydrologic soil groups (see note at bottom of Table 2.4) located in each of the 28 
subwatersheds are displayed in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.4 Summary of land use, slope, and soil group by subwatershed 
    Land Use (%) Slope (%) Hydrologic Soil Group (%)9 
Sub- 
watershed 
Area (ac) Crop Urban Forest Range 
Wet-
land 
Water 0-2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8+ A B C D 
1  12,393  44.5 4.6 8.4 41.1 0.0 1.4 76.1 18.6 4.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 83.8 0.0 
2  48,527  63.5 3.8 4.9 27.2 0.0 0.6 79.5 17.6 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 98.5 
3  6,267  57.1 4.7 12.3 22.9 0.0 3.0 76.5 19.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.5 33.9 45.6 
4  39,374  36.4 2.9 7.5 51.4 0.4 1.3 62.9 25.3 9.3 2.2 0.3 0.0 41.2 55.2 3.6 
5  60,724  58.8 4.4 6.6 29.6 0.3 0.4 75.4 19.4 4.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 4.3 95.7 0.0 
6  23,890  67.0 4.4 6.2 20.0 0.7 1.7 73.6 24.1 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 40.4 43.4 
7  7,734  50.8 11.4 6.5 26.2 2.3 2.8 78.2 20.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 40.6 32.9 
8  1,450  39.1 12.6 0.0 39.4 0.0 8.9 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.7 0.0 50.3 
9  42,852  68.6 5.8 5.2 19.5 0.4 0.6 78.0 17.7 3.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 99.0 
10  259,609  43.1 4.4 6.0 45.8 0.1 0.5 67.3 21.4 8.4 2.7 0.3 0.0 34.8 63.2 1.8 
11  75,604  72.2 4.4 3.9 19.0 0.0 0.6 66.4 24.8 7.7 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 96.7 
12  81,114  41.1 4.1 5.8 46.3 1.1 1.7 63.2 23.2 10.7 2.7 0.2 0.0 19.5 60.6 19.9 
13  45,102  50.7 4.7 6.9 35.9 0.0 1.9 61.5 23.7 12.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 93.5 
14  34,557  42.2 4.7 8.9 40.2 2.1 1.9 57.7 22.5 12.6 5.0 2.1 0.0 14.1 46.2 39.7 
15  26,028  52.6 4.2 7.6 34.0 0.7 0.9 60.4 27.7 9.9 2.1 0.0 0.0 6.8 78.5 14.7 
16  17,768  40.8 6.7 8.2 41.5 1.0 1.8 63.7 22.5 10.2 3.0 0.6 0.0 17.3 41.9 40.8 
17  75,559  58.3 4.6 7.2 28.8 0.5 0.6 62.9 25.9 9.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 92.3 
18  59,506  40.3 4.4 10.1 43.5 0.7 1.0 56.5 26.5 13.7 3.1 0.2 0.0 7.1 0.0 92.9 
19  6,183  16.8 11.3 7.4 57.9 3.5 3.1 58.6 16.7 12.7 7.1 5.0 0.0 26.0 24.4 49.6 
20  14,667  40.3 3.8 10.3 44.0 1.5 0.0 63.3 25.2 10.3 1.2 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 87.3 
21  38,499  20.2 4.0 9.7 65.5 0.3 0.3 54.0 26.5 14.1 4.9 0.5 0.0 0.3 42.1 57.6 
22  76,565  44.6 4.0 6.1 44.8 0.2 0.3 67.9 22.1 7.8 2.1 0.1 0.0 4.8 63.1 32.1 
23  45,733  38.0 3.6 8.7 47.0 1.4 1.3 56.7 23.3 14.5 4.9 0.6 0.0 15.3 18.9 65.8 
24  23,823  24.7 2.9 10.5 59.3 1.0 1.5 57.8 20.9 14.1 5.9 1.4 0.0 18.6 33.4 48.0 
25  53,826  8.5 2.5 12.0 74.2 1.8 1.1 49.1 19.5 17.2 9.7 4.6 0.0 7.2 62.2 30.6 
26  160,864  33.6 3.7 5.8 56.3 0.2 0.3 59.4 26.0 10.5 3.1 1.0 0.0 14.2 47.8 38.0 
27  169,764  8.7 4.3 16.6 59.4 1.2 9.7 44.4 18.6 16.7 11.2 9.1 0.0 12.0 69.4 18.7 
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 Group A soils have the lowest runoff potential as they typically have predominantly gravel or sand textures. Group B soils have moderately low runoff potential 
when thoroughly wet. Group C soils have moderately high runoff potential and Group D soils are comprised of significant amounts of clay and exhibit the 
highest erosive potential 
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The entire Tuttle Creek watershed area is 6,144,000 acres, with 25 percent of the entire 
watershed area residing in Kansas. According to data compiled from the 2007 National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) reports, the average farm size in the watershed was 482 
acres with a size distribution depicted in Figure 2.6. The median sized farm in the watershed was 
calculated from the NASS data to be approximately 243 acres. In order to delineate a watershed 
to fit the NASS results while maintaining reasonable shape and size for hydrology, the Kansas 
portion of the Tuttle Creek watershed was divided into 27 subwatersheds.
10
 Subwatersheds were 
further divided into 2,752 HRUs, which are unique combinations of land use and soil that occur 
within an individual subwatershed. Within these 2,752 HRUs, only 1,858 were categorized as 
cropland. According to the data in Table 2.4, approximately 41 percent of the total land area in 
the analyzed watershed is classified as cropland, 4 percent urban, 8 percent forest, 45 percent 
range/pastureland, 1 percent wetland, and 2 percent is categorized as surface water.  
 
                                                 
10
 Actually, the TCL watershed was divided into 28 subwatersheds (Figure 2.5) which was necessary to calculate 
loading into TCL. However, subwatershed 28 is located on the backside of the dam and does not contribute any 
loading to the reservoir. For this reason, the results only include loading from subwatersheds 1 through 27. 
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Figure 2.6 Size distribution of farms in the Tuttle Creek watershed 
 
Focusing on the 1,858 agricultural HRUs, the average size was 350 acres with the 
smallest being 5 acres and the largest being approximately 8,175 acres in size. The median size 
for the HRUs was 107 acres. About 60 percent of the HRUs were between 10 and 179 acres 
while nearly 80 percent were sized between 10 and 499 acres. The size distribution of the 
agricultural HRUs followed somewhat closely to the NASS derived distribution of farms as 
shown in Figure 2.6. The HRU data consisted of many farms in the 10 to 179 acre range, which 
resulted in a slightly smaller average farm size than the NASS data. The median values of 107 
acres and 243 acres for the HRUs and the NASS data, respectively, again supported the fact of 
there being many “smaller” sized farms.  
 Modeling Scenarios 
Based on previous research and reports (Williams et al. 2009; Langemeier and Nelson 
2006; O’Brien and Duncan 2008a-d), data for cropping rotations and the associated field 
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operations were developed for the Kansas and Nebraska portions of the Tuttle Creek watershed. 
For the Kansas side, there were four major crops planted and harvested under six different 
cropping rotations. For the Nebraska side, there were four major crops occurring under three 
different cropping rotations. Having knowledge of predominant crop rotations and knowing the 
reported crop acreage from the NASS, the proportions of each cropping rotation were estimated 
for each state-side of the TCL watershed. The crop acreage was very near the reported crop 
acreage reported by the NASS. Table 2.5 shows the crop and rotation breakdown for each state 
side of the watershed. It was assumed that these crop rotations existed in the TCL over the 31 
year SWAT modeling simulation period. 
Table 2.5 Percentage of crops and rotations in the TCL watershed 
Kansas side of TCL watershed  Nebraska side of TCL watershed 
Crop Percentage of Cropland  Crop Percentage of Cropland 
Corn (C) 37%  Corn (C) 63% 
Grain Sorghum (G) 29%  Grain Sorghum (G) 3% 
Soybeans (S) 28%  Soybeans (S) 31% 
Wheat (W) 7%  Wheat (W) 3% 
   
Cropping Rotation   Cropping Rotation  
C-S 25%  C-S 55% 
Continuous S 5%  Continuous C 35% 
Continuous C 15%  G-S-W 10% 
S-W 25%    
Continuous W 10%    
G-S-W  20%    
 
In addition to the cropping rotations, the associated field operations and enterprise 
budgets also were developed. Examples of the field operations used for a continuous corn 
cropping rotation are shown in Table 2.6. These operations were utilized by the SWAT model. 
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The remaining field operations by cropping rotation and enterprise budgets can be found in 
Appendix A.
11
  
Table 2.6 Continuous corn rotation under conventional tillage 
Date Practice SWAT Practice Amount 
3/27 Tandem disk Tandem disk plow  
4/5 Chisel Chisel plow  
4/5 Knife anhydrous ammonia Anhydrous ammonia 116 lbs/ac 
4/15 Field cultivate Field cultivator  
4/15 Herbicide application Atrazine 1.9 lbs/ac 
4/15 Herbicide application Metolachlor 1.5 lbs/ac 
4/16 Plant corn Plant/Begin growing season  
4/16 Nitrogen application Elemental nitrogen 14 lbs/ac 
4/16 Phosphorus application Elemental phosphorus 47 lbs/ac 
5/20 Herbicide application Dicamba 0.3 lbs/ac 
10/1 Harvest corn Harvest and kill  
11/5 Chisel Coulter Chisel plow  
 
Under the baseline scenario, the crops (and thus, cropping rotations) were randomly 
applied throughout the watershed consistent with the data displayed in Table 2.5. The cropland 
was rotated in a manner consistent with the data in Table 2.5 throughout the course of the 31 
years of weather simulation in the SWAT model. In the baseline case, it was assumed that there 
were no filter strips in place and all cropland was farmed using conventional tillage as shown in 
Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Description of scenarios 
 
                                                 
11
 The field operations data were used in the SWAT watershed model. The enterprise budget data were not directly 
utilized to calculate BMP costs, but have been included in Appendix A for additional information. 
 Baseline Scenario #1 Scenario #2 Scenario #3 
Tillage System Conventional 
tillage 
Conventional 
tillage 
No-till N/A 
Filter Strip? NO YES NO N/A 
Types of crops Cropping 
rotations 
Cropping 
rotations 
Cropping 
rotations 
Native grass 
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In scenario 1, the cropland also was under conventional tillage. However, this scenario 
included a 33 ft wide grass filter strip at the edge of each cropland HRU. It is assumed that each 
acre of filter strip treats runoff from 25 acres of cropland. Note, that the edge of each HRU does 
not necessarily border a body of surface water, hence each filter strip does not necessarily border 
a body of surface water. The cropping rotations were the same as in the baseline scenario (Table 
2.7). 
Scenario 2 employed 100 percent no-till management on all cropland. The only 
operations that break the surface of the ground are planting and drilling in a 100 percent no-till 
system. Chemicals are used for weed control. There were no filter strips in place and the 
cropping rotations were the same as in the baseline scenario (Table 2.7). 
Scenario 3 involved converting all cropland into native grass (Table 2.7). The native 
grass permanent vegetation (land retirement) was a mixture of bluestem grasses, switchgrass, and 
Indiangrass. Once established, there was no cultivation involved with the permanent vegetation, 
and it was assumed that there would be no fertilization. 
 Model Calibration and Validation 
The goal of this stage of the study was to calibrate the SWAT model for the TCL 
watershed. Two major rivers (Big Blue River and Little Blue River) discharge water and 
sediment to TCL. Therefore, there was a need to estimate and incorporate flow and sediment 
inputs from these rivers (inlets). The locations of the inlets are identified in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7 TCL watershed inlets 
 
In order to estimate sediment input to the TCL watershed, we set up and calibrated two 
watersheds for flow and sediment. We called the first watershed Upper Left (HUC 10270207), 
which contains the Little Blue River. The second watershed was named the Upper Right (HUC-
10270201, HUC-10270202, HUC-10270203, and HUC-10270204), which contains the Big Blue 
River. The two watersheds are identified in Figure 2.8. The results from the calibrated models 
above were used as inputs to the TCL watershed. The final stage involved calibration of the TCL 
watershed for flow and sediment. 
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Figure 2.8 Upper left and right watersheds 
 
The following datasets were required to set up the watershed models in SWAT: 
 Land use: National Land Cover Database 2001 (NLCD 2001) 
 Soils: State Soil Geographic Database (STATSGO) 
 Topography: USGS 90-meter Digital Elevation Model (DEM) 
 River Network: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Reach File Version 1.0 
 Weather: National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) weather stations 
There is need to identify at least one dry climatological period and one wet climatological 
period for the model setup and calibration. Precipitation from 24 weather stations over 31 years 
were used to estimate average annual precipitation shown in Figure 2.9. The period of 1998-2002 
was selected for model calibration and validation; data from 1997 was used for model warm-up.  
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Figure 2.9 Annual precipitation for the TCL watershed 
 
The model was set up based on 31 years (1978-2008) of climatological data from 9 
stations in this watershed (Figure 2.10). Observed streamflow discharge was obtained from the 
US Army Corps of Engineering station (upstream of TCL), while total suspended solids (TSS) 
concentration was obtained from Kansas Department of Health and Environment sampling point 
000240 shown in Figure 2.11. Calibration for TCL was completed using SWAT2009. The results 
of observed versus uncalibrated and calibrated model output as well as statistical analyses and 
model performance before and after calibration can be found in Nejadhashemi et al. (2011). 
Although no BMPs were applied in the base case within the SWAT model, it is important 
to note that the SWAT model was calibrated to actual flow and sediment inputs. This means that 
the calibrated loading values incorporate the fact that there are BMPs in place in the TCL 
watershed. Because there are BMPs in place throughout the TCL watershed and because the 
location of these BMPs is not known, assumptions are made in determining where BMPs are 
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already in place. This process used for accomplishing this will be covered in greater detail later 
in the “Economic Simulation Model” section. 
Figure 2.10 TCL watershed weather stations 
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Figure 2.11 TCL watershed monitoring stations 
 
 Modeling Results and Findings 
As described previously, scenarios 1, 2, and 3 assume BMP application across all 
cropland HRUs in the Kansas portion of the TCL watershed. While it is not realistic to assume 
that all cropland in the watershed will be treated by a BMP simultaneously, we move forward 
with the assumption that the estimated HRU pollutant loading values maintain their relative 
rankings and any inaccuracies in loading predictions are negligible. This assumption allows us to 
utilize the SWAT analysis output (ex-post) as input into the economic models.  
The average sediment and nutrient loading estimates across all cropland HRUs are 
displayed by Table 2.8 along with percentage reductions in pollutant loading from the baseline 
for all three BMP scenarios. 
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Table 2.8 Acre-weighted average pollutant loading at edge of HRU across all agricultural 
HRUs (tons or lbs/ac/yr) 
Pollutant Baseline Filter Strips 100% No-till 
Permanent 
Veg. 
 Average loading at edge of HRU (tons or lbs/acre/year) 
Sediment (tons/ac/yr) 2.87 0.78 2.21 0.15 
Nitrogen (lbs/ac/yr) 19.65 5.61 16.19 2.67 
Phosphorus (lbs/ac/yr) 4.75 1.30 4.89 0.36 
 Percentage loading reduction from baseline (%) 
Sediment (tons/ac/yr) - 72.6% 23.0% 94.6% 
Nitrogen (lbs/ac/yr) - 71.4% 17.6% 86.4% 
Phosphorus (lbs/ac/yr) - 72.6% -3.0% 92.5% 
 
Focusing on the loading at the edge of the agricultural HRUs, the average sediment 
loading under the baseline condition was estimated to be just below 2.9 tons/ac/yr. When 33 feet 
wide native grass filter strips were applied to all agricultural HRUs, the watershed-wide average 
sediment loading was reduced by 72.6 percent (Table 2.8) to 0.78 tons/ac/yr. Similar percentage 
reductions were achieved for nitrogen and phosphorus as well with 71.4 and 72.6 percent 
reductions for each of these nutrients, respectively.  
The use of 100 percent no-till management applied to all cropland fields resulted in lesser 
sediment reduction than filter strips by reducing loadings by 23 percent across the watershed. 
When all of the cropland in the watershed was converted to a permanent stand of native grass, 
substantial reductions in sediment (and nutrient) loading resulted. Sediment loading was reduced 
by approximately 95 percent while nitrogen and phosphorus loadings were reduced by 86.4 and 
92.5 percent, respectively.  
To account for sediment and nutrient transport in the watershed, delivery ratios are 
typically derived for each subwatershed and for each HRU. The delivery ratio of pollutant 
loading is a function of the stream transport effects. The stream transporting effects are defined 
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as the outflow pollutant load divided by the inflow load. The difference between inflow and 
outflow loads are due to pollutant deposition or other losses.  
The methods used for determining the sediment delivery ratios for each subwatershed in 
the TCL watershed are briefly described next using subwatershed 1 as an example. First, we 
know the amount of sediment exiting subwatershed 1 (as well as from the other 26 
subwatersheds) under baseline (and unaltered) conditions. We also know the amount of sediment 
entering TCL under baseline (and unaltered) conditions. In order to derive the sediment delivery 
ratio from subwatershed 1, the amount of sediment exiting subwatershed 1 is manually and 
artificially forced to zero within the SWAT model. Ceteris paribus conditions throughout the rest 
of the TCL watershed are employed in that the remaining 26 subwatersheds’ data remain intact 
and unaffected. Next, the amount of sediment entering TCL is calculated under these altered 
conditions (i.e., with subwatershed one “zeroed” out). The difference in sediment loading at TCL 
from the unaltered and altered conditions is calculated. This difference is then divided by the 
amount of sediment exiting subwatershed 1 under unaltered conditions. This results in a 
sediment delivery ratio value for subwatershed 1. This same technique is used for calculating the 
remaining 26 delivery ratios for each subwatershed.  
The sediment delivery ratios tend to be slightly variable across subwatersheds as 
displayed in Table 2.9. A delivery ratio of 0.56 in subwatershed 1 indicates that on average every 
one ton of sediment (leaving the edge of an HRU located in that subwatershed) results in 0.56 
tons in TCL. The remaining 0.44 tons is assumed to be deposited within to the stream channel. In 
general, the subwatersheds located nearer TCL and/or a major tributary exhibit higher sediment 
delivery ratio values. 
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Table 2.9 Sediment delivery ratios by subwatershed 
Subwatershed Sediment Delivery Ratio 
1 0.56 
2 0.51 
3 0.56 
4 0.71 
5 0.67 
6 0.60 
7 0.68 
8 0.69 
9 0.70 
10 1.00 
11 0.69 
12 1.00 
13 0.66 
14 0.73 
15 1.00 
16 0.99 
17 0.72 
18 0.67 
19 1.00 
20 0.75 
21 0.79 
22 1.00 
23 1.00 
24 0.79 
25 1.00 
26 1.00 
27 1.00 
 
Here, there is an assumption that all nutrient loads reaching a major stream segment will 
be further transported to the watershed outlet (into TCL). Thus, the nutrient (both nitrogen and 
phosphorus) delivery ratios are assumed to be 100 percent for the entire portion of the Tuttle 
Creek watershed analyzed. The reasons for assuming 100 percent nutrient delivery ratios for 
subwatersheds 1 through 27 are two-fold. First, the SWAT model provides no standard way of 
calculating nutrient delivery ratios. Second, this assumption is reasonable when one considers the 
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multi-year time horizon for which this analysis occurs and the relatively high nutrient delivery 
ratios (i.e., all over 95 percent) that were derived in previous northeast Kansas watershed 
research (Peterson et al. 2009).  
 Economic Simulation Model 
The SWAT watershed model described in the previous section generated calibrated 
results of average annual pollutant loading by farm (HRU) for each of the scenarios presented in 
Table 2.7. Using this output from the SWAT watershed model as input, the economic analysis 
model simulates possible BMP implementation scenarios and estimates the resulting pollutant 
loading into a reservoir and the costs of implementing the BMPs. There are two versions of the 
economic analysis model. The first emulates an economically optimal BMP scenario where 
BMPs are placed in areas of the watershed where pollutant loading is reduced at the lowest cost. 
The other version emulates a random approach to BMP implementation in the watershed. This to 
some degree represents the status quo approach of uniform BMP implementation across a 
watershed and serves as a point of comparison for the economically optimal approach (Nelson et 
al. forthcoming). Both of these models operate under the criteria of meeting a specified pollutant 
reduction goal subject to a specified budget constraint. These models can focus on either 
sediment, nitrogen, or phosphorus reduction individually and can accommodate up to three 
different types of BMPs. 
While it may appear that a genetic algorithm optimization model would be ideal for this 
analysis, the enormity of the TCL watershed makes this option infeasible.
12
 The search space 
increases exponentially as the possible BMP implementation combinations is 3
1,858 
(which equals 
                                                 
12
 A genetic algorithm is a search heuristic that mimics the process of evolution by generating solutions to 
optimization problems using techniques inspired by evolution, such as inheritance, mutation, selection, and 
crossover. 
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3.10 x 10
886
). In other words, too large of a search space given present-day computational and 
time constraints.  
Considering the multitude of social, environmental, economic, and political factors 
present at any point in time in an agricultural watershed, attempting to effectively examine the 
cost-effectiveness of alternative watershed management schemes can be a difficult task. An 
increasingly popular method of analyzing complex systems is the utilization of agent-based 
simulation modeling. An agent-based model (ABM) is a class of computational models with 
agents representing autonomous decision-making units. This allows the analyst to assess the 
effects of agent decision-making on the system as a whole. Recently, ABM’s have become a 
popular model choice for analyzing complex systems driven by micro-level decisions (Tesfatsion 
2006). ABM’s are particularly useful in emulating alternative market structures, specifically 
those where agents are heterogeneous and adapt their behavior to institutional rules. 
ABM’s are made up of two computational objects: the “agents” themselves and the 
“environment” in which they operate (Parker, Berger, and Manson 2002). In the Tuttle Creek 
watershed, the agents are the farm managers and the environment is the management mechanism 
that determines which BMPs are implemented and where. A goal of the simulations is to 
understand how changes in the environment (management mechanism) may induce different 
patterns and levels of BMP adoption among the agents. 
 Agents 
The         farms (HRUs) are indexed by         and are considered potential 
BMP adopters and thus have the ability to reduce the amount of soil leaving their cropland fields. 
Here, it is assumed that a governing authority or watershed manager has set a goal of reducing 
the maximum amount of sediment,   units, (or nitrogen or phosphorus) entering TCL while 
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operating under an annual fiscal budget of   dollars per year. Each farm can generate up to    
units of sediment reduction at a total annualized cost of   . Using the cost of implementing each 
BMP data described previously, total costs, which include one-time and annual costs over a 
given time horizon for each BMP on each farm, are determined and assigned. Average per unit 
costs of pollutant reduction (dollars per pound of pollutant reduced) are calculated for each farm-
BMP combination. Average per unit costs are assumed to vary across farms but are constant at 
the farm level. This cost property implies that the aggregate total and marginal cost curves will 
have “staircase” structures. 
Each farm can potentially adopt one of   BMPs,        . Here    , and the three 
BMPs are filter strips, no-till, and permanent vegetation. Let A denote the (  x  ) “average per 
unit cost matrix” representing the per-unit costs for BMP implementation. If farm i is to adopt a 
given BMP,     must be positive. That is, the BMP implemented must result in a positive 
amount of sediment reduction if sediment is the primary pollutant of concern. However, the 
associated nitrogen and phosphorus reductions may not be positive if sediment is the primary 
pollutant of concern. Before any BMP implementation occurred, the program eliminates any 
farm-BMP combination, which displays negative pollutant reduction
13
 (     ) because it is 
assumed that in all cases the watershed manager is knowledgeable of this and would not issue 
conservation funding to farms to adopt BMPs that actually increase the amount of pollutant 
runoff.  
 A deficiency of the data is that the physically-based information is at a subwatershed 
scale and the cost data is at the county level. This is because HRU’s are not necessarily 
contiguous (Hernandez et al. 2003). Therefore, it is not possible to precisely determine the 
                                                 
13
 This is only for the objective pollutant (or pollutant of concern); not all three pollutants. 
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annualized costs of a given BMP for a HRU (farm). The following method is used to account for 
this issue.  
First, the fraction of each subwatershed (numbered 1-27) in each county is determined. 
For example, subwatershed 26 covers four counties: Washington, Marshall, Clay, and Riley. 
Based on the data underlying Figure 2.5, subwatershed 26 is subdivided as 23 percent in 
Washington County, 2 percent in Marshall County, 25 percent in Clay County, and 50 percent in 
Riley County. Table 2.10 exhibits the county fractions for each subwatershed. 
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Table 2.10 Fraction of each county located in each subwatershed 
                     County 
Subwatershed Clay Gage Jefferson Marshall Nemaha Pawnee 
Pottawat-
omie Republic Riley 
Washing-
ton TOTAL 
1 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
3 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 1.00 
5 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.74 1.00 
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.00 
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 1.00 
23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
24 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 
26 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.26 1.00 
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
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It is known that the farms within subwatershed 26 are located in one of four counties. The 
next step is to assign each farm to a single county. This was so that costs for BMP 
implementation could be assigned to each farm because costs varied by county. The percentages 
from Table 2.10 are used to determine this. For example, there are 36 farms in subwatershed 26. 
Based on the percentages in Table 2.10, it is determined that 8 of these farms are located in 
Washington County, 1 in Marshall County, 9 in Clay County, and 18 farms are located in Riley 
County.  
The next step is determining which farms to place into each county. Because of a lack of 
accurate data, this determination is made through a stochastic process in Monte Carlo fashion. 
That is, for each iteration the 36 farms are assigned randomly to each of the four counties. But, 
the number of farms in each county do not vary from that discussed previously. The simulations 
are run 3,000 times and the results are averaged to ensure that the results are not just a “luck of 
the draw” occurrence.14  
An assumption of the SWAT model is that there are no BMPs in place in the Base 
scenario. First-hand knowledge of the area as well as NRCS reports indicate that this is not the 
case. But, the challenge is to determine where BMPs have been put into place and where they 
exist today. Determining this with any precision and incorporating this into the SWAT model is a 
difficult and expensive task that is beyond the scope of this research. For that reason, the 
following method is used. 
While personal knowledge and NRCS reports show that many soil saving BMPs have 
been implemented over the past three decades, other research has determined that some farmers 
                                                 
14
 To ensure that the final results were not sensitive to a particular set of random draws, all simulations were 
repeated 3,000 times in Monte Carlo fashion, with a “new” set of eligible farms picked each time. The authors tested 
this model and it was found that 3,000 iterations was sufficient to ensure that the mean performance measures 
computed across the 3,000 iterations was a stable statistic.  
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have extremely high willingness to accept (WTA) values and will most likely need very high 
payments for adoption and will not adopt certain BMPs under most realistic scenarios (Smith et 
al. 2007). Specifically, Smith et al. (2007) found that approximately 20 percent of Kansas farms 
have already adopted filter strips and 30 percent of farms have already adopted no-till. To 
account for these facts within this simulation model, it is assumed that 20 percent of the farms 
have already adopted BMPs and an additional 5 percent of farms have extremely high WTA 
values for BMP adoption. Thus, it is assumed that farms with these characteristics would not 
adopt new or additional BMPs in the model’s time horizon and thereby are removed from the 
choice set.  
At the beginning of each BMP implementation simulation, 25 percent of the farms are 
eliminated from the potential pool. Again, the problem is determining which 465 out of the 1,858 
farms would be eliminated. To handle this, the 465 ineligible farms are picked in a random 
fashion each time and Monte Carlo techniques are used with 3,000 iterations.
15
 
Once these initialization search and delete methods are completed, the simulation 
program proceeds to the selection process for BMP implementation (note, each of the 3,000 
iterations consists of the initialization processes and BMP implementation routine). 
 Environment 
The “environment” is the management mechanism that determines which BMPs are 
implemented on which farms in the watershed and the order in which these occur. The 
mechanism used is similar to a method used in the modeling of water quality trading markets. 
Specifically, the method modeled is a variant of the sequential, bilateral trading algorithm 
proposed by Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991). 
                                                 
15
 In later sections, this “random” method of removing 25 percent of the farms is replaced by an alternative method 
that removes 25 percent of the most erosive farms.  
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The BMP implementation process occurs by iterating over BMP implementation projects 
in the sequence they occur. With each implementation project, indexed by t, the algorithm begins 
by identifying the particular farm-BMP combination (i,b). Two different ways of doing this are 
modeled, one which simulates a highly targeted approach and the other which is random and 
more representative of a worst-case, potentially status-quo approach. These two implementation 
regimes are described below.  
Once the farm-BMP combination is identified, a BMP is assumed to be implemented on 
that farm resulting in    units of sediment reduction. This quantity is recorded, along with the 
average annualized per unit cost (of sediment, nitrogen, or phosphorus),     , total cost,      , 
and area treated by the BMP. Additionally, the average unit costs and reductions for each of the 
secondary pollutants (nitrogen and phosphorus in this example) are recorded. The A matrix is 
then updated by eliminating that farm (setting      ) from further BMP implementation 
because of the restriction of one BMP implemented per farm. The model then iterates through 
additional BMP implementation projects using the same process until: 1) no positive values exist 
in the A matrix; 2) no other BMPs could be implemented without violating the budget constraint; 
or 3) the primary pollutant reduction goal has been met.  
The two implementation regimes are: 
1. Targeted BMP implementation: This scenario assumes full information by the watershed 
manager in that BMPs can be placed strategically in the watershed to deliver the greatest 
sediment reduction for least cost. In this optimal case, the algorithm determines the farm-
BMP combination (   ), which has the lowest (and positive) average per unit cost of 
primary pollutant reduction. If this combination will not exceed either the pollutant 
reduction goal or the budget constraint, then the BMP will be implemented on this farm 
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and the resulting pollutant reduction and cost will be recorded in an output matrix as 
described above. This farm will then be removed from the possible choice set, which 
prevents it from being selected again. 
2. Random BMP implementation: The random approach to BMP implementation assumes 
very low information by the watershed manager and occurs in much of the same fashion 
as the optimal approach with one very important distinction. That is, each farm-BMP 
combination (   ) is selected in a completely random manner in which no consideration 
is given to the average per unit costs of pollutant reduction assuming neither of the 
constraints will be violated.  
 Scenarios Modeled 
Each of the BMP implementation scenarios operate under varying budget constraints. 
The annual budget constraint varies from $50,000 to $450,000 per year in increments of 
$100,000. These values are in line with estimated minimum and maximum funding amounts that 
could be available from the state of Kansas (e.g., through WRAPS and Kansas Water Plan 
funding sources) for purposes of addressing sedimentation in the TCL watershed (KDHE 2009). 
In addition to varying implementation regimes and budget constraints, the primary 
pollutant of concern also changes across scenarios. Specifically, simulations are first run which 
focus on reducing sediment accumulation in TCL. The resulting amounts of nitrogen and 
phosphorus reduction also are tabulated for these scenarios. In the same manner, scenarios, 
which focus on reducing nitrogen and phosphorus reduction, are run next. Table 2.11 lists the 
assumptions for each of the 30 original simulation scenarios modeled. 
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Table 2.11 Description of original scenarios 
Scenario1 BMP Regime 
Primary 
Pollutant 
Annual 
Budget 
Targ_S_50 Targeted Sediment $50,000 
Targ_S_150 Targeted Sediment $150,000 
Targ_S_250 Targeted Sediment $250,000 
Targ_S_350 Targeted Sediment $350,000 
Targ_S_450 Targeted Sediment $450,000 
Rand_S_50 Random Sediment $50,000 
Rand_S_150 Random Sediment $150,000 
Rand_S_250 Random Sediment $250,000 
Rand_S_350 Random Sediment $350,000 
Rand_S_450 Random Sediment $450,000 
Targ_N_50 Targeted Nitrogen $50,000 
Targ_N_150 Targeted Nitrogen $150,000 
Targ_N_250 Targeted Nitrogen $250,000 
Targ_N_350 Targeted Nitrogen $350,000 
Targ_N_450 Targeted Nitrogen $450,000 
Rand_N_50 Random Nitrogen $50,000 
Rand_N_150 Random Nitrogen $150,000 
Rand_N_250 Random Nitrogen $250,000 
Rand_N_350 Random Nitrogen $350,000 
Rand_N_450 Random Nitrogen $450,000 
Targ_P_50 Targeted Phosphorus $50,000 
Targ_P_150 Targeted Phosphorus $150,000 
Targ_P_250 Targeted Phosphorus $250,000 
Targ_P_350 Targeted Phosphorus $350,000 
Targ_P_450 Targeted Phosphorus $450,000 
Rand_P_50 Random Phosphorus $50,000 
Rand_P_150 Random Phosphorus $150,000 
Rand_P_250 Random Phosphorus $250,000 
Rand_P_350 Random Phosphorus $350,000 
Rand_P_450 Random Phosphorus $450,000 
1
 In later sections these original scenarios will include “_Orig.” at the end to denote that these are the original 
scenarios modeled. 
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 BMP Implementation Results 
This section begins by summarizing the overall simulation results followed by more in 
depth analyses regarding the effects of targeting versus random BMP implementation strategies, 
budgetary constraint levels, primary pollutant of concern, and changing BMP costs. 
Table 2.12 summarizes the results of the original 30 scenarios. The first column serves as 
a cross reference for the scenario assumptions listed in Table 2.11. The second through fourth 
columns report the average pollutant reduction costs per unit for sediment, nitrogen, and 
phosphorus, respectively. Note, these costs are not additive. Rather, they are simply the total cost 
divided by the amount of pollutant (sediment, nitrogen, or phosphorus) reduction. 
The next five columns report information related to BMP projects implemented in terms 
of the description of the projects and the total amount of land treated by the BMPs.
16
 Columns 
six through eight of this table provide more detail regarding the categories of the BMP projects 
in terms of the number of filter strips, no-till, and permanent vegetation projects, respectively. 
Column nine reports the total amount of land area treated by the BMP projects. 
The final three columns of Table 2.12 report the total amount of pollutant reduction 
achieved for sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus, respectively, by the implementation of the 
BMP projects. 
Overall the lowest average annual cost of sediment reduction is achieved by the 
Targ_S_50 scenario which reduces sediment for $0.35 per ton. The highest cost per ton of 
sediment is with the Rand_S_450 scenario at $14.13 per ton. This is only slightly higher than the 
Rand_N_450 and Rand_P_450 scenarios which are $13.88 and $13.47 per ton, respectively. 
                                                 
16
 In the cases of no-till and permanent vegetation, one acre of BMP application “treats” one acre of cropland. 
However, in the case of filter strips, one acre of filter strip is assumed to “treat” runoff from 25 acres of cropland. 
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Table 2.12 Original simulation results 
Scenario 
Average 
sediment 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/ton) 
Average 
nitrogen 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Average 
phosphor-
rous 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Total # of 
BMP 
projects 
# of Filter 
Strip 
Projects 
# of No-
till 
Projects 
#of 
Permanent 
Vegetation 
Projects 
Total 
area of 
land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(ac) 
Total 
amount 
of 
sediment 
reduction 
(tons) 
Total 
amount 
of 
nitrogen 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Total 
amount of 
phosphorus 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Targ_S_50 $0.35 $0.11 $0.43 84 84 0 0 10,578 139,488 427,374 114,162 
Targ_S_150 $0.47 $0.12 $0.48 249 249 0 0 32,118 314,587 1,195,437 305,579 
Targ_S_250 $0.55 $0.13 $0.52 327 327 0 0 53,640 447,431 1,835,904 473,438 
Targ_S_350 $0.62 $0.14 $0.56 415 415 0 0 74,970 553,999 2,434,125 618,854 
Targ_S_450 $0.69 $0.15 $0.59 502 502 0 0 96,494 640,157 3,019,082 752,754 
            
Rand_S_50 $7.65 $1.25 $5.87 20 9 7 4 3,009 6,317 38,599 8,227 
Rand_S_150 $10.95 $1.78 $8.34 33 14 11 8 6,604 13,169 80,838 17,288 
Rand_S_250 $12.44 $2.03 $9.47 44 17 15 12 9,800 19,291 118,020 25,346 
Rand_S_350 $13.45 $2.19 $10.12 53 20 18 15 12,630 24,838 152,538 33,035 
Rand_S_450 $14.13 $2.29 $10.56 62 23 21 18 15,522 30,332 186,945 40,589 
            
Targ_N_50 $0.50 $0.09 $0.45 122 122 0 0 10,721 97,558 524,256 108,760 
Targ_N_150 $0.53 $0.11 $0.51 252 252 0 0 32,217 279,333 1,299,507 292,967 
Targ_N_250 $0.60 $0.13 $0.53 373 373 0 0 53,593 414,752 1,955,732 464,351 
Targ_N_350 $0.66 $0.14 $0.57 460 460 0 0 75,057 528,394 2,545,985 612,373 
Targ_N_450 $0.71 $0.14 $0.59 530 530 0 0 96,068 624,512 3,074,626 747,955 
            
Rand_N_50 $7.46 $1.20 $5.54 20 10 7 4 2,972 6,462 40,052 8,707 
Rand_N_150 $10.68 $1.70 $7.76 33 14 11 8 6,487 13,464 84,412 18,524 
Rand_N_250 $12.15 $1.94 $8.77 44 18 14 12 9,562 19,704 123,313 27,284 
Rand_N_350 $13.20 $2.10 $9.42 53 21 17 15 12,283 25,257 158,814 35,386 
Rand_N_450 $13.88 $2.20 $9.84 62 24 20 18 15,059 30,815 194,491 43,473 
            
Targ_P_50 $0.41 $0.11 $0.39 94 94 0 0 10,676 120,530 460,259 125,746 
Targ_P_150 $0.52 $0.13 $0.46 206 206 0 0 31,852 286,353 1,176,655 322,245 
Targ_P_250 $0.59 $0.13 $0.50 317 317 0 0 53,326 417,752 1,840,376 491,548 
Targ_P_350 $0.65 $0.14 $0.54 409 409 0 0 74,438 534,304 2,474,334 640,962 
Targ_P_450 $0.71 $0.15 $0.58 540 540 0 0 95,902 630,748 3,033,672 769,160 
            
Rand_P_50 $7.01 $1.12 $4.94 20 10 5 4 2,896 6,891 43,023 9,776 
Rand_P_150 $10.16 $1.61 $6.98 33 15 9 9 6,210 14,197 89,725 20,676 
Rand_P_250 $11.75 $1.86 $8.00 43 19 11 13 8,922 20,355 128,547 29,895 
Rand_P_350 $12.80 $2.02 $8.63 52 23 13 16 11,443 26,119 165,374 38,758 
Rand_P_450 $13.47 $2.12 $9.03 61 26 16 19 14,025 31,883 202,693 47,564 
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The cost of nitrogen reduction ranges from a low of $0.09 per pound in the Targ_N_50 
scenario up to $2.29 per pound in the Rand_S_450 scenario. The lowest cost of reducing 
phosphorus is achieved with the Targ_P_50 scenario at an average cost of $0.39 per pound. The 
Rand_S_450 scenario has the highest phosphorus reduction costs of $10.56 per pound. This 
scenario results in the highest average costs across all of the pollutants. 
The number of BMP projects range from a low of 20 in all of the random implementation 
scenarios operating under a $50,000 annual budget to a high of 540 BMPs in the Targ_P_450 
scenario. Targeting nitrogen results in the highest number of BMP projects for each of the budget 
scenarios with the exception of $450,000.  
The total area of land treated by BMPs ranges from 2,896 acres in the Rand_P_50 
scenario up to 96,494 acres in the Targ_S_450 scenario. Across all of the pollutants and budget 
constraints, the targeted scenarios affect more land than the corresponding random scenarios. For 
example, there is 96,494 acres treated by BMPs in the Targ_S_450 scenario but only 15,522 
acres are treated in the Rand_S_450 scenario. 
The greatest amount of annual sediment reduction is achieved by the Targ_S_450 
scenario at 640,157 tons. The most nitrogen reduction is 3,074,626 pounds (scenario 
Targ_N_450) while the greatest phosphorus reduction is 202,693 pounds per year (scenario 
Targ_P_450).  
 Targeting vs. Random BMP Implementation 
Targeting should, by definition, result in more cost-effective primary pollutant reduction 
than random BMP implementation. In addition, to the extent that pollutants are positively 
correlated (e.g., installing a BMP to reduce sediment will also result in nitrogen and phosphorus 
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reduction), targeting also could result in more cost-effective reduction across the secondary 
pollutants. This is found to be the case in the TCL watershed.  
Focusing only on the “targeted” strategies, the first three columns of Table 2.12 
demonstrate, as expected, that the average sediment reduction costs are lowest for the strategies, 
which target sediment reducing BMPs. The same holds true for the strategies which target the 
other pollutants (nitrogen and phosphorus). The average sediment reduction costs range from 
$0.35 to $0.69 per ton in the Targ_S strategies as the annual budget increases from $50,000 to 
$450,000 per year. Nitrogen reduction costs range from $0.09 to $0.14 per pound in the Targ_N 
scenarios across the low to high budget constraints. In likewise fashion, phosphorus reduction 
costs go from $0.39 to $0.58 per pound as the budget goes from $50,000 to $450,000 per year.  
Targeted sediment strategies range from nearly 20.5 to over 23.2 times more cost-
effective than random implementation strategies (in terms of sediment reduction). Targeted 
nitrogen strategies are about 14.8 to 20.4 times more cost-effective (in terms of nitrogen 
reduction) while targeted phosphorus reduction strategies are 17.1 to 19.9 times more cost-
effective than random approaches (in terms of phosphorus reduction).  
Targeted strategies result in a greater number of BMP projects and a larger number of 
acres treated by the projects relative to the random approaches. Not only does targeting require 
more effort up front in terms of watershed modeling, but it also requires more BMP contracts 
and/or meetings with producers.  
Figure 2.12 displays the total cost curves for the targeted versus random schemes 
focusing on sediment with a $50,000 annual budget. Across the entire range of values, the total 
cost curve for the targeted strategy is much flatter than the random case. The flatness of the total 
cost curve indicates that more sediment is being reduced at the same total cost. Given a $50,000 
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annual budget, the targeted strategy reduces over 22 times more sediment compared to the 
random case (139,488 tons compared to 6,317 tons of annual sediment reduction). Alternatively, 
if the goal is 6,300 tons of sediment reduction it would cost nearly $50,000 to achieve this 
through random approaches versus just $1,600 using a targeted strategy, which is 3.2 percent of 
the cost. 
Figure 2.12 Sediment total cost curves for Targ_S_50 and Rand_S_50 
 
The total cost curve data in Figure 2.12 can also be expressed marginally. That is, how 
does the average annual cost per ton change as more sediment is being reduced? Examining the 
marginal cost curves in Figure 2.13 for these same scenarios highlights more of the differences 
between strategies. The random approach yields a downward sloping somewhat variable 
marginal cost curve (the explanation for this can be found on page 72). This curve ranges from 
$10.00 to $5.00 per ton marginal cost values. The targeted strategy, on the other hand, is upward 
sloping climbing from $0.22 to $0.44 per ton of sediment reduction. 
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Figure 2.13 Sediment marginal cost curves for Targ_S_50 and Rand_S_50 
 
A similar story results in the cases where nitrogen and phosphorus are the primary 
pollutants. Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 display the total cost curves for these cases. In the case of 
nitrogen, a $50,000 annual budget will result in 40,052 lbs of nitrogen reduction whereas a 
similar amount of nitrogen reduction can be achieved using a targeted approach for about $2,700 
annually, or 5.5 percent of the cost. In the case of phosphorus, a $50,000 annual budget will 
result in 9,776 lbs of phosphorus reduction whereas a similar amount of phosphorus reduction 
can be achieved using a targeted approach for about $3,500 annually, or 7.0 percent of the cost. 
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Figure 2.14 Nitrogen total cost curves for Targ_N_50 and Rand_N_50 
 
Figure 2.15 Phosphorus total cost curves for Targ_P_50 and Rand_P_50 
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 Effects of the budget constraint 
As the budget increases from $50,000 to $450,000, the total cost curve for the targeted 
case continues increasing at an increasing rate. This means that the primary pollutant reduction 
becomes more expensive as the most cost-effective BMPs are implemented. Thus, the marginal 
cost curve for the targeted case should continue to be upward sloping as the budget constraint 
increases.  
Figure 2.16 shows how the total cost curve for the $150,000 case essentially builds upon 
the total cost curve for the $50,000 scenario. This continues as the budget constraint increases. 
However, upon closer inspection one can see that there is not a perfectly smooth transition 
between like scenarios with different budget constraints. Figure 2.17 shows that total cost curve 
for the lower budget constraint scenario deviates above the higher budget scenario as the budget 
constraint is approached. This is because “large” total cost projects, which may be the next best 
in terms of cost-effectiveness, may exceed the budget. Thus, lower total cost projects must be 
implemented even though they may not be the next best in terms of cost-effectiveness. This 
result occurs in each of the targeted scenarios as budget constraints change.  
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Figure 2.16 Sediment total cost curves for Targ_S scenarios 
 
Figure 2.17 Sediment total cost curves for Targ_S_50 and Targ_S_150  
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This result also is seen by analyzing the marginal cost curves. In Figure 2.18, the 
marginal cost curves are upward sloping and essentially build upon each other. In each scenario, 
the marginal cost curve turns nearly vertical as the budget constraint is reached. However, there 
is very little horizontal movement at those points, so the effects on total costs are minimal. 
Figure 2.18 Sediment marginal cost curves for Targ_S scenarios 
 
The marginal cost curves for the random scenarios do not build upon each other as the 
budget constraint increases. The average marginal cost of sediment reduction steadily increases 
from $7.65 to $14.13 per ton as the budget increases from $50,000 to $450,000 per year (Table 
2.12). Figure 2.19 shows that the marginal cost curve for Rand_S_50 lies entirely below the 
other curves across the first 6,300 tons of sediment reduction. Apparently, there are some rather 
“large” total cost projects with high average sediment reduction costs that cannot be 
implemented because the budget constraint would be violated. As the budget constraint increases 
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cost curves for Rand_S_150, Rand_S_250, Rand_S_350, and Rand_S_450 scenarios in Figure 
2.19. 
Figure 2.19 Sediment marginal cost curves for Rand_S scenarios 
 
The reasons for the downward sloping trends of the curves in Figure 2.19 are related to 
the budget constraints. As the budget constraint is approached, many of the high average cost 
projects cannot be implemented for reasons stated previously. Thus, “lower” average cost 
projects (“lower” relative to the projects that would be implemented without the imposition of a 
budget constraint) are implemented causing the marginal cost curve to trend downwards. This 
point is illustrated by looking that the first 5,000 tons of reduction in Figure 2.19 for the 
relatively high budget scenarios, Rand_S_350 and Rand_S_450 and in the case of an infinite 
budget constraint shown later in Figure 2.22. The larger budget constraint scenarios generate 
somewhat flatter marginal cost curves (Figure 2.19). 
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The total cost curves for the secondary pollutants, nitrogen and phosphorus (note that 
sediment is still being targeted here), in Figure 2.20 and Figure 2.21 do not display the smooth 
convex curvature as the primary pollutant total cost curves. The secondary total cost curves 
exhibit much more variability. But, the curves are upward sloping and do build upon each other 
as the budget constraint increases. 
Figure 2.20 Nitrogen total cost curves for Targ_S scenarios 
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Figure 2.21 Phosphrous total cost curves for Targ_S scenarios 
 
For purposes of illustration (and not realism), each of the targeted and random scenarios 
are run under an unlimited budget constraint and pollutant reduction goal. The results for these 
scenarios are displayed in Table 2.13. According to these results focusing on phosphorus will 
yield more overall pollution reduction across all pollutants than a strategy focused on sediment 
or nitrogen. The reason for this is that many of the no-till projects, if implemented, will reduce 
sediment and nitrogen, but actually increase the amount of phosphorus runoff. In the scenarios 
where sediment and nitrogen are targeted, these BMP projects can and will be implemented. But, 
when phosphorus is targeted, these projects are not an option due to the fact that phosphorus 
runoff will be increased. Under an unlimited budget scenario, the targeted approaches are 
approximately 10 times more cost effective than the random scenarios. Figure 2.22 shows the 
marginal cost curves for the targeted and random approaches for sediment, nitrogen, and 
phosphorus.  
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Table 2.13 Simulation results for the targeted and random scenarios with an unlimited budget and pollutant reduction goal 
Scenario 
Total annual 
cost of BMPs 
Average 
S 
reduction 
cost for 
all land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(/ton) 
Average 
N 
reduction 
cost for 
all land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Average 
P 
reduction 
cost for 
all land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Total # of 
BMP 
projects 
# of 
Filter 
Strip 
Projects 
# of No-
till 
Projects 
#of 
Perma-
nent 
Vegeta-
tion 
Projects 
Total 
area of 
land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(ac) 
Total 
annual 
amount 
of 
sediment 
reduction 
(tons) 
Total 
annual 
amount 
of 
nitrogen 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Total 
annual 
amount 
of 
phosphor
us 
reductio
n (lbs) 
Targ_S_$$$ $3,429,944 $3.89 $0.61 $2.58 1,393 815 578 0 484,551 880,609 5,577,824 1,327,619 
Targ_N_$$$ $3,885,785 $4.81 $0.65 $2.82 1,393 795 598 0 484,551 807,783 5,936,667 1,380,356 
Targ_P_$$$ $4,371,890 $4.28 $0.63 $2.56 1,393 1,214 179 0 484,551 1,020,888 6,976,413 1,709,869 
             
Rand_S_$$$ $30,230,696 $32.49 $5.13 $23.00 1,393 464 464 465 484,607 930,535 5,887,270 1,314,662 
Rand_N_$$$ $32,535,051 $33.83 $5.17 $22.11 1,393 481 437 475 484,607 961,595 6,296,998 1,471,656 
Rand_P_$$$ $37,407,025 $35.90 $5.38 $21.86 1,393 541 311 541 484,607 1,041,857 6,950,307 1,711,283 
S = Sediment, N = Nitrogen, P = Phosphorus
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Figure 2.22 Sediment marginal cost curves under an unlimited budget constraint 
 
 
Figure 2.23 Nitrogen marginal cost curves under an unlimited budget constraint 
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Figure 2.24 Phosphorus marginal cost curves under an unlimited budget constraint 
 
 Primary pollutant of concern effects 
Regardless of the pollutant targeted, all of the BMP projects implemented result in 
secondary pollutant reduction as well. While it is true that there are some individual BMP 
projects that increase pollutant runoff (i.e., some no-till projects increase phosphorus runoff), the 
vast majority result in pollutant reduction for sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus. But, because 
all of the pollutants are not perfectly correlated in terms of reduction cost-effectiveness, 
assigning one pollutant as “primary” means that some BMP projects will be implemented that 
would otherwise not be if one of the secondary pollutants was chosen as “primary.” For example, 
if sediment is the targeted pollutant, it is likely that some BMP projects will be adopted that 
would otherwise not be if nitrogen or phosphorus was the “primary” pollutant. This is not to say 
that these BMPs result in increases (as opposed to reductions) in the other pollutants for reasons 
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stated previously, but rather that they are not the most cost-effective BMPs across all of the 
pollutants.  
Figure 2.25 depicts this result. As expected, the most cost-effective sediment reduction is 
achieved when sediment is the primary pollutant. When sediment is the primary pollutant, the 
$50,000 annual budget results in nearly 140,000 tons of sediment reduction. On the other hand 
when nitrogen or phosphorus are the primary pollutants, only 97,500 (70 percent of the 
Targ_S_50 scenario) and 120,500 (86 percent of the Targ_S_50 scenario) tons of sediment 
reduction is achieved.  
Figure 2.25 Total cost curves for sediment reduction in the Targ_(S,N,P)_50 scenarios 
 
Similarly, when nitrogen is the primary pollutant, a $50,000 budget achieves 524,250 
pounds of nitrogen reduction as seen in Figure 2.26. Targeting sediment or phosphorus yields a 
reduction or 427,350 (82 percent of the Targ_N_50 scenario) and 460,250 (88 percent of the 
Targ_N_50 scenario) pounds, respectively. 
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Figure 2.26 Total cost curves for nitrogen reduction in the Targ_(S,N,P)_50 scenarios 
 
When phosphorus is the primary pollutant, the $50,000 budget results in 125,750 pounds 
of phosphorus reduction. This compares to 114,150 (91 percent of the Targ_P_50 scenario) and 
108,750 (86 percent of the Targ_P_50 scenario) pounds of phosphorus reduction stemming the 
Targ_S_50 and Targ_N_50 scenarios, respectively. Figure 2.27 displays these results. 
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Figure 2.27 Total cost curves for phosphorus reduction in the Targ_(S,N,P)_50 scenarios 
 
As the budget constraint increases, however, the effects of primary pollutant are 
gradually muted. As Figure 2.28 depicts, under a $450,000 budget the resulting sediment 
reduction for the Targ_S_450, Targ_N_450, and Targ_P_450 scenarios are 640,150, 624,500, 
and 630,750, respectively. Hence, focusing on nitrogen as the primary pollutant will still yield 
97.6 percent of the sediment reduction as the scenario, which focuses primarily on sediment 
under a $450,000 budget constraint. This compares to a 70 percent reduction under a $50,000 
budget (as shown previously). The same results hold for the other corresponding scenarios. Thus, 
under targeted scenarios, the determination and selection of the primary and secondary pollutants 
can have important effects on the expected loading reductions for each pollutant particularly 
under lower budget constraints. 
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Figure 2.28 Total cost curves for nitrogen reduction in the Targ_(S,N,P)_450 scenarios 
 
As would be expected, when BMPs are implemented in a random fashion, the selection 
of the primary pollutant is nearly irrelevant. As Figure 2.29 shows, the three curves are nearly 
identical under a $50,000 budget. Taking the curves out further under a $450,000 budget, Figure 
2.30, indicates that this relationship holds across all of the budget constraints considered.  
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Figure 2.29 Total cost curves for sediment reduction in the Rand_(S,N,P)_50 scenarios 
 
Figure 2.30 Total cost curves for sediment reduction in the Rand_(S,N,P)_450 scenarios 
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 Effects of changing BMP costs 
The BMP cost data displayed in Table 2.1 are based on 2009 values of cropland cash 
rent, CRP rents, and establishment and maintenance costs for filter strips and for converting 
cropland to permanent vegetation. Further, the costs of no-till are based on per acre incentive 
payments for converting to no-till established by the EQIP program in 2009 (KS EQIP 2009; NE 
EQIP 2009). 
Recent upward swings in commodity prices and overall farm profitability are being 
capitalized into land values and rents. Thus, the opportunity costs associated with converting 
cropland to filter strips and permanent vegetation also increase. Increasing fuel prices also result 
in higher establishment costs for each of these BMPs. Meanwhile, higher fuel prices make no-till 
a more financially attractive option (all else being equal) to conventional or minimum tillage. For 
these reasons, adjustments to the 2009 BMP costs are made as follows.  
The total annualized costs for filter strips and permanent vegetation are first increased by 
150 percent to capture the increasing land opportunity costs and fuel prices. For no-till, the 
annualized costs were decreased by 50 percent to account for the higher fuel prices. Table 2.14 
displays the annualized costs for each BMP over a 15-year time horizon. These cost scenarios 
will be denoted as the “X” scenarios to distinguish these from the original scenarios. 
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Table 2.14 Adjusted BMP Annualized costs over a 15-year time horizon - “X” scenarios 
County, State 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Filter 
Strips per cropland 
acre treated
1
 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for No-till 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Permanent 
Vegetation 
Clay, KS $5.74 $6.50 $121.58 
Gage, NE $8.50 $10.00 $162.23 
Jefferson, NE $8.50 $10.00 $152.90 
Marshall, KS $7.06 $6.50 $133.85 
Nemaha, KS $7.18 $6.50 $138.69 
Pawnee, NE $8.21 $10.00 $158.28 
Pottawatomie, KS $6.47 $6.50 $129.87 
Republic, KS $5.82 $6.50 $114.95 
Riley, KS $6.82 $6.50 $122.81 
Washington, KS $6.83 $6.50 $124.61 
1
 Annualized cost of filter strip divided by 25 cropland acres (treated) 
Table 2.15 displays the results of the “X” scenarios. In general, the results for the “X” 
scenarios follow the same patterns as the original scenarios. In the targeted “X” scenarios, filter 
strips are again the only BMP implemented in the watershed. Even though the annualized costs 
for filter strips and no-till are very similar on a per acre basis, the greater pollutant reduction 
efficiencies achieved by filter strips makes this the more attractive BMP. In the random “X” 
scenarios, however, there is more balance between no-till and filter strip projects but less 
permanent vegetation projects compared to the original scenarios. 
In all cases, the amount of pollutant reduction achieved by the “X” scenarios is less than 
the corresponding original scenarios. This is due to the higher costs of filter strips, which tend to 
still be more cost-effective than no-till (even with the reduced costs of no-till).
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Table 2.15 Simulation results for the “X” scenarios 
Scenario 
Average 
sediment 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/ton) 
Average 
nitrogen 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Average 
phosphor-
rous 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Total # of 
BMP 
projects 
# of Filter 
Strip 
Projects 
# of No-
till 
Projects 
#of 
Permanent 
Vegetation 
Projects 
Total 
area of 
land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(ac) 
Total 
amount 
of 
sediment 
reduction 
(tons) 
Total 
amount 
of 
nitrogen 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Total 
amount of 
phosphorus 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Targ_S_50_X $0.50 $0.17 $0.62 59 59 0 0 7,124 99,591 287,113 79,608 
Targ_S_150_X $0.62 $0.17 $0.69 189 189 0 0 21,357 237,035 859,769 213,526 
Targ_S_250_X $0.73 $0.19 $0.74 264 264 0 0 35,701 338,541 1,299,917 334,169 
Targ_S_350_X $0.81 $0.20 $0.78 318 317 0 0 50,203 427,653 1,735,850 447,735 
Targ_S_450_X $0.88 $0.21 $0.81 369 369 0 0 64,140 503,141 2,134,228 548,622 
            
Rand_S_50_X $8.34 $1.37 $6.90 20 8 8 3 3,108 5,791 35,152 6,997 
Rand_S_150_X $12.07 $1.99 $9.71 32 12 12 7 6,389 11,956 72,505 14,871 
Rand_S_250_X $14.39 $2.36 $11.30 40 15 15 10 8,839 16,626 101,551 21,165 
Rand_S_350_X $15.87 $2.60 $12.32 48 18 18 13 11,053 21,050 128,465 27,109 
Rand_S_450_X $17.01 $2.78 $13.09 56 20 20 15 13,263 25,300 154,841 32,880 
            
Targ_N_50_X $0.72 $0.13 $0.65 86 86 0 0 7,143 68,595 375,152 75,943 
Targ_N_150_X $0.75 $0.16 $0.73 197 197 0 0 21,478 196,100 928,965 202,707 
Targ_N_250_X $0.82 $0.17 $0.77 283 283 0 0 35,574 300,861 1,408,522 319,485 
Targ_N_350_X $0.88 $0.19 $0.79 360 360 0 0 50,211 393,850 1,855,596 437,498 
Targ_N_450_X $0.94 $0.20 $0.82 426 426 0 0 64,163 471,594 2,254,543 539,930 
            
Rand_N_50_X $8.16 $1.31 $6.37 20 8 8 3 3,020 5,915 36,716 7,570 
Rand_N_150_X $11.90 $1.91 $8.98 32 13 12 7 6,143 12,122 75,470 16,057 
Rand_N_250_X $14.28 $2.28 $10.55 40 16 15 10 8,477 16,767 105,187 22,699 
Rand_N_350_X $15.75 $2.51 $11.51 48 18 17 13 10,634 21,260 133,211 29,080 
Rand_N_450_X $16.94 $2.70 $12.28 55 21 20 15 12,636 25,345 159,192 34,975 
            
Targ_P_50_X $0.58 $0.16 $0.56 63 63 0 0 7,099 84,922 313,976 87,605 
Targ_P_150_X $0.70 $0.18 $0.65 163 163 0 0 21,323 212,515 832,787 229,075 
Targ_P_250_X $0.80 $0.19 $0.70 224 224 0 0 35,336 308,546 1,282,136 351,387 
Targ_P_350_X $0.87 $0.20 $0.74 304 304 0 0 49,804 397,459 1,729,568 465,191 
Targ_P_450_X $0.93 $0.21 $0.78 353 353 0 0 63,879 476,897 2,165,517 568,319 
            
Rand_P_50_X $8.01 $1.28 $5.80 19 9 6 4 2,712 6,017 37,736 8,307 
Rand_P_150_X $11.87 $1.89 $8.35 30 13 9 8 5,452 12,132 76,238 17,232 
Rand_P_250_X $14.23 $2.25 $9.84 39 16 11 11 7,600 16,937 107,058 24,490 
Rand_P_350_X $15.80 $2.50 $10.83 46 19 13 13 9,514 21,316 134,816 31,115 
Rand_P_450_X $17.09 $2.70 $11.63 52 22 15 16 11,233 25,227 159,798 37,079 
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Next, the total annualized costs for filter strips and permanent vegetation are increased by 
200 percent to capture a more drastic increase in land opportunity costs and fuel prices. For no-
till, the annualized costs were decreased by 75 percent to account for the even higher fuel prices, 
and thus, a greater relative cost advantage of no-till (all else equal). Table 2.16 displays the 
annualized costs for each BMP over a 15-year time horizon. These cost scenarios will be denoted 
as the “Y” scenarios to distinguish these from the original (Table 2.1) and “X” scenarios (Table 
2.14). 
Table 2.16 Adjusted BMP Annualized costs over a 15-year time horizon - “Y” scenarios 
County, State 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Filter 
Strips per cropland 
acre treated
1
 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for No-till 
Annualized Cost 
($/acre) for Permanent 
Vegetation 
Clay, KS $7.66 $3.25 $162.10 
Gage, NE $11.34 $5.00 $216.30 
Jefferson, NE $11.34 $5.00 $203.86 
Marshall, KS $9.41 $3.25 $178.46 
Nemaha, KS $9.57 $3.25 $184.92 
Pawnee, NE $10.95 $5.00 $211.04 
Pottawatomie, KS $8.63 $3.25 $173.16 
Republic, KS $7.76 $3.25 $153.26 
Riley, KS $9.10 $3.25 $163.74 
Washington, KS $9.11 $3.25 $166.14 
1
 Annualized cost of filter strip divided by 25 cropland acres (treated) 
Table 2.17 displays the results of the “Y” scenarios. In general, the results for the “Y” 
scenarios follow the same patterns as the original and “X” scenarios. In all cases the amount of 
pollutant reduction achieved by the “Y” scenarios is less than the corresponding original and “X” 
scenarios.  
A notable difference here is that in the targeted “Y” scenarios, both filter strips and no-till 
are implemented in each of the budget constraints considered. Based on the distribution of these 
two BMPs, it appears that no-till is relatively more cost-competitive at reducing nitrogen as 
compared to sediment or phosphorus. For example, under a $50,000 annual budget constraint, 
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the Targ_N_50_Y scenario results in 156 total BMP projects, of which, 154 are no-till projects. 
On the other hand, the Targ_S_50_Y and Targ_P_50_Y scenarios result in a near even 
distribution of filter strips and no-till projects. 
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Table 2.17 Simulation results for the “Y” scenarios 
Scenario 
Average 
sediment 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/ton) 
Average 
nitrogen 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Average 
phosphor-
rous 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Total # of 
BMP 
projects 
# of Filter 
Strip 
Projects 
# of No-
till 
Projects 
#of 
Permanent 
Vegetation 
Projects 
Total 
area of 
land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(ac) 
Total 
amount 
of 
sediment 
reduction 
(tons) 
Total 
amount 
of 
nitrogen 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Total 
amount of 
phosphorus 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Targ_S_50_Y $0.63 $0.22 $0.86 62 32 30 0 7,297 79,092 221,238 57,737 
Targ_S_150_Y $0.78 $0.23 $0.95 181 107 75 0 22,255 189,131 654,387 155,535 
Targ_S_250_Y $0.92 $0.25 $1.02 266 165 101 0 36,695 270,298 1,004,966 243,851 
Targ_S_350_Y $1.02 $0.26 $1.05 311 198 113 0 48,945 340,221 1,313,930 328,689 
Targ_S_450_Y $1.11 $0.27 $1.09 359 228 131 0 61,382 401,990 1,634,355 407,518 
            
Rand_S_50_Y $8.39 $1.42 $7.67 21 8 10 3 3,375 5,774 34,212 6,318 
Rand_S_150_Y $13.02 $2.16 $10.99 32 12 14 7 6,328 11,147 67,119 13,201 
Rand_S_250_Y $15.77 $2.61 $12.91 40 14 17 9 8,458 15,321 92,592 18,713 
Rand_S_350_Y $17.99 $2.95 $14.42 46 16 19 11 10,228 18,720 113,964 23,355 
Rand_S_450_Y $19.53 $3.21 $15.44 52 18 21 13 11,945 22,181 135,088 28,055 
            
Targ_N_50_Y $1.30 $0.13 $1.19 156 2 154 0 15,065 37,944 378,335 41,627 
Targ_N_150_Y $1.20 $0.18 $1.39 310 29 281 0 39,188 123,904 817,404 106,742 
Targ_N_250_Y $1.22 $0.21 $1.35 410 75 335 0 57,906 203,797 1,170,024 182,941 
Targ_N_350_Y $1.28 $0.23 $1.32 456 102 355 0 71,519 271,321 1,484,817 261,627 
Targ_N_450_Y $1.35 $0.25 $1.33 500 125 375 0 84,228 330,137 1,776,426 334,959 
            
Rand_N_50_Y $8.35 $1.36 $6.94 21 8 10 3 3,202 5,803 35,746 6,984 
Rand_N_150_Y $12.96 $2.08 $10.09 32 12 14 7 6,008 11,207 69,815 14,393 
Rand_N_250_Y $15.78 $2.53 $11.97 40 14 16 9 7,997 15,348 95,796 20,221 
Rand_N_350_Y $17.94 $2.86 $13.38 46 17 18 11 9,740 18,845 118,307 25,260 
Rand_N_450_Y $19.48 $3.11 $14.42 52 19 20 13 11,401 22,302 139,683 30,118 
            
Targ_P_50_Y $0.76 $0.19 $0.72 58 38 20 0 6,401 64,564 264,917 68,113 
Targ_P_150_Y $0.89 $0.23 $0.83 157 116 41 0 17,765 165,654 652,979 178,616 
Targ_P_250_Y $0.99 $0.24 $0.90 210 158 52 0 28,831 248,743 1,016,077 275,697 
Targ_P_350_Y $1.09 $0.26 $0.94 267 203 64 0 39,964 316,663 1,341,790 364,237 
Targ_P_450_Y $1.17 $0.26 $0.99 320 250 70 0 51,933 380,819 1,696,268 449,598 
            
Rand_P_50_Y $8.42 $1.35 $6.32 20 9 8 3 2,723 5,776 35,965 7,698 
Rand_P_150_Y $13.25 $2.10 $9.47 30 12 11 7 5,145 10,997 69,284 15,375 
Rand_P_250_Y $16.14 $2.56 $11.34 37 15 13 9 6,867 15,020 94,647 21,370 
Rand_P_350_Y $18.35 $2.90 $12.74 43 17 14 11 8,415 18,466 116,906 26,600 
Rand_P_450_Y $20.01 $3.16 $13.79 48 19 15 13 9,800 21,737 137,474 31,527 
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Figure 2.31 and Figure 2.32 display the marginal and total cost curves for sediment, 
respectively, as the costs of BMPs change from the original case to the “X” case and finally to 
the “Y” case. Across the first 100,000 tons of sediment reduction, each of the marginal cost 
curves appear to have similar slopes (only different y-intercepts). But, after 100,000 tons of 
reduction, the slope of scenario “Y” increases at a much faster rate than the original scenario. 
Figure 2.33 depicts the total acreage being treated by BMPs across total sediment 
reduction for each of the different scenarios. It can be seen that the curves for the original and 
“X” scenarios perfectly overlay across the first 503,000 tons of reduction. From this figure, it is 
evident that the original and “X” scenarios consist of the same 426 BMP projects. In each of 
these scenarios, only filter strips are applied. Because filter strip costs are higher in the 
Targ_S_450_X scenario, the acreage-sediment reduction curve ends after when the $450,000 
constraint is met at 503,000 tons of reduction. 
The Targ_S_450_Y scenario, on the other hand, follows closely to the original and “X” 
scenario curve across the first 100,000 tons of reduction. It is likely that the same filter strips are 
being applied in each case. After 100,000 tons of reduction, no-till becomes the most cost-
effective BMP and more of these projects are implemented in the “Y” scenario. However, no-till 
is not as environmentally effective on a per acre basis as filter strips. Therefore, more acres need 
to be treated to achieve the same amount of sediment reduction as compared to the other two 
scenarios. In the “Y” scenario, 350,000 tons of sediment reduction requires 50,500 acres of BMP 
treatment, whereas, only 37,500 acres need to be treated in the “X” scenario to achieve a similar 
reduction. 
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Figure 2.31 Sediment marginal cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
 
Figure 2.32 Sediment total cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
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Figure 2.33 Total acres treated by BMPs for different BMP cost levels (Sediment) 
 
The targeted nitrogen cost curves (Figure 2.34 and Figure 2.35) depict a different story as 
compared to the sediment examples discussed above. As with the sediment case, the original and 
“X” scenario exhibit a similar shape due to the fact that the same BMP projects are implemented 
in each case as shown in Figure 2.36 (across the first 2,250,000 lbs of nitrogen reduction). 
However, the relatively high cost of filter strips and low cost of no-till in Targ_N_450_Y results 
in a quite differently shaped marginal cost curve (Figure 2.34). Here, the marginal costs are 
lower than the “X” case across the first 250,000 lbs of nitrogen reduction. In terms of total cost, 
this translates to about $30,000. Evidently, the reduced cost of no-till combined with the 
moderate effectiveness of nitrogen reduction resulting from no-till adoption makes certain no-till 
projects more cost-effective than filter strips in the Targ_N_450_X scenario. As Table 2.17 
shows, 99 percent of the BMPs implemented in the Targ_N_50_Y scenario compared to 48 and 
34 percent of the BMPs in the Targ_S_50_Y and Targ_P_50_Y scenarios, respectively. Still, 
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more acres need to be treated in the “Y” scenario to achieve the same amount of nitrogen 
reduction as compared to the other two scenarios. In the “Y” scenario, 1,776,426 lbs of nitrogen 
reduction requires 84,228 acres of BMP treatment, whereas, only 47,500 acres need to be treated 
in the original scenario to achieve a similar reduction. 
Figure 2.34 Nitrogen marginal cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
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Figure 2.35 Nitrogen total cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
 
Figure 2.36 Total acres treated by BMPs for different BMP cost levels (Nitrogen) 
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In the case of targeting phosphorus, the cost curves behave much as they do in the case of 
targeting sediment (Figure 2.37 and Figure 2.38). The marginal cost curves in Figure 2.37 are all 
very similar in shape with the main differences being in the y-intercept. Examining Figure 2.39, 
one can see that again the same BMP projects are being implemented for the original and “X” 
scenarios. However, unlike the cases of targeting sediment or nitrogen, the acre-reduction curve 
for the Targ_P_450_Y scenario comes very close to matching the other two scenarios. Upon 
closer inspection, it is evident that the projects are not being implemented in the exact same 
order. However, the filter strip and no-till BMP projects are matching the acres per sediment 
reduction values of the other two scenarios closely. Across all of the considered budget 
constraints, the ratio of filter strip projects to no-till projects is approximately 3:1 (Table 2.17).  
Figure 2.37 Phosphorus marginal cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
 
$0.00
$0.20
$0.40
$0.60
$0.80
$1.00
$1.20
$1.40
0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000
A
n
n
u
a
l 
co
st
 p
e
r 
lb
.
Phosphorous reduction (lbs)
Targ_P_450_Orig.
Targ_P_450_X
Targ_P_450_Y
100 
 
Figure 2.38 Phosphorus total cost curves for different BMP cost levels 
 
Figure 2.39 Total acres treated by BMPs for different BMP cost levels (Phosphorus) 
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 Cost-effective spatial targeting for conservation 
Spatial targeting occurs all of the time in our daily life. Consider a person who leaves the 
house on a shopping trip with their billfold in hand and returns to their house two hours later 
without it. A “wise” person will begin searching in areas in which they have just been in the past 
two hours. Retracing steps and focusing the search to these areas is a more efficient use of one’s 
time than just searching randomly across the countryside. In principle, spatial conservation 
targeting is no different. It is the deliberate focus of BMP implementation on a particular 
geographical area. Implementing BMPs in areas that exhibit the most potential for erosion and/or 
nutrient loads is a good first step in efficient targeting. This approach to targeting could simply 
rely on baseline sediment and nutrient loading maps as shown in Figure 2.40, Figure 2.41, and 
Figure 2.42. 
Figure 2.40 Baseline sediment losses from cropland by subwatershed 
 
Baseline Sediment Losses from 
Cropland (tons/acre/year)
3.39 - 4.61
2.35 - 3.38
1.86 - 2.34
0.39 - 1.85
102 
 
Figure 2.41 Baseline nitrogen losses from cropland by subwatershed 
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Figure 2.42 Baseline phosphorus losses from cropland by subwatershed 
 
However, this may not be the most cost-effective technique because costs are not being 
considered. Cost-effective conservation spatial targeting includes the economics of pollutant 
reduction and focuses BMPs in areas of the watershed, which deliver the greatest benefits 
(pollutant reduction) for the cost. 
Using the targeted approach discussed in previous sections, prescriptions for cost-
effective spatial targeting can be derived. The process for determining target areas is described 
next. 
The spatial targeting approach described here answers the question: Where in the 
watershed will a given BMP (i.e., filter strips, no-till, or permanent vegetation) provide the most 
cost-effective pollutant (i.e., sediment, nitrogen, or phosphorus) reduction? This targeting 
approach is performed with the original BMP costs as well as for the adjusted BMP costs used in 
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the “Y” scenarios described previously. For obvious reasons, only the targeted scenarios (not the 
random) are used. No farms are deleted or eliminated from the choice set. The budget constraint 
and pollutant reduction goals are both set infinitely high, so that all possible BMPs are 
implemented. Only one iteration is run to produce the results necessary to determine the cost-
effective spatial targeting prescriptions. 
The results from one iteration provide information on the costs and pollution reduction 
achieved by implementing a given BMP on a farm. Each farm is located in one of the 27 
subwatersheds. Using the cost, pollution reduction, and the acreage being treated by the BMP, 
acre-weighted averages are calculated for each subwatershed. A $6.69/ton sediment acre-
weighted average reduction costs for subwatershed 1 reported in the first cell of Table 2.18 
indicates that for an average acre in this subwatershed, sediment can be reduced for $6.69/ton. 
This is more cost-effective than implementing BMPs in subwatershed 8, which exhibits 
$16.69/ton sediment reduction costs, but not near as cost-effective as investing in filter strips in 
subwatershed 17. 
While subwatershed 17 possesses the most cost-effective sediment reduction via filter 
strips, this subwatershed does not exhibit the most cost-effective nitrogen reduction via filter 
strips. Table 2.18 also displays the acre-weighted average costs of reducing nitrogen and 
phosphorus by subwatershed. Filter strips on subwatershed 17 results in an average cost of 
$0.26/lb of nitrogen reduction compared to just $0.20/lb for the same BMP on subwatershed 13 - 
nearly 25 percent more cost-effective. While the difference in cost-effectiveness is just $0.06/lb, 
this 25 percent increase in cost-effectiveness adds up greatly across thousands of pounds of 
nitrogen reduction. Table 2.18 also displays the weighted average costs of pollution reduction for 
no-till and permanent vegetation. 
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The targeting calculations also are performed for the “Y” scenarios. The “Y” scenarios 
represent the case where the total annualized costs for filter strips and permanent vegetation are 
increased by 200 percent to capture a more drastic increase in land opportunity costs and fuel 
prices. For no-till, the annualized costs were decreased by 75 percent to account for the even 
higher fuel prices, and thus, a greater relative cost advantage of no-till (all else equal). The 
results for the “Y” scenarios are displayed in Table 2.19.
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Table 2.18 Acre-weighted average pollutant reduction costs for Targ_S_$$$_Orig. scenarios for each BMP 
 
Filter Strips 
 
No-till 
 
Permanent vegetation 
Subwatershed 
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
  
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
  
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
1 $6.69 $0.47 $2.09   $78.82 $5.03 $52.99   $98.00 $7.30 $31.27 
2 $3.24 $0.35 $1.23   $32.84 $4.74 $25.73   $47.63 $5.51 $18.64 
3 $3.43 $0.37 $1.41   $31.99 $4.25 $31.57   $50.48 $5.84 $21.14 
4 $3.63 $0.35 $1.64   $35.45 $3.07 $28.74   $50.30 $5.23 $23.24 
5 $3.45 $0.33 $1.49   $33.07 $2.60 $22.57   $49.93 $5.04 $21.99 
6 $3.39 $0.33 $1.35   $30.77 $3.22 $28.40   $49.73 $5.20 $20.07 
7 $3.90 $0.39 $1.65   $35.82 $3.70 $32.44   $56.96 $6.16 $24.61 
8 $16.69 $1.16 $4.79   $158.06 $16.36 $161.36   $238.95 $23.35 $71.24 
9 $2.53 $0.38 $1.31   $23.49 $6.11 $19.63   $37.41 $5.93 $19.67 
10 $2.20 $0.32 $1.46   $21.16 $2.62 $23.54   $31.12 $4.77 $21.07 
11 $1.43 $0.26 $0.95   $12.42 $2.41 $14.28   $21.16 $4.24 $14.47 
12 $2.07 $0.31 $1.41   $18.72 $2.37 $17.28   $29.00 $4.73 $20.01 
13 $1.81 $0.20 $0.97   $14.49 $1.08 $7.67   $26.34 $3.27 $14.68 
14 $2.81 $0.32 $1.38   $25.75 $2.39 $14.84   $41.13 $4.93 $20.45 
15 $1.83 $0.29 $1.28   $17.06 $2.06 $15.62   $26.53 $4.35 $18.74 
16 $2.95 $0.38 $1.69   $27.17 $3.28 $24.15   $43.05 $5.95 $24.91 
17 $1.36 $0.26 $0.93   $11.15 $2.42 $13.66   $19.86 $4.10 $13.90 
18 $1.48 $0.27 $1.00   $13.55 $2.76 $16.59   $21.50 $4.32 $14.99 
19 $4.47 $0.53 $2.32   $41.41 $4.80 $47.46   $65.19 $8.38 $34.53 
20 $1.65 $0.30 $1.09   $14.28 $3.29 $26.23   $23.81 $4.64 $16.26 
21 $1.61 $0.29 $1.09   $15.20 $3.09 $18.10   $23.80 $4.64 $16.67 
22 $2.52 $0.34 $1.51   $23.02 $2.93 $23.21   $35.31 $5.08 $21.48 
23 $1.56 $0.35 $1.31   $14.39 $3.24 $13.95   $23.04 $5.46 $19.60 
24 $2.38 $0.41 $1.52   $20.52 $5.14 $41.06   $34.31 $6.27 $22.77 
25 $2.62 $0.34 $1.61   $22.81 $2.56 $16.49   $39.05 $5.73 $24.99 
26 $2.36 $0.37 $1.46   $21.86 $3.60 $20.49   $33.58 $5.50 $21.12 
27 $2.29 $0.38 $1.51   $17.55 $3.65 $25.26   $32.85 $6.03 $22.33 
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Table 2.19 Acre-weighted average pollutant reduction costs for Targ_S_$$$_Y scenarios for each BMP 
 
Filter Strips 
 
No-till 
 
Permanent vegetation 
Subwatershed 
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
  
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
  
Sediment 
($/ton) 
Nitrogen 
($/lb) 
Phosphorus 
($/lb) 
1 $13.37 $0.94 $4.19   $19.70 $1.26 $13.25   $196.00 $14.61 $62.54 
2 $6.47 $0.69 $2.47   $8.21 $1.19 $6.43   $95.26 $11.01 $37.27 
3 $6.86 $0.73 $2.82   $8.00 $1.06 $7.89   $100.95 $11.67 $42.28 
4 $7.25 $0.71 $3.29   $8.86 $0.77 $7.19   $100.61 $10.46 $46.47 
5 $6.89 $0.65 $2.98   $8.27 $0.65 $5.64   $99.86 $10.07 $43.97 
6 $6.78 $0.66 $2.70   $7.69 $0.80 $7.10   $99.46 $10.40 $40.15 
7 $7.80 $0.77 $3.31   $8.96 $0.93 $8.11   $113.91 $12.32 $49.21 
8 $33.37 $2.32 $9.57   $39.52 $4.09 $40.34   $477.90 $46.69 $142.49 
9 $5.06 $0.75 $2.61   $5.87 $1.53 $4.91   $74.81 $11.87 $39.35 
10 $4.40 $0.63 $2.92   $5.29 $0.66 $5.89   $62.25 $9.54 $42.14 
11 $2.86 $0.53 $1.91   $3.10 $0.60 $3.57   $42.32 $8.49 $28.94 
12 $4.15 $0.63 $2.82   $4.68 $0.59 $4.32   $58.01 $9.45 $40.03 
13 $3.62 $0.39 $1.94   $3.62 $0.27 $1.92   $52.68 $6.54 $29.35 
14 $5.63 $0.64 $2.77   $6.44 $0.60 $3.71   $82.26 $9.85 $40.90 
15 $3.67 $0.57 $2.55   $4.26 $0.52 $3.90   $53.06 $8.70 $37.47 
16 $5.91 $0.77 $3.38   $6.79 $0.82 $6.04   $86.10 $11.90 $49.82 
17 $2.72 $0.52 $1.85   $2.79 $0.60 $3.42   $39.73 $8.20 $27.80 
18 $2.96 $0.55 $2.00   $3.39 $0.69 $4.15   $43.00 $8.64 $29.98 
19 $8.95 $1.05 $4.65   $10.35 $1.20 $11.86   $130.38 $16.77 $69.07 
20 $3.31 $0.60 $2.19   $3.57 $0.82 $6.56   $47.62 $9.28 $32.51 
21 $3.22 $0.58 $2.18   $3.80 $0.77 $4.53   $47.61 $9.27 $33.33 
22 $5.04 $0.69 $3.02   $5.75 $0.73 $5.80   $70.61 $10.15 $42.95 
23 $3.13 $0.69 $2.62   $3.60 $0.81 $3.49   $46.09 $10.93 $39.19 
24 $4.77 $0.82 $3.05   $5.13 $1.28 $10.26   $68.63 $12.55 $45.54 
25 $5.24 $0.69 $3.23   $5.70 $0.64 $4.12   $78.11 $11.46 $49.99 
26 $4.71 $0.74 $2.92   $5.47 $0.90 $5.12   $67.15 $11.01 $42.24 
27 $4.59 $0.77 $3.03   $4.39 $0.91 $6.31   $65.71 $12.05 $44.66 
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The data in Table 2.18 and Table 2.19 may be better represented in map form. Dividing 
each of the scenario’s results into “quartiles,” cost-effective conservation spatial targeting maps 
are created.
 17
 In other words, sorting the average costs for a given scenario in ascending order 
and then dividing the data into four groups of seven subwatersheds each is a useful way of 
presenting the results cartographically. Individual maps are created for each of the 18 scenarios 
covered in Table 2.18 and Table 2.19. Upon closer inspection, the spatial priority ranking of the 
subwatersheds is identical across the original cost scenarios and the adjusted “Y” cost scenarios. 
For this reason, only the maps for the “Y” scenarios (which correspond with Table 2.19) will be 
analyzed here. The remaining maps for the original cost scenarios can be found in Appendix C. 
Figure 2.43 has been included to give the reader an indication of which watercourses are 
located in the economically derived priority areas. It displays the locations of the major rivers 
and creeks in the Kansas portion of the TCL watershed. Figure 2.44 shows the priority areas in 
the TCL watershed for reducing sediment via filter strips. According to this figure, the most cost-
effective sediment reducing locations for placing filter strips is in the east-northeast portion of 
the watershed. Particularly, subwatersheds 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 23. Here, sediment can be 
reduced for $2.72 to $3.62/ton annually. The poorest places (from a cost-effectiveness 
standpoint) for sediment reducing filter strips are subwatersheds 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 19. Here, 
sediment reduction costs are much higher ranging from $6.87/ton up to $33.37/ton annually. In 
general, the north-central portion of the TCL watershed is the least cost-effective region to place 
filter strips for sediment reduction.  
Figure 2.45 and Figure 2.46 display the nitrogen and phosphorus reduction costs via filter 
strips by subwatershed. Many of the subwatersheds are prioritized in similar fashion to the 
                                                 
17
 The word “quartiles” is in quotes because the number 27 is not perfectly divisible by 4. So, the quartiles used here 
contain 7, 7, 7, and 6 subwatersheds in the high, medium-high, medium-low, and low categories. 
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sediment case. For example, subwatersheds 11, 13, 18, 20, and 21 are labeled as the highest 
priority areas across all of the pollutants for filter strips. Sediment can be reduced for $2.72 to 
$3.62/ton annually, nitrogen reduction for $0.39 to $0.60/lb annually, and phosphorus can be 
reduced for $1.85 to $2.47/lb annually. Alternatively, subwatersheds 1, 7, 8, and 19 are identified 
as being the least cost-effective across all of the pollutants for filter strips. Sediment, nitrogen, 
and phosphorus annual reduction costs can approach $33.37/ton, $2.32/lb, and $9.57/lb, 
respectively. 
Figure 2.43 Major watercourses and subwatershed delineation for the TCL watershed 
 Tuttle Creek Lake
Little Blue River
Big Blue River
Big Blue River
Horseshoe Creek
Black Vermillion River
Mill Creek
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Figure 2.44 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with filter 
strips 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$2.72 - $3.62
$3.63 - $5.04
$5.05 - $6.86
$6.87 - $33.37
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with filter strips.
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Figure 2.45 Spatial average nitrogen reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with filter 
strips 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$0.39 - $0.60
$0.61 - $0.69
$0.70 - $0.77
$0.78 - $2.32
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with filter strips.
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Figure 2.46 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with 
filter strips 
 
 
Figure 2.47, Figure 2.48, and Figure 2.49 display the average annual pollutant reduction 
costs when no-till is applied in each of the subwatersheds. According to Figure 2.47, the most 
cost-effective sediment reducing locations for placing no-till is again in the east-northeast portion 
of the watershed. Particularly, subwatersheds 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 23. Here, sediment can 
be reduced for $2.79 to $3.80/ton annually. The poorest places (from a cost-effectiveness 
standpoint) for sediment reducing no-till are subwatersheds 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 19. Here, sediment 
reduction costs are much higher ranging from $8.22/ton up to $39.52/ton annually. In general, 
the north-central portion of the TCL watershed is the least cost-effective region to place no-till 
for sediment reduction. 
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$1.85 - $2.47
$2.48 - $2.82
$2.83 - $3.23
$3.24 - $9.57
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with filter strips.
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Figure 2.48 displays the nitrogen reduction costs via no-till. The prioritization, here, 
differs quite a little bit from the sediment case. For example, only three of the subwatersheds are 
identified as high-priority in both cases - subwatersheds 11, 13, and 17. In addition, some of the 
subwatersheds that are identified as medium-high priority regarding sediment are labeled as high 
priority in the nitrogen case. This occurs with subwatersheds 12, 15, and 25.  
Figure 2.49 shows the annual phosphorus reduction costs for no-till adoption in the TCL 
watershed. Again, some of the subwatersheds that are identified as medium-high priority with 
sediment are characterized as high priority with phosphorus. Subwatersheds 15 and 25 fall into 
this category. Alternatively, several of the subwatersheds identified as high priority under 
sediment are medium-high priority regarding phosphorus - subwatersheds 18 and 21, in 
particular.  
Considering no-till as a BMP for cost-effectively reducing all of the pollutants 
simultaneously, would indicate that subwatersheds 11, 13, and 17 as the highest priority for no-
till adoption. Here, sediment can be reduced for $2.79 to $3.80/ton annually, nitrogen reduction 
for $0.27 to $0.64/lb annually, and phosphorus can be reduced for $1.92 to $4.12/lb annually. On 
the flip side, subwatersheds 1, 8, and 19 are identified as being the least cost-effective across all 
of the pollutants for no-till. Sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus annual reduction costs can 
approach $39.52/ton, $4.09/lb, and $40.34/lb, respectively.  
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Figure 2.47 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with no-
till 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$2.79 - $3.80
$3.81 - $5.70
$5.71 - $8.21
$8.22 - $39.52
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with no-till.
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Figure 2.48 Spatial average nitrogen reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with no-till 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$0.27 - $0.64
$0.65 - $0.80
$0.81 - $1.06
$1.07 - $4.09
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with no-till.
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Figure 2.49 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with 
no-till 
 
 
Figure 2.50, and Figure 2.51, and Figure 2.52 display the annual average pollutant 
reduction costs with permanent vegetation. In general, there are less difference between these 
maps as compared to the differences seen with the other two BMPs discussed previously. In 
other words, subwatersheds that are identified as high economic priority for sediment are 
generally identified as high economic priority for nitrogen and phosphorus as well. For each of 
the pollutants, subwatersheds 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, and 21 are all labeled as high priority. In similar 
fashion, subwatersheds 1, 7, 8, and 19 are all identified as low priority for permanent vegetation 
reduction of each of the pollutants. Subwatersheds 24 and 27 are low priority for nitrogen via 
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$1.92 - $4.12
$4.13 - $5.80
$5.81 - $7.10
$7.11 - $40.34
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with no-till.
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permanent vegetation whereas these are considered medium-high priority areas for sediment 
reduction. 
Figure 2.50 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with 
permanent vegetation 
 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$39.73 - $52.68
$52.69 - $70.61
$70.62 - $99.86
$99.87 - $477.90
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with permanent 
vegetation.
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Figure 2.51 Spatial average nitrogen reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with 
permanent vegetation 
 
 
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$6.54 - $9.28
$9.29 - $10.46
$10.47 - $11.90
$11.91 - $46.69
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with permanent 
vegetation.
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Figure 2.52 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under adjusted (“Y”) costs with 
permanent vegetation 
 
 
 
From a cost-effective conservation spatial targeting standpoint, certain areas of the TCL 
watershed should be prioritized higher than others. Depending on which BMP and which 
pollutant is under consideration the subwatersheds may be ranked differently. In other words, if 
sediment is the concern and filter strips are expected to be promoted and adopted the focus 
should be on subwatersheds 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 23. However, if nitrogen is the main 
concern and no-till will be the primary BMP promoted and financed, then the focus should be on 
subwatersheds 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 25. 
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$27.80 - $37.27
$37.28 - $42.14
$42.15 - $46.47
$46.48 - $142.49
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y’) with permanent 
vegetation.
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If one were to place equal weighting on each of the three BMPs and pollutants, two 
prescriptions can be made based on the previous maps. First, the most cost-effective pollutant 
reduction will likely be achieved in subwatersheds 11 and 13. These subwatersheds were 
identified as high priority across all of the BMPs and pollutants. Secondly, subwatersheds 1, 8, 
and 19 exhibit the least potential (relatively speaking) for cost-effectively reducing any of the 
pollutants in regards to any of the BMPs considered. The remaining 22 subwatersheds fall 
somewhere in between these two bounds. In other words, depending on the BMP/pollutant focus, 
these subwatersheds may exhibit some potential for cost-effective conservation. 
 Characteristics of economically targeted areas 
As described previously, the economically targeted areas take into account both the 
physiographical and the economic characteristics of the farm (or HRU) and the BMP. In general, 
the three primary physiographical factors affecting sediment and nutrient runoff and contribution 
to TCL for a given farm and BMP are land slope, hydrologic soil group, and delivery ratio (for 
sediment). Thus, it would be expected that subwatersheds 11 and 13 would exhibit different 
physiographical characteristics than subwatersheds 1, 8, and 19.  
Based on information in Table 2.4, subwatershed 19 actually has a much greater 
percentage of land with slopes greater than 6 percent than either subwatershed 11 or 13. 
However, only 49.6 percent of the land in subwatershed 19 is classified as being in hydrologic 
soil group D.
18
 This compares to 96.7 and 93.5 percent of the land in subwatersheds 11 and 13. 
Subwatersheds 1 and 8 have 0.0 and 50.3 percent of land with “D” soils, respectively. In terms of 
delivery ratios for sediment (Table 2.9), subwatershed 19 has the highest at 1.00 while 
subwatersheds 1, 8, 11, and 13 have sediment delivery ratios of 0.56, 0.69, 0.69, and 0.66, 
                                                 
18
 Which represents areas with higher risks for runoff generating potential. 
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respectively. From this, it appears that soil type is driving much of the differences in sediment 
and nutrient contribution to TCL. However, the physiographical characteristics that make up 
each subwatershed only put into picture part of the story. The economic characteristics help to 
explain the other part.  
Each of the five subwatersheds described previously are contained completely or partially 
in Marshall County, Kansas. Subwatersheds 8 and 19 lay completely in Marshall County. Over 
90 percent of subwatershed 1 is contained in Gage County, Nebraska with the remaining 10 
percent in Marshall County. Subwatershed 11 is 64 and 36 percent in Marshall and Nemaha 
Counties, respectively. Subwatershed 13 is 27 and 73 percent in Marshall and Nemaha Counties, 
respectively. Of the counties in Kansas, Nemaha County exhibits the highest annualized costs for 
filter strips and land retirement with permanent vegetation. Gage County, Nebraska exhibits the 
highest annualized costs across all of the counties considered here. Thus, it appears that while 
high land opportunity costs make subwatersheds 11 and 13 less attractive, the relatively large 
pollutant loading and levels of BMP effectiveness make these subwatersheds prime spots for 
cost-effective BMP investments. 
According to Figure 2.41, subwatershed 2 would be a higher priority area for reducing 
nitrogen than subwatershed 26. This is likely due to the fact that 98.5 percent of the land in 
subwatershed 2 is “D” soils compared to just 38 percent of subwatershed 26. However, as Table 
2.19 shows, no-till investments are nearly 25 percent more cost-effective when applied to 
subwatershed 26 as opposed to subwatershed 2. Part of the reason for this is that the annualized 
costs of no-till are approximately 25 percent less for subwatershed 26 compared to subwatershed 
2.  
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What does all of this mean for cost-effective targeting? Cost-effective targeting is not as 
simple as looking at just one factor such as land slope or land opportunity costs. While soil type 
appears to be a good indicator of targeting, relying heavily on it can even be misleading. For 
example, 99 percent of the soils in subwatershed 9 are hydrologic group D. This subwatershed 
ranks number one in this respect. However, this subwatershed should be low priority for nitrogen 
reduction via no-till and should be medium-low priority for sediment reduction with filter strips. 
At least in the case of TCL watershed, cost-effective targeting can only occur when all relevant 
physiographical and economic factors are considered. 
 Distribution of BMP types across subwatersheds 
The spatial targeting analysis performed previously focused on one BMP at a time across 
the TCL watershed. Building on this, another important aspect may be the distribution of the 
different BMP types across the watershed when cost-effective targeting is performed and all 
BMPs are available for adoption. In other words, what is the optimal ratio of filter strips to no-till 
to permanent vegetation projects across subwatersheds in the TCL watershed? In order to 
determine this, the following procedures are used. 
Targeted simulations are run focusing on sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus. The 
pollution reduction goal is set infinitely high and the annual budget constraint is set at $450,000. 
No farms (HRUs) are deleted from the choice set. The BMP costs are from the “Y” scenarios 
(Table 2.16). One iteration of each scenario is run and the simulation results are tabulated and 
further analyzed.  
The total number of BMP projects implemented is equal to 1,770 in each scenario. It is 
not equal to 1,858 (total number of cropland farms or HRUs) because 88 farms exhibit zero or 
negative primary pollutant reduction and are eliminated from the possible choice set. In regards 
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to the 1,770 BMP projects, specific information about the subwatershed location/identification 
and BMP type (i.e., filter strip, no-till, or permanent vegetation) is known and tabulated. From 
this data, Figure 2.53, Figure 2.54, and Figure 2.55 are created which show the proportion of the 
total BMP projects that fall into each subwatershed by type of BMP. These three figures 
represent the cases when sediment, nitrogen, or phosphorus are the primary pollutants of 
concern, respectively. The total number of BMP projects implemented under each scenario are 
400, 580, and 343. 
To briefly summarize these figures, one can see that permanent vegetation projects are 
not implemented in any scenario. In general, more filter strips are applied in the targeted 
sediment and phosphorus cases as compared to when nitrogen is the primary concern. No-till 
projects are predominantly implemented when nitrogen is the focus pollutant (Figure 2.54). 
Across all scenarios, subwatershed 10 has the greatest number of projects mainly due to its 
relative large area. Focusing on subwatersheds 11 and 13 (which were identified as very high 
priority in the previous subsections), there is approximately an equal distribution of filter strips 
and no-till when sediment is the main focus. However, under a targeted nitrogen strategy, there is 
about a 3.5 to 1 ratio of no-till to filter strips in these two subwatersheds. Under a targeted 
phosphorus strategy, there is approximately a 2.5 to 1 ratio of filter strips to no-till in 
subwatersheds 11 and 13. In terms of least cost-effective subwatersheds, very little to zero BMP 
activity occurs across subwatersheds 8 and 19.  
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Figure 2.53 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_S_450_Y 
 
Figure 2.54 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_N_450_Y 
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Figure 2.55 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_P_450_Y 
 
For reasons stated previously, it may be the case that many producers have already 
adopted some of these BMPs on their farms. It also possible (and maybe even probable) that 
many of these BMPs have been adopted on farms (HRUs) that exhibit the most cost-effective 
pollutant reduction. In other words, the BMPs have been adopted on fields which have great 
erosion and runoff potential and/or have a low cost of implementation. If we make this 
assumption, then the stochastic “search and deletion of farms” process used previously may not 
be the most accurate. In order to mimic this assumption, the data used to generate Figure 2.53, 
Figure 2.54, and Figure 2.55 are used with one important modification. That is, the most cost-
effective 25 percent BMP projects/farms are removed. Figure 2.56, Figure 2.57, and Figure 2.58 
show the proportion of the total BMP projects that fall into each subwatershed by type of BMP 
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In these scenarios, the number of BMP projects in subwatersheds 11 and 13 tend to 
decrease. For example, when all farms are considered no-till projects in subwatershed 13 make 
up over 5 percent of all projects across the TCL watershed when nitrogen is the pollutant of 
concern. However, when the most cost-effective 25 percent of BMPs are removed, this amount 
drops to below 2 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of filter strips attributable to subwatershed 
11 increases from 1.6 to 2.1 percent as the most cost-effective farms are removed (when nitrogen 
is the pollutant of concern).  
Figure 2.56 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_S_450_Y with 
the most cost-effective 25 percent of farms removed 
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Figure 2.57 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_N_450_Y with 
the most cost-effective 25 percent of farms removed 
 
Figure 2.58 Distribution of the different BMPs across subwatersheds, Targ_P_450_Y with 
the most cost-effective 25 percent of farms removed 
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 An alternative method of selecting farms that have already adopted BMPs 
Up to this point in the analysis, it has been assumed that any existing BMP adoption in 
the TCL watershed was random in nature. That is, a random 25 percent of the farms in the 
watershed are assumed to have already implemented BMPs, and therefore, are eliminated from 
the choice set in the simulation routines. The reason behind this is that given the available data 
that exists there is no way of precisely determining which farms have or have not implemented 
BMPs in the past.  
Perhaps a more realistic assumption would be to assume that BMPs have already been 
adopted by farms which have the greatest potential for soil erosion.
19
 In cases where soil erosion 
is severe, farmers will often install BMPs either with or without cost-share funding in an effort to 
save significant losses of top soil and/or prevent gullies from forming in their fields. To simulate 
this alternative approach, the following assumption is made within the simulation program. Prior 
to any simulation the 25 percent of farms that exhibit the greatest amount of baseline soil erosion 
(on a per acre basis) are eliminated from the possible choice set. More specifically, the top 465 
farms out of 1,858 in total are assumed to have already implemented BMPs and are removed 
from the selection pool. The simulation processes proceed in the same manner as described in 
previous sections. It should be noted that the adjusted “Y” costs are used in these analyses and 
the primary pollutant is sediment (i.e., scenarios in which nitrogen and phosphorus are “primary” 
are not presented or discussed). Also of importance, the text “_alt” is included at the end of the 
scenario description to indicate that this alternative method of selecting farms that have already 
adopted BMPs is used. 
                                                 
19
 Soil erosion is used as opposed to nitrogen or phosphorus loss because of the visible nature of erosion. 
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Table 2.20 presents the results attained by using the alternative method of selecting farms 
that have already adopted BMPs. Comparing these results to those in Table 2.17 (which uses the 
“random” method of selecting the 25 percent of farms already adopting BMPs), there is an 
“across-the-board” increase in the average pollutant reduction costs. In terms of sediment under a 
$50,000 annual budget, the average reduction costs increase from $0.63 per ton to $1.75 per ton. 
This is equal to a difference of $1.12 per ton and a 277 percent increase in average costs. As the 
budget constraint increases, the difference between the two corresponding sets of scenarios (in 
Table 2.20 and Table 2.17) remains around $1.12 per ton, but the percentage increase decreases 
from 277 percent in the case of a $50,000 budget to just over 200 percent increase in the case of 
a $450,000 budget.  
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Table 2.20 Simulation results for the "Y" scenarios with alternative method of selecting farms already having adopted BMPs 
Scenario 
Average 
sediment 
reduction 
cost for all 
land 
treated by 
BMPs 
(/ton) 
Average 
nitrogen 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Average 
phosphor-
rous 
reduction 
cost for all 
land treated 
by BMPs 
(/lb) 
Total # of 
BMP 
projects 
# of Filter 
Strip 
Projects 
# of No-
till 
Projects 
#of 
Permanent 
Vegetation 
Projects 
Total 
area of 
land 
treated 
by BMPs 
(ac) 
Total 
amount 
of 
sediment 
reduction 
(tons) 
Total 
amount 
of 
nitrogen 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Total 
amount of 
phosphorus 
reduction 
(lbs) 
Targ_S_50_Y_alt $1.75 $0.30 $1.54 59 16 43 0 9,484 28,215 165,381 31,993 
Targ_S_150_Y_alt $1.91 $0.31 $1.50 107 44 63 0 23,172 78,022 486,589 99,385 
Targ_S_250_Y_alt $2.03 $0.32 $1.49 168 82 87 0 36,957 122,876 789,159 166,956 
Targ_S_350_Y_alt $2.14 $0.33 $1.50 236 123 113 0 50,915 163,063 1,062,330 232,647 
Targ_S_450_Y_alt $2.26 $0.34 $1.55 318 175 142 0 63,790 198,542 1,307,531 289,801 
            
Rand_S_50_Y_alt $14.24 $1.81 $10.86 20 7 10 3 3,672 3,408 26,767 4,470 
Rand_S_150_Y_alt $21.71 $2.74 $15.11 30 11 14 6 6,805 6,675 52,828 9,590 
Rand_S_250_Y_alt $26.88 $3.38 $17.91 37 13 16 8 8,837 9,005 71,585 13,511 
Rand_S_350_Y_alt $29.84 $3.75 $19.45 43 15 18 10 10,792 11,341 90,275 17,399 
Rand_S_450_Y_alt $32.45 $4.07 $20.83 48 17 19 11 12,549 13,411 106,902 20,887 
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Figure 2.59 and Figure 2.60 graphically display the total and marginal cost curves for the 
targeted and random cases for both methods of selecting farms that have already adopted BMPs. 
The random BMP implementation scenarios do not appear to be significantly different (i.e., 
comparing the total cost curves for Rand_S_50_Y and Rand_S_50_Y_alt). For example, the 
Rand_S_50_Y scenario reduces 5,774 tons of sediment annually compared to 3,408 tons in the 
Rand_S_50_Y_alt scenario. Much of the noticeable divergence between these two random 
scenarios occurs after the first $25,000 in funding is used. 
On the other hand, the targeted scenarios differ significantly. The “alternative” method of 
selecting the 25 percent of farms already adopting BMPs (Targ_S_50_Y_alt) results in only 
28,215 tons of annual sediment reduction compared to nearly 80,000 tons in the Targ_S_50_Y 
scenario. 
As stated in a previous section, the targeted approach to BMP implementation can be 20 
to 23 times more cost-effective than a random approach. Under the assumption of this 
“alternative” method of selecting the 25 percent of farms already adopting BMPs, we find that 
targeted BMP strategies are 8 to 14 times more cost-effective than random methods. While this is 
significantly lower than the previous findings, there still appears to be a vast advantage in terms 
of cost-effectiveness to targeting.
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Figure 2.59 Sediment total cost curves including alternative method of selecting farms 
already adopting BMPs 
 
Figure 2.60 Sediment marginal cost curves including alternative method of selecting farms 
already adopting BMPs 
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Assuming 25 percent of the most erosive farms in TCL have already adopted BMPs 
results in fairly significant changes in terms of cost-effective spatial targeting prescriptions. 
Comparing Figure 2.44 to Figure 2.61, we can see that the economic priority areas move from 
the eastern portion of TCL watershed to the western portion (when considering sediment and 
filter strips). Only subwatersheds 13 and 17 remain as a high priority in each case.  
Figure 2.61 Spatial average sediment reduction costs with filter strips and assuming 25% of 
most erosive farms in TCL watershed have already adopted BMPs 
 
 
Comparing Figure 2.47 to Figure 2.62 we see a similar shift of economic priority from 
the northeastern part of TCL watershed to the southwest region. Again, subwatersheds 13 and 17 
are the only two that remain classified as “high” in each case. Perhaps most significant here is 
the finding that subwatersheds 24 and 25 move from being “medium-high” priority to “low” 
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$5.87 - $6.55
$6.56 - $7.49
$7.50 - $8.18
$8.19 - $33.37
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y”) with filter strips 
assuming 25% of most erosive farms 
already have adopted BMPs.
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priority under this alternative method of selection. The reason for this is that there are a few 
highly erosive farms in each of these subwatersheds. If these few farms have already adopted 
BMPs, there is not much relative value in funding additional BMPs such as no-till in these two 
subwatersheds. 
Figure 2.62 Spatial average sediment reduction costs with no-till and assuming 25% of 
most erosive farms in TCL watershed have already adopted BMPs 
 
 
The east to west change of focus is again evident when comparing Figure 2.63 to Figure 
2.50 for controlling sediment with permanent vegetation. Again, subwatersheds 11 and 17 are the 
only two that remain a “high” economic priority in each case. Comparing Figure 2.63 (with 
permanent vegetation) to Figure 2.61 (with filter strips) one can see that all of the “high” and 
“low” priority subwatersheds are the same across the two scenarios.  
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$5.76 - $7.09
$7.10 - $8.40
$8.41 - $9.49
$9.50 - $39.52
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y”) with no-till 
assuming 25% of most erosive farms 
already have adopted BMPs.
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Figure 2.63 Spatial average sediment reduction costs with permanent vegetation and 
assuming 25% of most erosive farms in TCL watershed have already adopted BMPs 
 
  
 Dredging versus BMPs 
TCL and its watershed are used as a case-study to examine the economics of watershed 
protection and reservoir rehabilitation including dredging. TCL exhibits, perhaps, one of the 
most critical cases of reservoir sedimentation in Kansas and throughout the Midwest. As of 2009, 
which was 47 years since the reservoir was completed, TCL contained 180,378 acre-feet of 
sediment. With over 42 percent (Table 2.21) of its total original conservation (sediment plus 
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$85.75 - $92.87
$92.88 - $109.35
$109.36 - $119.58
$119.59 - $477.90
Adjusted cost scenario (‘Y”) with permanent 
vegetation assuming 25% of most erosive 
farms already have adopted BMPs.
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multi-purpose) storage capacity (425,312 acre-feet) lost to sediment accumulation, TCL provides 
a unique and fitting case-study example for this analysis. 
Table 2.21 Tuttle Creek Lake and watershed characteristics and dredging costs 
Characteristics  
Original conservation storage pool (acre-feet)  425,312  
Sediment deposited as of 2009 (acre-feet)  180,378  
Sediment deposited as of 2009 (cubic yards)  291,009,849  
Sediment deposited as of 2009 (tons)  291,009,849  
Total drainage area (square miles)  9,628  
Total drainage area (acres)  6,161,920  
Kansas portion of Tuttle Creek watershed 
Portion of drainage area - KS portion (%) 25% 
Drainage area - KS portion (square miles)  2,377  
Drainage area - KS portion (acres)  1,521,554  
Pastureland/Rangeland - KS portion (%) 42% 
Pastureland/Rangeland - KS portion (acres)  646,639  
Cropland - KS portion (%) 43% 
Cropland - KS portion (acres)  649,548  
Other - KS portion (%) 15% 
Other - KS portion (acres)  225,367  
  
Dredging costs in 2009  
Cost per cubic yard or ton $4.11 
Dredging and disposal cost per acre foot $6,631 
Sediment deposited as of 2009 (acre-feet)  180,378  
Cost to remove sediment deposited until 2009 $1,196,050,480 
Onetime equivalent costs  
Cost per total watershed-acre $194.10 
Cost per cropland acre (total watershed) $269.59 
 
 Dredging  
Dredging is the removal of accumulated lake bottom sediments. This removal process 
can take place through mechanical, hydraulic, or pneumatic means (Hudson 1998). Sediments 
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are frequently removed from our nation’s rivers and ports for navigation and boating purposes. 
Although less common, dredging can also take place in lakes and reservoirs as a way of 
reclaiming water storage capacities. While there are many aspects to consider with dredging 
projects, one important consideration is cost.  
As Williams and Smith (2008) point out, the decision on whether or not to dredge will 
depend on sediment source, sedimentation rate with and without management practices, 
effectiveness and cost of management practices, dredging cost inflation, the planning horizon, 
and the discount rate used to calculate present values. If accumulated sediment has not 
negatively impacted current reservoir services (e.g., recreation, flood control), then it might be 
reasonable to forego dredging in favor of investing in additional in-field and in-stream 
conservation practices to reduce the need for future dredging.  
As part of this process, dredging cost data were collected from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers historical dredging database (USACE 2011). These costs include the cost of 
maintenance dredging, as well as mobilization of equipment and costs of disposal. The smaller 
the project the larger the mobilization cost is as a percent of overall costs. Both Corps and 
industry managed projects are included in the calculations. Figure 2.64 displays the historical 
trend in dredging costs in nominal dollars. From a low of $0.30/yd
3 
in 1970 to a high of 
$4.11/yd
3 
in 2009, dredging costs have exhibited an average inflation rate of 6.94 percent over 
this 39 year period.  
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Figure 2.64 Historical dredging costs in nominal dollars 
 
The cost of constructing TCL in 1962 dollars was $80,051,031. Given an annual inflation 
rate of 6.94 percent (consistent with the average inflation of dredging costs) in construction 
costs, the cost in 2009 dollars is $1,096,699,225. If $6.45/yd
3 
were spent to dredge 291,009,874 
cubic yards from the lake, it would approximately equal the construction cost in 2009 dollars. At 
a dredging cost of $4.11/yd
3
, it would cost $1,196,050,480 (or $194 per total watershed-acre) to 
restore TCL to its original storage capacity (Table 2.21). Clearly, dredging is an expensive 
option. 
While reservoir sedimentation and dredging data are typically in acre-feet or cubic yards 
units, soil erosion figures are typically reported in tonnage. Since each of these processes will be 
compared in this analysis, a common unit of measurement is needed. According to Holland 
(1971), past sediment samples from Kansas reservoirs exhibited (dry) soil bulk densities of 
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3
. Other studies have specified cropland soil bulk densities in the 
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
C
o
st
 p
e
r 
C
u
b
ic
 Y
ar
d
 (
n
o
m
in
al
 $
)
139 
 
ranges of 0.94 to 1.43 tons/yd
3
 (NYSSESC 2005) and 1.01 to 1.35 tons/yd
3
 (Hillel 1998) 
depending on the soil characteristics (i.e., more clay content yields lower soil bulk density 
values). For simplicity, we will assume a ratio of 1 ton per 1 cubic yard. Thus, a 2009 dredging 
cost of $4.11 per cubic yard is equal to $4.11 per ton. This will be used as a starting point for the 
following analysis. 
Under the adjusted BMP cost assumptions, Table 2.17 shows that all of the targeted “Y” 
scenarios up to a $450,000 annual budget result in average sediment reduction costs of much less 
than $4.11/ton. But, the marginal cost curves were increasing at an increasing rate. While 
dredging is expensive, there may be some point at which it becomes more feasible than spending 
additional money on BMP implementation. What is the transition point at which it becomes 
more cost-effective to dredge (either now or in the future) rather than spend more money on 
BMP implementation?  
 Case 1a: Implement BMPs and/or dredge beginning in year 1 (i.e., year 2009) assuming a 
random 25% of farms have already adopted BMPs 
Several simplifying assumptions are made in the following case study. This case assumes 
perfect substitutability and equality between preventing a ton of soil from reaching TCL via 
BMP implementation and dredging a ton of sediment from TCL. Each results in one less ton of 
sediment in TCL at the end of each year. While there are other non-monetary benefits and costs 
associated with each of the BMP methods, these are not directly accounted for in this analysis.  
The cost of dredging in year 1 is equal to $4.11 per ton. The average annual cost 
preventing sediment from reaching TCL via the three BMPs analyzed previously is $1.11 per ton 
for a $450,000 budget. Graphing the marginal and total cost curves for sediment reduction 
according to the assumptions of Targ_S_$$$_Y (i.e., targeted sediment reduction scenario with 
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adjusted BMP costs and unlimited budget) shows that BMP implementation is economically 
preferred to dredging for the first 603,414 tons of sediment per year or $915,274 annual budget. 
This is equal to reducing 32.4 percent of the baseline sediment loading into TCL each year (from 
the Kansas portion of the watershed). Stated differently, all funds should be directed towards 
BMP implementation if operating under an annual budget of less than $915,274 per year. Or, if 
there are more than $915,274 in funding available for the restoration and/or protection of TCL, 
then the first $915,274 should be spent on BMPs and any remaining funds should be directed 
towards dredging (note, this is ignoring any other possible benefits provided by watershed 
BMPs). Figure 2.65 graphically shows the points of transition.  
Figure 2.65 Marginal and total cost curves for sediment reduction for Targ_S_$$$_Y (Case 
1a) 
 
The above prescription assumes that BMPs are implemented in a highly targeted or 
“optimal” approach. If targeting of BMPs is not an option, then the prescription here would be to 
immediately spend the funds dredging. This is based on Figure 2.66, which shows the 
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Rand_S_$$$_Y scenario along with a line equal to the constant marginal cost curve of dredging 
at $4.11 per ton. The average cost of reducing sediment via BMPs without any targeting is 
$32.49 per ton, which is nearly 8 times higher than the cost of dredging.  
Figure 2.66 Marginal cost curve for sediment reduction for Rand_S_$$$_Y (Case 1a) 
 
 Case 1b: Implement BMPs and/or dredge beginning in year 1 (i.e., year 2009) assuming the 
most erosive 25 percent of farms have already adopted BMPs 
Using the same methods as in Case 1a but under the assumption that the most erosive 25 
percent of farms have already adopted BMPs, yields somewhat different results. Figure 2.67 
shows that BMP implementation is economically preferred to dredging for the first 226,427 tons 
of sediment per year or $545,544 annual budget. This is equal to reducing 12.2 percent of the 
baseline sediment loading into TCL each year (attributable to the Kansas portion of the 
watershed). In other words, all funds should be directed towards BMP implementation if 
operating under an annual budget of less than $545,544 per year. While this is significantly 
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lower than the $915,274 value from Case 1a, it is still evident that targeted BMP implementation 
is economically preferred to dredging under “realistically feasible” budget scenarios.20 
Figure 2.67 Marginal and total cost curves for sediment reduction for Targ_S_$$$_Y_adj 
(Case 1b) 
 
If targeting of BMPs is not an option, then the prescription here, again, would be to 
immediately spend the funds dredging. This is based on Figure 2.68, which shows the 
Rand_S_$$$_Y_adj scenario along with a line equal to the constant marginal cost curve of 
dredging at $4.11 per ton. The average cost of reducing sediment via BMPs without any 
targeting is $53.63 per ton, which is nearly 13 times higher than the cost of dredging. Thus, if we 
assume that BMPs have already been adopted on highly erosive fields throughout TCL 
watershed, the more important targeting of BMPs becomes. 
 
                                                 
20
 The term “realistically feasible” is based on a previous assertion that $450,000 annual budget is in all likelihood a 
maximum based on relevant agency budgets. 
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Figure 2.68 Marginal cost curve for sediment reduction for Rand_S_$$$_Y_adj (Case 1b) 
 
 Case2a: Implement BMPs in year 1and dredge beginning in year 16 assuming a random 25% 
of farms have already adopted BMPs 
The second case describes a situation in which BMPs are implemented in years 1 through 
15. Then, beginning in year 16, dredging will occur. The question is: What are the savings in 
dredging costs realized in year 16 due to the implementation of BMPs in years 1 through 15?  
This calculation is essentially calculating the present value of the cost of dredging in 15 
years. Beginning with a current cost of dredging of $4.11 per ton, a 6.94 percent inflation rate, 
and a 15 year analysis period, the future value of dredging (at the beginning of year 16) is 
calculated to be $11.25 per ton. Converting this to present value terms using a discount rate of 
4.625 percent (NRCS 2009) yields a present value of $5.71 per ton. The higher inflation rate 
relative to a lower discount rate results in a present value of dredging in 15 years value that is 
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higher than current dredging costs. From an economic perspective, if dredging is to be delayed 
15 years or more, more money can be justifiably spent on BMP implementation. 
As Figure 2.69 depicts, up to $1,047,959 should now be spent on targeted BMP 
implementation. This is an increase of $132,685 per year due to the decision to delay dredging 
until year 16. This amounts to 629,488 tons of annual sediment reduction or 33.8 percent of the 
total sediment loading into TCL from the Kansas portion of the watershed. Coincidentally, this 
also happens to approximately be the point at which the marginal cost curve becomes effectively 
vertical. 
Figure 2.69 Marginal and total cost curves for sediment reduction for Targ_S_$$$_Y (Case 
2a) 
 
As stated earlier, this finding is simply a function of the inflation to discount rate 
difference. If the two rates were set equal, then the prescription from Case 2 would essentially be 
no different from the prescription from Case 1. In other words, the point at which funding should 
taken away from BMP implementation is the same. Conversely, if the discount rate was higher 
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than the rate of inflation, less money should be directed towards BMP implementation because 
dredging is going to relatively cheaper in the future.  
In all cases and scenarios, if BMPs can only be implemented in a random fashion, the 
prescription would be to forego all BMP implementation in favor of dredging now or in the 
future. This is because random BMP implementation is between 5 to 8 times more costly than 
current or delayed dredging costs. 
 Case 2b: Implement BMPs in year 1 and dredge beginning in year 16 assuming the most 
erosive 25 percent of farms have already adopted BMPs 
Using the same methods as in Case 2a but under the assumption that the most erosive 25 
percent of farms have already adopted BMPs, yields somewhat different results. Applying this 
assumption results in less funding that could be spent on targeted BMP implementation. That is, 
when Case 2a is compared to Case 2b, nearly $325,000 less could now be spent on targeted BMP 
adoption. This is displayed in Figure 2.70 which shows that up to $723,347 could now be spent 
on targeted BMP implementation compared to $1,047,959 in Case 2a.  
Making the decision to delay dredging until year 16 (i.e., comparing to Case 1b) results in 
an increase of $177,803 per year that could be spent on BMPs. Case 2b suggests that 261,199 (an 
increase from 226,427 tons in Case 1b) tons of annual sediment reduction could be achieved via 
BMP implementation or 14.0 percent of the total sediment loading into TCL from the Kansas 
portion of the watershed.  
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Figure 2.70 Marginal and total cost curves for sediment reduction for Targ_S_$$$_Y_adj 
(Case 2b) 
 
 Conclusion 
This study answered the question: How can physiographical and economic relationships 
within the watershed be quantified to provide insights into the selection of cost-effective 
alternative management strategies? This question was addressed by integrating a geographic 
information system (GIS) based watershed model, reservoir rehabilitation management 
strategies, statistical analyses of historic watershed and water quality data, with an economic 
analysis of alternative sedimentation reduction strategies. The following are some of the key 
findings, which can offer decision-makers better insight into the benefits and cost implications 
associated with achieving various water quality levels and sedimentation reduction goals within a 
large watershed. 
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Both physiographical and economic factors must be considered for cost-effective conservation 
to occur. 
Consideration of only one side (i.e., either physiographic or economic) of a soil and water 
resource issue will not result in an optimal strategy from a cost-effectiveness standpoint. 
Targeting areas that produce the most pollution per acre is more cost-effective than a random 
approach, but may miss the mark if those areas also exhibit high BMP costs (e.g., due to high 
opportunity costs). Likewise, focusing only on areas where BMP costs are low may produce 
“better than random” results, but may not achieve cost-effective pollution reduction if the areas 
do not exhibit high levels of pollutant reduction. 
 
Optimal BMP targeting is from 8 to 23 times more cost-effective than random implementation, 
but also is likely to be more costly to administer. 
Random BMP implementation is not an effective method for funding and placing BMPs. 
This is somewhat representative of a policy where conservation funds are issued to any interested 
and willing landowner in a county or watershed. While this approach achieves equity, 
conservation dollars are being spent in areas that do not deliver a good “bang for the buck” 
relative to other areas. Specifically, a targeted approach can reduce 23 times more sediment for a 
given budget than a random approach. It should be noted, however, that a highly targeted 
approach can be costly from an administration standpoint. 
 
BMP implementation is more cost-effective than dredging if done in a targeted manner, but 
not if randomly implemented. 
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In the case of TCL watershed, if conservation funds cannot be implemented in a highly 
targeted manner, then it may in fact be more cost-effective to allocated funds for dredging. 
Annualized dredging costs are around $5 per ton whereas annualized “random” BMP 
implementation costs average from $30 to $50 per ton. Under a targeted approach, 
approximately $500,000 to $1,000,000 per year could be spent on BMP implementation before 
any funds are spent on dredging. It should be noted that if one were to assume that sediment 
delivery ratios are equal to one for each subwatershed, these dollar figures would increase. 
  
Up to approximately 1 million dollars per year, not considering “intangible” costs of BMP 
implementation, could be spent on targeted BMP implementation before some selected 
dredging may be needed.  
 “Intangible” costs represent all those costs other than pure accounting costs, which a 
farmer may take into consideration when deciding whether to implement a given BMP. 
Examples may include: various hassle factors, need for additional training/education, and/or 
concern of more future government regulation if participating in a conservation program. This 
study only included the accounting costs of adopting BMPs, and thus, may have underestimated 
the total costs of BMP implementation.  
However, the original BMP costs were adjusted to reflect more current-day economic 
values. These adjusted “Y” cost scenarios were used in the dredging cost analysis. Based on this, 
approximately $500,000 to $1,000,000 could be spent on targeted BMP implementation before 
any funds are spent on dredging.  
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If “intangible” costs of BMP implementation are significant and/or BMPs cannot be targeted 
effectively, dredging is likely more cost-effective. 
In general, reservoir dredging has been looked upon as a very expensive approach to 
reducing reservoir sedimentation. However, it may not be entirely cost-prohibitive on an 
annualized per unit basis. Relatively low “intangible” costs and/or effective targeting are 
necessary conditions that must exist for BMP implementation to be more cost-effective than 
dredging. If either one of these conditions does not hold, dredging may in fact be a more cost-
effective approach to addressing sedimentation in TCL. Again, random BMP implementation 
results in average costs of sedimentation reduction of  $30 to $50 per ton whereas dredging costs 
average $5 per ton. 
 Limitations and future research needs 
While this research analyzes and compares the cost-effectiveness of various BMP 
implementation approaches in the TCL watershed with dredging, the benefits associated with 
each of these strategies have not been addressed. Other limitations of this study are that only 
three in-field cropland BMPs are included in the analysis and streambank stabilization strategies 
were not considered. In addition to these points, only the Kansas portion (~25 percent) of the 
entire TCL watershed was considered for BMP application. In other words, “business as usual” 
is assumed to be the case for the Nebraska portion. There may in fact be value related to an 
interstate cooperative approach to address these issues. To be clear, a comprehensive benefit-cost 
analysis is not performed in this study. The following discussion highlights some of the 
limitations of this study and makes recommendations for future areas of research related to BMP 
implementation, dredging, and reservoir sedimentation in general. 
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The exact locations and types of BMPs currently in place throughout the TCL watershed 
are unknown. Because of this reality, assumptions are made in this study regarding previous 
BMP implementation. Specifically, 25 percent of the farms are removed from the choice set. 
This is accomplished by either: 1) randomly removing 25 percent of the farms; or 2) removing 
the most erosive 25 percent of farms from the choice set. In reality, current conditions are likely 
somewhere in between these two extremes. Thus, the results presented should be interpreted with 
this in mind. More accurate information regarding past and current BMP adoption is necessary to 
enhance the realism of studies like this. 
While this analysis compares BMP implementation to dredging from a cost standpoint, 
this is only half of the story. The benefits created or preserved by each activity must be 
considered to adequately analyze these management alternatives. Consider the following as a 
foreword to some of the relevant benefits. 
The application of BMPs to reduce soil erosion and nutrient runoff can result in benefits 
to a watershed region that may not be directly linked to the downstream reservoir (i.e., TCL). 
BMPs can improve soil productivity over time, which is a benefit to landowners. Improved 
wildlife habitat for hunting and other related recreation benefits in the watershed above the 
reservoir also may be created or preserved through BMP implementation. Further, benefits 
related to improved water quality in streams and rivers may be non-additive. That is, a reduction 
in nitrogen runoff close to a stream located far away from the reservoir may actually be more 
valuable to society than a reduction of soil erosion in a field bordering the reservoir. Our analysis 
only considers the costs and pollutant reductions achieved by BMP implementation and does not 
attempt to quantify any of the other benefits. 
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To the extent that society values carbon sequestration in the future, BMP implementation 
could result in benefits that accrue to society at large and not just those in the watershed or 
reservoir users. It also may be likely that users of water downstream of TCL would benefit from 
improved water quality attributable to BMPs.  
The possibility of changes in climatic conditions and the impacts of those changes are 
other wild cards in this discussion. Climatic changes may significantly affect water use, water 
quality, and TCL watershed ecosystem services. Less frequent but more intense rainfall events or 
even more droughty conditions may increase the use and benefits of BMPs. The possibilities of 
these additional benefits and the growth of them would need to be considered in a more 
comprehensive benefit-cost analysis. 
There does not exist a current, comprehensive analysis of the benefits generated by all of 
the resources in and around TCL or any of the conservation practices implemented throughout 
the watershed. A 2001 Army Corps of Engineers study estimated benefits generated by TCL, but 
this study focuses solely on the reservoir (USACE 2001). Without much provided detail, it is 
likely that this study did not include many of the non-market benefits of TCL. A more 
comprehensive, watershed-wide analysis of costs and benefits (including non-market values) 
would be necessary to more adequately compare the various alternatives for protecting and/or 
restoring TCL: BMP implementation to dredging to BMP implementation with dredging to “do-
nothing”. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Incorporating Point Sources into the Watershed 
Management Discussion 
While nonpoint sources are nearly the sole contributors of sediment in many watersheds, 
contributions of nutrient pollution often comes from both point and nonpoint sources. 
Wastewater treatment plants, in particular, emit both nitrogen and phosphorus into receiving 
surface waters. These point sources are regulated through environmental permits which define 
the amount of nutrients (and other pollutants) that may be discharged into receiving streams and 
rivers. Nonpoint sources (with the exception of larger confined animal operations) are generally 
unregulated. Water quality trading is a policy alternative that attempts to capitalize on 
cooperative arrangements between regulated point sources and unregulated nonpoint sources. 
Chapter 4 incorporates a similar agent-based modeling technique as used in the previous 
chapter, but focuses on the simulation of a point-nonpoint source water quality trading market 
for nutrient reduction. Whereas Chapter 2 considered the case of a “watershed manager” 
attempting to allocate conservation funding in a targeted manner, Chapter 4 simulates a market 
where the participants have the incentive to find the most cost-effective means of reducing 
nutrient loading to meet water quality limits. Potentially, society as a whole can benefit from 
such cooperative arrangements.  
As one might imagine, the construction and design of these markets will affect the 
amount of trading that does or does not occur. Chapter 4 attempts to answer the following 
research question: How can water quality trading markets be designed in ways that take into 
account different levels of information among buyers and sellers and what are the implications 
for the determination of “optimal” trading ratios? To examine the ways that these market 
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imperfections may interact to impact the performance of a WQT market, an agent-based model is 
constructed, which simulates a hypothetical point-nonpoint market.
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CHAPTER 4 - A Simulation of Factors Impeding Water Quality 
Trading 
 Introduction 
Environmental economists have argued that pollution trading programs are an efficient 
means of improving environmental quality, as they give firms with the lowest pollution control 
costs the largest incentive to reduce pollution. Such low-cost firms are able to sell pollution 
credits to firms with higher control costs. Aligning incentives with control costs is the condition 
needed to ensure minimum-cost control of pollution overall. Such incentives typically do not 
arise from traditional, uniform regulations. 
Following on the highly successful trading programs for air emissions such as sulfur 
dioxide (NCEE, 2001), many states have recently adopted trading programs to improve water 
quality. There are at least 47 water quality trading (WQT) programs currently active or under 
development worldwide with the overwhelming majority in the United States (Selman et al., 
2009). In principle, such programs could be applied to any water-borne pollutant and allow 
trading among point sources, among nonpoint sources, or between point and nonpoint sources 
(the latter is known as “point-nonpoint trading”). Most of the existing programs are designed 
with point-nonpoint trading to limit nutrient loading: point sources are allowed to meet their 
nutrient emission limits by purchasing water quality credits from agricultural producers in the 
surrounding watershed. These producers are then obligated to implement a best management 
practice (BMP) that reduces expected nutrient loading by an amount commensurate with the 
number of credits sold. 
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Substantial evidence exists that nonpoint sources can reduce nutrient loading at a much 
lower cost than point source polluters in many watersheds, suggesting substantial scope and 
gains from point-nonpoint trading (Faeth, 2000). Despite the potential gains, perhaps the most 
commonly noted feature of existing programs is low trading volume; none of the programs have 
had extensive trading activity and many have had no trading at all (Hoag and Kughes-Popp, 
1997). A widely cited and vivid example is the Fox River program in Wisconsin (Hahn, 1989), 
which had only one trade after its inception in 1981 even though an early study (O’Neil, 1983) 
found substantial potential gains from trading among all participating firms. 
These outcomes suggest the presence of obstacles to trading that were not recognized in 
the design of existing programs. While these obstacles have not been studied in a systematic 
fashion, individual researchers have identified various trading barriers in different contexts. Two 
of the barriers discussed in the literature are limited trading information and distortionary trading 
ratios. Limited information among market participants regarding each others’ bid prices will 
introduce inefficiency because there is no assurance that the executed transactions are the most 
gainful (Atkinson and Teitenberg, 1991; Netusil and Braden, 2001). The trading ratio in point-
nonpoint programs is typically defined as the quantity of expected nonpoint loading reduction 
needed to offset one unit of point source loadings. Many existing programs set trading ratios 
substantially greater than one, ostensibly to adjust for the greater uncertainty in nonpoint loading 
reduction (EPA, 1996). However, such ratios operate like a tax to dampen the benefits from 
trading, hence reducing trading volume and overall gains from trading (Malik et al., 1993; 
Horan, 2001, Horan and Shortle, 2005; Hennessy and Feng, 2008). 
How can WQT markets be designed in ways that take into account different levels of 
information among buyers and sellers and what are the implications for the determination of 
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“optimal” trading ratios? To examine the ways that these market imperfections may interact to 
impact the performance of a WQT market, an agent-based model is constructed, which simulates 
a hypothetical point-nonpoint market. In particular, the market is modeled using a variant of the 
sequential, bilateral trading algorithm proposed by Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991). This paper 
first presents an overview of the simulation modeling technique and then analyzes the effects of 
two prominent market impediments identified in the WQT literature: information levels and 
trading ratios.  
 Relevant literature 
While WQT has been promoted by economists as a cost-effective means to achieve water 
quality goals, experience with actual WQT programs has yet to produce these results. Several 
theoretical studies have investigated the factors impeding trading (e.g., Malik et al, 1993; Horan, 
2001; Hennessy and Feng, 2008; Stavins, 1995), but very few articles have simulated an 
environmental trading market in action and only a small number of these have focused on water 
quality trading. Two notable exceptions have utilized trading simulations and relate to this 
research. An often cited article in the environmental markets literature is Atkinson and 
Tietenberg (1991) who simulated a sulfur dioxide trading market. Netusil and Braden (2001) 
followed with a simulation of a water quality market with varying transactions costs. There also 
are several relevant articles that addressed the effects of a trading ratio including Horan (2001) 
and Horan and Shortle (2005).  
Atkinson and Tietenberg examined the bubble policy of the Emissions Trading Program. 
The data used in this study came from 27 point sources in the St. Louis Air Quality Control 
Region. They attempted to explain the divergence in costs between the least cost solution and 
incentive based emissions trading approaches in air quality. More specifically, the article 
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examined the hypothesis that a sequential, bilateral process cannot achieve a cost-effective 
equilibrium in markets dealing with non-uniformly mixed pollutants. 
Simultaneous trading with complete information was the first scenario modeled. This 
most closely mimicked the least cost solution. The second scenario consisted of sequential 
trading with complete information. Firms were assumed to have complete knowledge of each 
other’s control costs, so that trades occurred in the order of gains from exchange – i.e., the first 
trade was between the two traders that had the most to gain from a transaction. The last scenario 
was sequential and operated under incomplete information in which a firm was randomly 
selected and then a “best” trading partner was found. This semi-random selection process 
continued until no feasible trades remained. This algorithm was run 500 times for each air 
quality standard. In all of the scenarios, the air quality standards had to be met. 
The results showed that more stringent standards resulted in greater divergence from the 
least cost benchmark, for all scenarios. The authors also concluded that the amount of 
information available and the sequencing of trades played a large role in the amount of cost 
savings realized. They thought that the most realistic scenario should be found somewhere 
between the complete information, sequential trading scenario and the random partial 
information scenario (thus achieving anywhere between 7% to 88% of the least cost benchmark). 
They did admit, however, that their cost savings results may be too optimistic because they did 
not account for transactions costs. They also suggested that a market for uniformly mixed 
pollutants may come closer to achieving the least cost benchmark. 
Netusil and Braden (2001) built upon Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) and extended their 
previous work in the area of transferable discharge permits. This is one of only a few studies that 
examined markets for water quality. The authors examined the effects of sequential bilateral 
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trading under imperfect information in a hypothetical sediment loading market. Their model 
allowed market participants to make multiple trades as opposed to a single trade. 
Their research also incorporated different levels of transactions costs into each trade. 
Another unique issue the authors addressed was lumpy abatement technologies. Trading does not 
always result in perfectly divisible transactions. This effectively simulated how a market would 
function in the real-world, since the quantity supplied by a given trader does not always equal the 
quantity demanded by a given trading partner. 
The data used in this analysis came from a 1,064-acre watershed area in Macon County, 
Illinois. Modeling was performed using a gains-ranked (high information) and a random (zero 
information) contracting scenario. In each scenario, the number of internal and external contracts 
was computed. Internal contracts were defined as trades between two sites under common 
ownership and external contracts were trades between two separate entities. 
The results showed that under the gains-ranked scenario, the sediment load under all 
transaction cost levels were lower than the regulatory policy’s requirement. Another important 
finding in this scenario was that the distribution of internal and external contracts changed as the 
transactions costs levels changed. High transactions costs resulted in a decrease in overall trading 
and caused a shift towards internal contracting. An interesting finding was that as transactions 
costs increased, the overall spending on abatement activities (inclusive of transactions costs) can 
sometimes decrease. The reasoning is that high transactions costs block low value contracts from 
occurring and allow the higher value trades to happen. Under random contracting (zero 
information), however, an increase in transactions costs always resulted in an increase in 
abatement and total costs. 
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The conclusions drawn were that neither trading scenario matched the least cost solution. 
This is because the least cost solution allows for simultaneous multilateral reallocations. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that both trading scenarios resulted in substantial cost 
savings relative to the regulatory approach even at the highest transactions costs level and lowest 
information level. 
Horan (2001) and Horan and Shortle (2005) analyzed different levels of trading ratios in 
the context of water quality trading. Horan (2001) presented trading ratios utilized in several 
existing, pilot, and planned point- and nonpoint-source trading markets. These ranged from 1.3:1 
to 3:1. Horan and Shortle (2005) performed a numerical example of trading in Susquehanna 
River Basin and arrived at “optimal” trading ratios in the range of 0.89:1 to 3.3:1  
Horan (2001) argued that from a welfare efficiency standpoint, the optimal trading ratio 
would necessarily be less than one when a WQT model is specified to have uniformly mixed 
pollutant loads, stochastic nonpoint loads, convex damages, and no transactions costs. This is 
because the variability in nonpoint loadings creates stochastic ambient pollution concentrations 
and stochastic damages from pollution. This leads to more social risk if damages are convex in 
ambient pollution and if increases in nonpoint loadings increase the variability of ambient 
pollution. Social risk is costly, so there are more benefits to reducing the variable nonpoint 
source pollution. Higher trading ratios work against this objective because they reduce the 
trading revenue per unit of loading reduction for nonpoint sources, thereby attracting fewer 
nonpoint traders and a higher overall level of nonpoint pollution. Thus, smaller trading ratios are 
more economically efficient.  
Horan (2001) suggested that it is realistic to assume policies are designed to allocate 
resources within the context of policy makers’ preferences, not to maximize aggregate economic 
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surplus. Thus, trading ratios are designed to be politically optimal. He further argued that trading 
ratios in excess of one may be the rational public sector response to the risk associated with 
stochastic nonpoint pollution because political support groups are likely to focus on expected 
loading reductions as opposed to overall social risks. Thus, trading ratios must be greater than 
one for most trading programs to be politically palatable. 
 Conceptual Model 
As with most markets, WQT markets can suffer from various imperfections and frictions, 
which tend to hinder trading and/or reduce the overall gains from trading. This section utilizes 
classic demand a supply diagrams to assess the impact of different market imperfections. 
 Frictionless market 
As a point of comparison, the equilibrium of a frictionless market with no imperfections 
is discussed first, represented in Figure 4.1. The demand curve in this figure represents treatment 
plants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for purchasing credits, reflecting the cost of controlling 
pollution through technology upgrades. The supply curve represents farms’ cost of pollution 
control through best management practices, which is their willingness to accept (WTA) to sell 
credits. When   = 0 credits, treatment plants are meeting their limits by controlling all of their 
pollution through their own facility upgrades or technological improvements. As   increases, 
plants are buying additional credits to allow more of the pollution to be controlled by the 
nonpoint sources. Thus, at any point on the diagram the total amount of pollution control does 
not change; however, the sources responsible for the pollution control does change. Stated 
differently, the quantity of trades has zero effect on expected water quality. 
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Figure 4.1 Frictionless WQT market 
 
 
This frictionless market condition assumes there are no intangible or transaction costs, 
and also that the trading ratio is 1:1. In the equilibrium of this market, point sources purchase  * 
credits from nonpoint sources at a price of   . Area   represents the market gains to point 
sources, reflecting the difference between the potential cost of technology upgrades (points along 
the demand curve) and the actual cost of purchased credits (the price   ). Area B is the gain to 
nonpoint sources, or the price received for the credits sold (  ) less the cost of generating those 
credits (points along S). The sum of these two areas is equal to total benefits or total cost savings 
from the program. Cost savings are maximized under these frictionless or “perfect” market 
conditions.  
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It is important to note that the areas delineating the gains to point source and nonpoint 
sources in the figure assume that every contract is traded at the equilibrium price,   . This would 
only occur under a simultaneous trading scenario. However, the way water quality markets are 
designed, trading must occur in a sequential and bilateral fashion. So, each contract results in a 
potentially unique price. Acknowledging this would change the individual values of the point- 
and nonpoint-source gains, but the total cost savings (sum of the two gains) would not vary. This 
limitation is true for all of the following market scenarios.  
 Information levels 
The first type of imperfection considered is limited information, which impacts the 
sequencing of trades. A frictionless market presumes complete information, where every 
participant in the market knows precisely the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept of all 
potential traders. In this situation, the trades would be executed in order of their market gains: the 
first trade would be between the buyer with the highest WTP and the seller with the lowest 
WTA, with successive trades yielding progressively narrower gaps between WTP and WTA 
until all gains have been exhausted at the equilibrium point. In a low information scenario, 
participants have little or zero information on other traders’ WTP or WTA values. In this limiting 
case, buyers and sellers would be traders would be paired together in a random order 
uncorrelated to the gains from trading. 
Ermoliev et al. (2000) actually proved that random-ordered, sequential trading can lead to 
an efficient outcome ( * in Figure 4.1). However, this can only occur when every participant has 
the ability to be a buyer and a seller and there are no transaction costs. That is, traders can back 
out of earlier trades at no penalty if they find a new trading partner that is more advantageous. 
This assumption is unlikely to hold for water quality trading programs in practice, where each 
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trade usually involves a binding contract that can only be breached at some financial penalty. All 
of the models in our paper operate under the assumptions that only point sources are able to buy 
credits, only nonpoint sources can sell credits, and that the penalties for breaching trade contracts 
are prohibitively large. Since Ermoliev et al.’s (2000) assumptions are not met in these models, 
different information levels should result in different levels of cost savings. 
 Figure 4.2 shows the effects of different information levels in the market. For this 
example, the focus only will be on the point sources located at points 1 and 3 on the demand 
curve (hereafter plant 1 and plant 3), and the nonpoint sources located at points 2 and 4 on the 
supply curve (hereafter farm 2 and farm 4). For simplicity, let us assume that all four of these 
entities would trade at most one credit. As in any market, the net gain from a given trade is equal 
to the difference between the price along the demand curve and the price along the supply curve. 
In a complete information and frictionless market, the first transaction involving any of these 
traders would be between plant 1 and farm 4. Plant 3 and farm 2 will not engage in trading 
because there would be a negative net gain from doing so. So, for the four traders combined, the 
net gain from trading under complete information is P1 – P4. 
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Figure 4.2 Effects of information 
 
 
A low information scenario, on the other hand, has the potential to result in different net 
gains (theoretically, it also has the potential to result in the same net gains). Suppose plant 1 
trades with farm 2. The resulting net gain from this transaction is P1 – P2. Suppose also that plant 
3 trades with farm 4 for a net gain of P3 – P4. The combined net gain from this sequence of 
trading is (P1 – P2)+(P3 – P4) = (P1 – P4) – (P2 – P3). So, assuming that all other traders are paired 
the same as the complete information scenario, this “ill-ordering” of trades would reduce the 
overall market gains by P2 – P3. This suggests that lower information is likely to increase trading 
volume while reducing the total gains from trading. However, whether point sources or nonpoint 
sources gain or lose from less information depends on the order of trading that is realized and 
cannot be unambiguously predicted. 
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 Trading ratios 
Figure 4.3 displays the impact of imposing a trading ratio on an otherwise frictionless 
market. As explained above, maximum efficiency is achieved by a 1:1 trading ratio. Imposing a 
2:1 trading ratio affects the nonpoint sources or the suppliers in the market. They must reduce 
nutrient loading by two pounds in order to receive one tradable credit. This essentially doubles 
the price of all credits sold, resulting in the steeper supply curve shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Effects of a trading ratio 
 
 
The quantity of credits traded reduces to    and the equilibrium price of credits increases 
to   . The gains to point sources with the 2:1 trading ratio is area A, compared to area A+B+C+D 
in the efficient market. Thus, raising the trading ratio to 2:1 induces a loss to point sources of 
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area B+C+D. The gains to nonpoint sources with a 2:1 trading ratio is area B+E, compared to 
area E+F+G in the efficient market. Thus, the net effect of the 2:1 trading ratio to the nonpoint 
sources is equal to B–F–G. If B is bigger than F+G, then the nonpoint sources benefit from the 
higher trading ratio. The change in total cost savings from the higher trading ratio is equal to a 
loss of area C+D+F+G. 
Unlike the frictionless market, expected loading in this case does respond to changes in 
the volume of credit trades. Because nonpoint traders must reduce loading by 2 lbs for every 1 
pound emitted by point source traders, there will be a net reduction of 1 pound of expected 
loading for each trade. For the equilibrium depicted in the diagram, point sources increase their 
expected loading by    pounds, while nonpoint sources reduce expected loading by 2   pounds. 
This implies a net reduction in expected loading equal to    pounds. 
 Co-effects of information levels and trading ratios 
The last type of market imperfection covered in this section of the thesis are the co-
effects of trading ratios with low information levels. The combined effects of these two 
imperfections are illustrated in Figure 4.4. Note, that linear supply and demand curves are used 
here for clarity.  
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Figure 4.4 Co-effects of trading ratio and information 
 
 
First, assume a supply curve under some “base” trading ratio (e.g., 1:1). Next, consider a 
higher trading ratio case (e.g., 3:1), which as seen before results in an upward shift and pivot of 
the supply curve. Focusing on the demand side, one can see that the highest price a point source 
is willing to pay for a credit is equal to     , which is located at the top of the demand curve. 
Similarly, the lowest willingness to accept prices are represented where the nonpoint sources’ 
supply curves (under each trading ratio) cross the y-axis and are equal to      and      . 
In previous discussion of information levels, it was found that whenever market 
participants located to the right of where demand and supply cross trade a less than efficient 
outcome results. Under a zero information case, these participants, which will be referred to as 
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“poor” traders (high cost sellers and low cost buyers) because they result in “poor” market 
performance, can and will participate in the market. 
Highlighted segments A, B, C, and D in Figure 4.4 illustrate the segments of demand and 
supply that fall to the right of equilibrium. Under the base trading ratio, the potential “poor” 
traders are equal to line segment A on the demand side and segment C on the supply side. In the 
case of a higher trading ratio, the amount of “poor” traders is represented by segment B on the 
demand side and D on the supply side. To determine the effects of a higher trading ratio under 
zero information, these segments must be compared across trading ratio levels. 
When segments A and B on the demand side are compared, there is a slight increase. This 
means that the potential for “poor” point sources to trade in the market increases. On the other 
hand, when C is compared to D on the supply side, there is a significant decrease, which 
indicates that the potential for “poor” nonpoint sources trading decreases significantly. Overall, 
this indicates that increasing the trading ratio can actually improve market efficiency (“ill-
ordered” trades decrease) when there is a scarcity of information in the marketplace.  
 Conceptual model summary 
The main predictions of theory are that the lack of information increases the quantity of 
credits traded and reduces overall cost savings. The trading ratio will also reduce overall cost 
savings but will reduce the quantity of credits traded. However, several relationships cannot be 
resolved from theory alone, nor can the magnitude of any of the impacts be assessed. These 
items will be addressed in the empirical simulation analysis in the following sections.  
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 Simulation Model 
An agent-based model (ABM) is created to simulate a hypothetical point-nonpoint source 
market. ABM’s have increasingly been used to study micro-level decisions and the resulting 
cascade of impacts within complex systems (Tesfatsion, 2006). This simulation is one in which 
all point sources (hereafter, we also refer to point sources as “plants”) are required to meet a 
lower limit of nutrient concentrations in their discharge stream. Plants can either upgrade their 
technology to meet this limit, or keep their old technology and buy water quality credits from 
nonpoint sources (hereafter, also called “farms”) to offset their excess discharges. Such a 
regulatory driver is necessary for the market to function. Farms who sell credits are then 
obligated to adopt land management practices to reduce expected loadings. 
The model relies on pre-specified values of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for purchasing 
credits by each plant and the willingness-to-accept (WTA) for selling credits by each farm who 
is a potential trader. A sequential, bilateral trading algorithm (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991) 
then simulates market outcomes from these base data. As described in the subsections below, the 
impact of information levels and trading ratios are captured either by varying the input data or by 
altering the assumptions in the trading algorithm that govern how buyers and sellers are paired 
together. 
ABMs require specification of two types of computational objects: the “agents” 
themselves and the “environment” in which they operate (Parker et al., 2002).  
 Agents 
The agents in this model are point- and nonpoint-sources of a water contaminant (e.g., 
nutrients). To create model agents, costs and quantities are generated for each of I = 10 point 
sources and J = 500 nonpoint sources using random draws from independent lognormal 
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distributions. The lognormal distribution is chosen to allow for the well-documented skewness in 
the distribution of costs and environmental impacts across the population of polluters (Nowak, et 
al., 2006). The parameter values of the lognormal distributions for both buyers and sellers are 
shown in Table 4.1. The distributional parameters and the population sizes are chosen to 
approximately reflect the data used by Smith (2004) to model phosphorus trading in the Middle 
Kansas River subwatershed. To ensure that the final results are not sensitive to a particular set of 
random draws, all scenarios are repeated 10,000 times in Monte Carlo fashion, with a new set of 
prices and quantities assigned to all agents each time. The results reported are the means of the 
10,000 iterations.  
Table 4.1 Lognormal distribution parameters for buyers and sellers 
Item Mean Standard deviation 
Buyer quantities (lbs) 5,000 1,250 
Buyer WTP ($/lbs) 20 15 
Seller quantities (lbs) 200 50 
Seller WTA ($/lbs) 12 8 
  
 Environment 
The “environment” is the trading mechanism that determines how buyers and sellers are 
paired together in the water quality trading market.  
 The marginal gains matrix and the trading ratio 
In each replication of the model, the WTP and WTA data were randomly generated from 
the distributions presented in Table 4.1. These data are used to form the core element of the 
simulation model, the marginal gains matrix. This matrix contains the potential gains from each 
possible pairing of the farms and plants. The rows of this matrix correspond to plants while its 
columns correspond to farms. In scenario  , the cell in row   and column   of this matrix is  
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where    is the assumed trading ratio in scenario   (expressed as the number of credits a farm 
must sell to offset one unit of plant discharge) and         is the mutual gain if plant   buys 
one more credit from farm   under the assumptions embedded in scenario  . 
A related matrix  , has the same dimensions and tracks the quantity of credits available 
for trade between each trading partner. The quantity data are also generated from the 
distributions in Table 4.1. At the start of trading the (i,j)th element of   is equal to     = min(qi, 
qj), where qi and qj are the randomly generated quantity of credits demanded by plant i and 
quantity of credits to be supplied by farm j, respectively. As trading proceeds the values in this 
matrix are reduced by the quantity transacted by the respective trading partners. A trader is 
removed from the market when its available quantity reached zero. 
 The trading algorithm and information levels 
The effect of marketplace information is captured by varying the assumptions in the 
sequential, bilateral trading algorithm that pairs buyers and sellers together in a specific order. 
Four possible information scenarios are modeled, which are described in turn below. 
 Complete information or marginal-gains-ranked trading 
This scenario assumes that every point source and every nonpoint source in the watershed 
knows precisely all the WTP and WTA values of all traders. In this situation, the most 
advantageous trades are executed first. Action begins by the plant with the highest WTP trading 
with the farm having the lowest WTA. This is determined by the element in the marginal gains 
matrix with the greatest positive value. 
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The point source purchases as many credits as it needed or until it buys out the nonpoint 
source, whichever occurs first. The quantity data and the marginal gains matrix are both updated 
accordingly when the trade is completed. 
The second trade begins by finding the greatest positive number in the updated marginal 
gains matrix. This determines the next two trading partners. The aforementioned process is then 
repeated. This marginal gains-ranked process continues until there are no more gains to be made 
by trading. 
 Zero information trading 
The second scenario presumes zero information, in which none of the traders know their 
own or anyone else’s WTP/WTA. Therefore, the trades occur in a completely random order. The 
single restriction is that only trades resulting in positive gains are allowable. A single element 
from the marginal gains matrix is chosen at random and this determines the trading partners. The 
trade is then made and the marginal gains matrix and quantity data are updated. Subsequent 
trades operate in the same random fashion. Trading continues until no positive gains remain. 
 Incomplete information trading: WTP Known 
The third scenario models the case where the plants’ WTP values are known to all 
traders, but farms’ WTA values are unknown. This depicts a situation in which the point sources 
drive the market. The first trade is between plant with the highest WTP and a randomly selected 
farm. Plants in remaining trades are selected in descending order of their WTP, paired with a 
randomly chosen farm each time. Trading data are updated using the same process as the other 
scenarios. 
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 Incomplete information trading: WTA Known 
The fourth scenario is similar to the third but reverses the roles of the plants and farms. 
Here, the plants’ WTP values are unknown, but farms’ WTA are common knowledge, implying 
that farms choices will drive the market. Farms enter the market in ascending order of their 
WTA, and are paired with randomly chosen plants, following the same previously described 
updating rules between trades.  
 The simulation experiments 
Table 4.2 lists the assumptions for each of the 24 simulation experiments conducted. 
Scenarios 1a through 1f assume that all market participants have perfect, complete information 
regarding others’ WTP and WTA values. On the other hand, scenarios 2a through 2f assume that 
there is zero information known regarding these values. A comparison of scenario sets 1 and 2 
will reveal the effect of complete information on market performance. If market performance 
changes significantly between these two cases, scenarios 3(a through f) and 4(a through f) will 
illuminate the separate effects of marketplace information on WTP or WTA under the partial 
information scenarios.  
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Table 4.2 The simulation experiments 
Scenario Trading Ratio Information Level 
1a 0.5:1 Complete 
1b 1:1 Complete 
1c 1.5:1 Complete 
1d 2:1 Complete 
1e 2.5:1 Complete 
1f 3:1 Complete 
2a 0.5:1 Zero 
2b 1:1 Zero 
2c 1.5:1 Zero 
2d 2:1 Zero 
2e 2.5:1 Zero 
2f 3:1 Zero 
3a 0.5:1 WTP Known 
3b 1:1 WTP Known 
3c 1.5:1 WTP Known 
3d 2:1 WTP Known 
3e 2.5:1 WTP Known 
3f 3:1 WTP Known 
4a 0.5:1 WTA Known 
4b 1:1 WTA Known 
4c 1.5:1 WTA Known 
4d 2:1 WTA Known 
4e 2.5:1 WTA Known 
4f 3:1 WTA Known 
 
Various levels of the trading ratio also are used. The trading ratio varies from a low of 
0.5:1 in the “a” scenarios up to 3:1 in “f” scenarios. The increment between the ratios is 0.5.  
Before presenting the simulation results for each scenario, two matters of interpretation 
should be noted. First, in evaluating the performance of the WQT market, comparisons are made 
to a baseline situation in which treatment plants would be required to meet the nutrient reduction 
limit by upgrading technology. Based on the information about the plants’ expected costs and 
quantities in Table 4.1, the limits would require the plants to reduce their annual nutrient load by 
a combined (expected value of) 10 plants × 5,000 lbs/plant = 50,000 lbs annually. The expected 
175 
 
total annual cost of these technology upgrades would be $20/pound × 50,000 lbs = $1.0 million. 
These two values form a baseline for comparing market outcomes. As trades occur in a WQT 
market, the same loading reduction is achieved but an increasing share of loading reduction is 
obtained from farms instead of treatment plants. Trading also will reduce the overall cost of 
achieving the target. Therefore, cost savings can be expressed both in dollar terms and as a 
percentage of the baseline costs. Likewise, trading volume can be expressed as the number of 
credits traded (measured in the pounds of loading reduction borne by farms) or as a percentage of 
the loading reduction target. 
Second, the gains from trading are equivalent to the cost savings to society from trading. 
A portion of these cost savings would be a gain to the point sources, to the extent that their credit 
purchases are less costly than the technology upgrades would have been. The remaining portion 
would be a benefit to farms, to the extent that credit revenue is larger than their costs of adopting 
land management practices. However, these simulations make no attempt to partition the total 
cost savings into the benefits to the two groups. The relative sizes of the gains would depend on 
the actual credit prices, which would vary across transactions and would depend on the relative 
negotiating power of the two groups. Lacking any reliable means to estimate the relative 
bargaining power and contract prices, estimates of the gains to the two groups could only be 
obtained by making arbitrary assumptions.  
 Simulation Results 
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of the scenarios resulting from the first 50 trades. While 
all of the scenarios ultimately resulted in more than 50 trades (ranged from 120-300 trades 
depending on the scenario), real-world evidence has shown that most programs result in very few 
transactions. Based on this, it was decided to primarily focus on the first 50 trades to provide a 
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more realistic analysis setting. This offers one base of comparison, which would apply if trading 
is limited. Appendix C displays the scenario results when all possible trades are completed. 
Table 4.3 Simulation results 
Scenario 
Trading 
Ratio 
Volume Traded Cost Savings Final Costs 
Base 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Loading 
Reduction 
by PS (lbs) 
Additional 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Total 
Loading 
Reduction 
(lbs) Total ($) 
Percent 
(%) Total ($) 
Avg. 
($/lb) 
1a 0.5 9,133 31,735 - 40,867 412,685 41.3 587,315 14.37 
1b 1.0 9,476 40,524 - 50,000 228,499 22.8 771,501 15.43 
1c 1.5 6,351 43,649 3,175 53,175 147,751 14.8 852,249 16.03 
1d 2.0 4,816 45,184 4,816 54,816 106,804 10.7 893,196 16.29 
1e 2.5 3,888 46,112 5,832 55,832 76,717 7.7 923,283 16.54 
1f 3.0 3,239 46,761 6,479 56,479 56,569 5.7 943,431 16.70 
2a 0.5 9,139 31,722 - 40,861 226,862 22.7 773,138 18.92 
2b 1.0 9,492 40,508 - 50,000 85,333 8.5 914,667 18.29 
2c 1.5 6,368 43,632 3,184 53,184 50,567 5.1 949,433 17.85 
2d 2.0 4,822 45,178 4,822 54,822 37,452 3.7 962,548 17.56 
2e 2.5 3,887 46,113 5,831 55,831 29,546 3.0 970,454 17.38 
2f 3.0 3,240 46,760 6,480 56,480 24,331 2.4 975,669 17.27 
3a 0.5 9,134 31,733 - 40,866 363,109 36.3 636,891 15.58 
3b 1.0 9,476 40,524 - 50,000 177,677 17.8 822,323 16.45 
3c 1.5 6,354 43,646 3,177 53,177 101,392 10.1 898,608 16.90 
3d 2.0 4,820 45,180 4,820 54,820 66,671 6.7 933,329 17.03 
3e 2.5 3,888 46,112 5,832 55,832 43,917 4.4 956,083 17.12 
3f 3.0 3,240 46,760 6,480 56,480 31,088 3.1 968,912 17.16 
4a 0.5 9,134 31,733 - 40,866 275,477 27.5 724,523 17.73 
4b 1.0 9,476 40,524 - 50,000 117,971 11.8 882,029 17.64 
4c 1.5 6,351 43,649 3,175 53,175 68,249 6.8 931,751 17.52 
4d 2.0 4,816 45,184 4,816 54,816 49,469 4.9 950,531 17.34 
4e 2.5 3,888 46,112 5,832 55,832 42,166 4.2 957,834 17.16 
4f 3.0 3,240 46,760 6,479 56,479 38,569 3.9 961,431 17.02 
NPS = nonpoint source 
PS = point source 
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The first and second columns of Table 4.3 serves as a cross reference for the scenario 
inputs and assumptions listed in Table 4.2. The third through sixth columns report trading 
volume; loading reductions by type and source. 
The next two columns report the cost savings, in total dollars and as a percentage of the 
baseline total costs ($1 million). Simulated cost savings varied widely, ranging from about 
$24,000 to $413,000 or from about 2.4% to 41.3% of baseline costs. Again, the potential cost 
savings varied substantially under the various simulated market structures. 
The last two columns report the final (post-trading) costs. Due to the different trading 
ratios, some of the scenarios exactly achieved the loading reduction target while others were 
either below or above the target level. The next-to-last column was computed simply as the 
baseline (pre-trading) costs less the cost savings from trading (e.g., in scenario 1a, $1,000,000 - 
$412,685 = $587,315), while the last column expresses the final cost in average terms – i.e., 
costs per unit of loading reduction achieved (in scenario 1a, $587,315/40,867 lbs = $14.37/lb of 
loading reduction). The last column provides a useful comparison of the cost-effectiveness 
across scenarios. With no trading, the cost per unit of loading reduction is $1,000,000/50,000 lbs 
= $20.00/lb. With trading, this cost ranged from $14.37/lb to $18.92/lb, so as expected, trading 
will reduce per-unit control costs.  
 Information levels 
The effect of marketplace information on overall cost savings is unambiguously positive. 
This can be illustrated by comparing scenario 1a (complete information), which resulted in net 
cost savings of $412,685 to scenario 2a (zero information), which resulted in savings of only 
$226,862. This relationship between complete and zero information held for every scenario 
modeled regardless of trading ratios. These results were expected and are similar to the findings 
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of Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991). Intuitively, lower information reduces cost savings because it 
creates some risk that “high cost” sellers – those with high WTA values – will displace some low 
cost sellers that could have traded for a larger gain. Similarly, the “low paying” buyers with low 
WTP values, may displace some of the higher paying buyers. The market transactions that 
maximize cost savings would include the low cost sellers paired with the high cost buyers, but in 
the limiting case of zero information, all buyers and sellers are equally likely to participate.  
When the gains per trade are depicted graphically, the effects of information levels on 
market performance become more pronounced. Table 4.5 illustrates the gains per trade under 
different information levels with a 1:1 trading ratio assuming all trades are completed. Scenario 
1b ends at $497,161 of total gains. This level of gains is reached after 227 trades have been 
completed. Scenario 2b, on the other hand, reaches a maximum of $392,259, but does so after 
255 trades; an additional 28 trades. Scenario 1b could have ceased after 118 trades and more 
gains would have been realized ($393,724) than the total for scenario 2b. If trading were halted 
after 118 trades in scenario 2b, only $188,623 (48% of its final value) of gains would have been 
realized.  
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Figure 4.5 Effects of marketplace information on cost savings with a 1:1 trading ratio 
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Figure 4.5 also reveals the effects of different types of incomplete information. When 
traders are informed of buyers’ prices (WTP Known - scenario 3b), the cumulative cost savings 
curve behaves very similarly to the complete information case (scenario 1b) across the early 
trades while scenario 4 (WTA Known) behaves similarly to the zero information case. Scenario 
3b results in more cost savings than scenario 4b across the first 65% of trades. Analyzing only 
the first 50 trades (Figure 4.6), shows the importance of information regarding buyers’ prices 
relative to sellers’ prices when only a limited number of trades occur. These results imply that if 
market designers feel that only a limited number of trades will be completed, creating an 
institution that provides accessible information about buyers’ prices (3b) is preferred to 
providing information about sellers’ prices (4b). Of course, this still depends on other factors 
such as the cost of providing this information to market participants. 
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Figure 4.6 Effects of marketplace information on cost savings with a 1:1 trading ratio (first 
50 trades) 
 
 
 Trading ratio 
As expected, there is a negative relationship between the trading ratio and potential gains 
from trading. Focusing on the “1” scenarios, the cost savings decrease from over $412,000 to 
$56,000 as the trading ratio increases from 0.5:1 to 3:1. But, this can be somewhat misleading 
because each of these scenarios results in a different amount of nutrient loading reduction. In the 
case of a 0.5:1 trading ratio, the nutrient reduction target of 50,000 lbs is not met. And in the case 
of a 3:1 trading ratio (scenario 1f), there are an additional 6,479 lbs of nutrient reduction beyond 
the target.  
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As stated earlier, the purpose of a trading ratio greater than one is to account for nutrient 
reduction uncertainty and ensure that there is an overall increase in water quality (beyond that 
which would occur in the absence of WQT and reliance on only technology upgrades). 
According to the simulation results, this is generally the case. Figure 4.7 illustrates the trading 
volume and net environmental gains in the different scenarios. The height of the red bars 
represents the amount of loading reduction transferred from point sources to nonpoint sources 
through trading. The green bars represent the amount of loading reduction achieved from 
necessary upgrading of wastewater treatment plants. In cases of a trading ratio greater than 1:1 
(i.e., scenarios 1c through 1f and 2c through 2f), there are additional loading reductions achieved 
beyond the target, represented by the height of the blue bars. With a 2:1 trading ratio for 
example, each unit of increased plant loadings is offset by a two pound reduction in expected 
loading by farms, resulting in net environmental gains. Scenario 1d results in 4,816 credits 
traded. Because of the 2:1 trading ratio, nonpoint sources reduce expected loading by a total of 
9,632 lbs (2*4,816), so combining this with the 45,184 lbs of reduction achieved from 
wastewater treatment plant upgrades the total expected loading reduction amounts to 54,816 lbs. 
So, the introduction of a trading ratio greater than 1:1 results in an environmental improvement – 
the 50,000 lbs loading reduction target is exceeded by 4,816 lbs. 
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Figure 4.7 Trading volume and additional loading reduction by scenario (first 50 trades) 
 
 
Because of reasons stated earlier, the most useful metric for evaluation and comparison 
across scenarios may be the average cost of nutrient reductions. The effect of the trading ratio on 
cost-effectiveness is not independent of the information levels. This is demonstrated graphically 
by comparing Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. Under complete information, an increase in the trading 
ratio raises average costs throughout the period of trading (Figure 4.8). Increasing the trading 
ratio from 1:1 to 2:1 (Scenarios 1b and 1d) increases final average costs from $15.43 to $16.29, 
an increase of 5.6%. Increasing the ratio from 1:1 to 3:1 increases final average costs by 8.2%. 
Further, with complete information, reducing the trading ratio from 1:1 to 0.5:1 results in an 
increase in final average costs.  
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Figure 4.8 Effects of a trading ratio under complete information 
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Figure 4.9 Effects of a trading ratio under zero information 
 
 
The results are different for zero information. Here, the 0.5:1 trading ratio (Scenario 2a) 
is the least cost-effective (highest average costs) across the first 50 trades (Figure 4.9). Under 
zero information, we find that the trading ratio has an unambiguously positive effect on cost-
effectiveness. One reason this occurs is that high trading ratios help to eliminate the highest-cost 
sellers by pricing them out of the market. As noted above, zero information creates a risk that 
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with initial WTA’s near the maximum WTP will not be able to find a gainful trading partner if 
the trading ratio is increased.  
 Co-effects of information levels and trading ratios  
Table 4.4 shows the effects of information levels on cost-effectiveness across different 
trading ratios. Specifically, scenarios 1(a through f) with complete information are compared to 
scenarios 2(a through f) with zero information. The results show that as the trading ratio 
increases information levels become less important. At extremely high trading ratios, the 
difference in average cost-effectiveness between complete- and zero-information approaches 
zero. It is important to note, however, that this difference will never become positive. In other 
words, more information is always preferred to less information but it becomes less important as 
the trading ratio increases. 
Table 4.4 Effects of information levels on cost-effectiveness across different trading ratios 
Scenarios for 
Comparison 
Trading 
Ratio 
Difference in 
Average 
Cost-Effectiveness 
($/lb) 
More Cost-
Effective 
Scenario? Conclusions 
1a & 2a 0.5:1 -4.55 Complete (1a)  
As trading ratio 
increases, information 
becomes less 
important. 
1b & 2b 1:1 -2.86 Complete (1b)  
1c & 2c 1.5:1 -1.82 Complete (1c)  
1d & 2d 2:1 -1.26 Complete (1d)  
1e & 2e 2.5:1 -0.85 Complete (1e)  
1f & 2f 3:1 -0.57 Complete (1f)  
      
Based on these results, the determination of an “optimal” trading ratio should necessarily 
depend on the amount of information available to market participants. The next section discusses 
points to consider in the characterization of an “optimal” trading ratio.  
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 Characteristics of an “optimal” trading ratio 
Since real-world WQT markets most likely operate somewhere in between complete and 
zero information, a “partial” information scenario, where there is some information known about 
both WTP and WTA values, may be more realistic. If the partial information scenario is defined 
as halfway in between complete and zero information, then averages can be calculated across 
appropriate scenarios’ output data. For example, the output from scenario 1b (complete 
information, 1:1 trading ratio) and scenario 2b (zero information, 1:1 trading ratio) can be 
averaged. The averaged data are reported in Table 4.5. 
In the process of designing existing programs, potential traders often emphasize cost-
effectiveness while environmental groups tend to focus on expected loadings. A possible test of 
political feasibility is to compare the scenarios based on these two criteria. Based on the 
information in Table 4.5, the poorest performing scenarios appear to be the cases where there are 
extremely low or high trading ratios. The “a” (0.5:1 trading ratio) scenario have the lowest 
average costs of all scenarios at $16.65/lb of reduction. Most importantly, however, is the fact 
that the “a” scenario result in only 40,864 lbs of loading reduction - 9,136 lbs short of the goal. 
This is the only scenario that fails to meet the goal of 50,000 lbs of loading reduction. For this 
reason, the 0.5:1 trading ratio would not be a politically or socially acceptable.  
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Table 4.5 Partial information scenarios 
 
Disregarding scenario “a”, scenario “b” (1:1 ratio) results in the greatest amount of cost 
savings (16%) and the lowest average costs at $16.86/lb. However, there is no additional loading 
reduction achieved beyond the 50,000 lbs target. 
The “f” scenario (3:1 trading ratio) exhibits the highest average costs of nutrient 
reduction at $16.99/lb. The overall cost savings of 4% are minimal. On the positive side, 
however, is the fact that this scenario does result in 6,479 lbs of additional loading reduction.  
It is difficult to definitively rank scenarios b through f as the ordering would be 
dependent upon normative judgments about the relative weighting of the criteria. There are, 
however, several definite implications for an “optimal” trading ratio.   
If overall information availability is a concern or if the goal is to maximize total loading 
reduction a higher trading ratio (e.g., 3:1) is recommended.  On the other hand, if it is presumed 
that information will be readily disseminated and understood by market participants, a lower 
trading ratio may be more economical. The cost of disseminating information to market 
participants needs to be considered during the decision-making process. If the goal is to simply 
maximize cost savings while achieving the reduction goal, a 1:1 trading ratio shows the greatest 
potential. However, if WQT market designers hope to gain additional loading reduction while 
Scenario 
Trading 
Ratio 
Volume Traded Cost Savings Final Costs 
Base 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Loading 
Reduction 
by PS (lbs) 
Additional 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Total 
Loading 
Reduction 
(lbs) Total ($) 
Percent 
(%) Total ($) 
Avg. 
($/lb) 
a 0.5 9,136  31,728   -  40,864  319,774  32.0   680,226  16.65  
b 1.0 9,484  40,516   -  50,000  156,916  15.7   843,084  16.86  
c 1.5 6,359  43,641  3,180  53,180  99,159   9.9   900,841  16.94  
d 2.0 4,819  45,181  4,819  54,819  72,128   7.2   927,872  16.93  
e 2.5 3,888  46,112  5,831  55,831  53,132   5.3   946,868  16.96  
f 3.0 3,240  46,760  6,479  56,479  40,450   4.0   959,550  16.99  
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maintaining high levels of cost savings a 1.5:1 trading ratio may be most appropriate. If overall 
average cost-effectiveness or additional nutrient reductions is of importance and buyer and seller 
information is scarce, a higher trading ratio may be in order. 
 Simulation of real-world WQT markets 
While the model developed here utilized constructed data, there is no reason why these 
same market simulation algorithms could not simulate markets from observed data in particular 
locations. Because WQT programs, by nature, involve complex interactions between economics 
and the biophysical world, accurately simulating a WQT market requires detailed cost and 
watershed modeling data.  
There are two types of cost data needed. On the point source side, facility upgrade costs 
and annual operation maintenance costs of meeting a more stringent nutrient standard are needed 
for wastewater treatment plants in the study watershed. These data either can be attained from 
surveys or by using general industry cost functions (e.g., Greenhalgh and Sauer, 2003). In either 
case, the one-time and annual costs along with the appropriate time horizon should be used to 
calculate the annualized costs, which considers the time value of money by including a discount 
rate. 
For nonpoint sources, the expected costs for BMPs are needed. These costs can come 
from surveys or from previous research. University Extension fact sheets can often times provide 
general estimates for this type of data (e.g., Devlin et al., 2003). One-time and annual costs 
should be converted to an annualized basis in analogous fashion to the point source data. 
Further, traders may perceive “intangible” costs that are weighed against any potential 
gains. That is, the assumption that only monetary trading gains enter traders’ utility functions 
may not hold. A growing literature documents that the behavior of participants in an institution is 
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influenced by institutional processes and rules, independent of the participants’ fiscal outcomes 
(Berg, et al., 2005; Johnston and Duke, 2007). Obtaining the information necessary to estimate 
intangible costs that may exist is crucial for simulating a real-world WQT market. Since these 
data are subjective by nature, it only can be obtained accurately through interaction with 
potential market participants via experiments, interviews, or surveys.  
Along with the economic data, biophysical watershed data are needed. Watershed models 
play a central role in the simulation and execution of real-world WQT markets. Watershed 
models represent a scientific understanding of how land characteristics, BMPs, and other factors 
relate to pollutant loading into surface waterbodies (Nejadhashemi et al., 2009). There are many 
types of models ranging from very simple to very advanced (see Nejadhashemi et al., 2009 for 
guidance in choosing a model). Regardless of the type of model used, the minimum output from 
the model should be: the baseline nutrient loading from each subwatershed, reduction in loading 
from each subwatershed after a given BMP(s) is implemented, and relevant delivery ratios.  
Combining all of this information will allow the researcher to generate the necessary 
WTP and WTA curves discussed previously in this paper. The procedures laid out in this paper 
should be followed to simulate sequential, bilateral trading in the real-world watershed.  
 Conclusion 
While there is substantial evidence that nonpoint sources have lower nutrient reduction 
costs than point sources, experience with WQT reveals a common theme: little or no trading 
activity. The success of WQT seems, in part, to depend on the structure of the market created to 
bring buyers and sellers together to transact exchanges. These outcomes suggest the presence of 
obstacles to trading that were not recognized in the design of existing programs.  
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While the complete information scenario serves as a useful benchmark, most existing 
WQT markets are decentralized in nature, so that limited information causes traders to be 
matched in a less efficient sequence. A variety of information levels are possible. One side of the 
market may have more information than the other (incomplete information) or neither side 
having any knowledge of the other side’s bid or offer prices (zero information). Each of these 
scenarios leads to a different sequencing of trades.  
Several notable results are found regarding information levels. The results imply that if 
market designers feel that only a limited number of trades will be consummated, creating an 
institution that provides accessible information about buyers’ prices is preferred to providing 
information about sellers’ prices. Overall, more information is always better, but it becomes less 
important with higher trading ratios.  
Trading ratios are a common component of many existing WQT programs. A typical 
trading ratio of 2:1 requires a nonpoint source to reduce two pounds of expected nutrient loading 
in order to receive one pound of trading credit. These ratios are purported to serve as a “safety 
factor” and are incorporated to account for the uncertainty in the measurement and monitoring of 
nonpoint source loading. Because nonpoint traders must reduce loading by two pounds for every 
one pound emitted by point source traders, there will be a net reduction of one pound of expected 
loading for each trade. So, while inhibiting some trades from ever occurring, trading ratios also 
have the potential to improve water quality beyond trading with a 1:1 trading ratio. This paper 
examines these tradeoffs in terms of effects on market performance and then describes 
procedures that can be used to characterize an optimal trading ratio if one exists. Based on the 
findings of this study, an “optimal” trading ratio should depend on the market designers’ goals 
and the amount of information available and the cost of disseminating this information.  
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Previous studies (Malik et al, 1993; Horan, 2001; Horan and Shortle, 2005) have shown 
that under plausible conditions a trading ratio greater than 1:1 is likely to increase the risk of 
environmental damage because it dampens the incentive for nonpoint sources to trade and results 
in a greater share of overall loading attributed to (risky) nonpoint sources. This result is at odds 
with the trading ratios chosen in existing programs, nearly all of which are greater than 1:1. 
Horan (2001) offers one potential explanation for this discrepancy – certain groups of political 
stakeholders lobby for higher trading ratios because their goal is to raise overall loading 
reductions. Here, we find that apart from any implications on environmental risk or political-
economic factors, there is an economic welfare justification for high trading ratios in certain 
situations with limited trading information. Limited information introduces a random element to 
market participation, creating a risk that high-cost sellers (low-cost buyers) will transact to 
displace low-cost sellers (high-cost buyers) who could have traded for greater gain. To the extent 
that high trading ratios price the highest-cost sellers and lowest-cost buyers out of the market, it 
reduces this risk and lowers average costs.  
There are several limitations to this study. One is that these simulations did not consider 
the risk and variability associated with NPS loading. Mean loading values were used. In the real-
world, there will most definitely be some years in which the BMPs put in place by farms will 
over-perform and significantly reduce nutrient runoff and in other years the BMPs may 
significantly under-perform. Incorporating this stochastic process into the model would 
illuminate the effect of environmental risk – which previous research has shown will tend to 
decrease the welfare-maximizing trading ratio – against the information effects considered in the 
present study. A stochastic model also would be capable of predicting policy-relevant measures 
such as the percentage of time nutrient reduction targets would be exceeded and by how much. 
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Two other important market impediments not addressed in this study are transactions 
costs and intangible costs. These two factors may play a major role in determining the success or 
failure of a market for water quality.  
Based on the findings of this paper and the previous research that helped to mold this 
study, there appears to be a need for the comprehensive simulation of a WQT market in a real-
world watershed to provide a further examination of potential market impediments. The data 
requirements for a study such as this would be substantial, but necessary for describing the “true” 
story that has and continues to be played out in past, current, and future WQT markets.
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CHAPTER 5 - Concluding Remarks 
Nearly a decade of working in the water resource economics research and extension 
fields has provided an appreciation for the role that economics can play in the management of 
our water resources as well as the limitations that exist. The following are a few general 
observations based on my extension experience and research. 
Cost-effective conservation is smart economics and is a way of getting the biggest “bang 
for the buck,” but it may not be the most politically or socially palatable approach. In other 
words, cost-effective policies may fund conservation practices for one farmer, while a neighbor 
farmer just down the road receives nothing due to not meeting the cost-effective criteria needed 
to receive any funding in the way of BMP cost-share or incentive payments. A similar case may 
occur when a farmer who has already been using a suite of conservation practices funded out of 
his own pocket gets no additional funding, while his neighbor, whose fields have massive gullies 
after every rain resulting from years of neglecting terraces and moldboard plowing, receives 
substantial conservation payments.  
What is “right” or “wrong” or “fair” in this situation? Or, to whom should conservation 
payments be issued? These are most definitely challenging questions and certainly hot topics in 
conservation policy arenas. First, there is likely not a “Pareto-optimal” approach where everyone 
is made better off (or at least as well off) and no one is made worse off. Many policies seem to 
attempt to achieve this result often times at the taxpayers’ expense. Secondly, it seems 
reasonable to assert that, from an economic perspective, conservation payments should only be 
issued for practices where the vast majority of benefits go to those offsite or downstream. In 
other words, in cases where the external benefits of the BMP are much greater than those 
received by the farmers themselves.  
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As stated in Chapter 2, a BMP such as no-till has been adopted by many farmers on their 
own without outside compensation. This is most likely due to the increased net returns offered 
from no-till cropping systems for certain farming operations. For this reason, it is questionable as 
to whether management practices like no-till should be funded through conservation programs. If 
it makes economic sense to the farmer to adopt no-till, he will adopt. If it doesn’t make economic 
sense, he will not adopt. It is a debatable point as to whether or not a relatively small per acre 
incentive payment for three years (i.e., EQIP) is going to be enough to convince a farmer to 
change their entire cropping management strategy. It is economically reasonable to presume that 
any farmer who has in the past received conservation funding for converting to no-till would 
have converted to no-till on their own without any outside compensation or returned to their 
conventional farming methods at the conclusion of the allotted time period. Cases such as these 
yield a negative return on investment for the conservation funding agencies. Further, these cases 
have the potential to “harm” neighboring farmers.21  
A tillage management strategy is a significant and long-term decision and investment by 
a farmer and a little money for a few years is likely not going to cause any change in behavior 
that would not have occurred otherwise without the conservation funding. If policy cost-
effectiveness is of concern, conservation dollars ought not to be directed towards cropping 
management strategies such as these that many farmers have already found to be very cost-
effective and profitable on their own without outside compensation.  
On the other hand, BMPs such as filter strips offer little financial benefit to the farmer. 
Rather, the overwhelming majority of the benefits go to downstream stakeholders. These 
represent market failures by way of externalities. In these cases, cost-share and incentive 
                                                 
21
 Farmers who get conservation payments may be able to afford higher bids for cash renting cropland compared to 
neighboring farmers who did not receive the payments. 
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payment funding can be economically justified. Most farmers operate a profit-seeking business. 
Just like any other business they have a goal of remaining in operation and viable in the future. 
So, a profit must be made. Taking profitable cropland out of production for the benefit of society 
and wildlife may sound great in theory, but the truth is that it is not feasible for the majority of 
farmers. Society stands to benefit from BMPs such as filter strips and permanent vegetation 
establishment, so society should justifiably bear some of the cost. As an aside, it is my 
experience that most farmers will voluntarily contribute some of their own resources (e.g., time 
and money) to such projects even if the majority of benefits go downstream. Most farmers are 
excellent stewards of the land and desire to conserve our soil and water resources for future 
generations.  
Related to all of this, it is not cost-effective to allocate conservation funds to individuals 
for practices they are already doing (i.e., early versions of the Conservation Security Program). 
Again, this is paying farmers for something that they obviously thought generated positive net 
returns or made sense to them in some other way. Throwing more money at existing BMPs 
depletes budget resources without improving environmental quality.  
The idea of “cost-effective conservation” was addressed in this dissertation and every 
attempt was made to make this research as applicable as possible to real-world policy. It was 
found that targeting of conservation practices is 8 to 23 (note: not small by any stretch of the 
imagination) times more cost-effective than an approach where funds are given to any willing 
farmer/landowner who fills out an application. This really highlights the necessity of targeting. 
Considering the case of a watershed impacted by reservoir sedimentation, saving or spending 
funds on dredging would be economically preferred to random or even semi-random BMP 
implementation. It should be noted that “optimal” targeting is difficult in the real-world and most 
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likely cannot be achieved to the degree modeled in this dissertation. But, one policy alternative 
that does offer some potential in attaining the most cost-effective environmental improvement is 
competitive bidding. Specifically, a BMP auction policy approach.
22
 BMP auctions are an 
excellent way of creating the proper incentives to allow the “market” to identify the most cost-
effective environmental improvements in a watershed.  
Doing much research in the area of WQT and meeting with both farmers and those in the 
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) industry helps to provide an understanding and a sense of 
the potential success/failure for this policy alternative. This chapter concludes with a few 
concluding remarks related to WQT.  
Right now, it does not appear that WQT has great potential - at least in the central part of 
the United States. The current nutrient discharge limits in place (or those being proposed for the 
very near future) are achievable by most WWTPs with relatively little effort and/or financial 
resources.  
The WWTP community sees a lot of risk associated with participating in these types of 
markets relative to “concrete and steel” engineering solutions that can be achieved via plant 
upgrades. Further, cities desire to have up to date and modern treatment facilities. WWTPs 
notoriously, whether deservedly or undeservedly, get a bad rap for being dirty, smelly, and 
pollution causing. A poor, rundown looking facility does not help this cause. A WWTP operator 
in central Kansas summarized it best by saying, “Look, we work around crap all day long, we 
don’t want a facility that looks like crap.” In other words, they want shiny, state-of-the-art 
facilities. So, why would they want to pay farmers to put conservation practices in at the expense 
of facility improvements?  
                                                 
22
 BMP auctions were briefly described in Chapter 1. 
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However, if EPA cranks the nutrient limits down to very low levels in the future (given 
today’s costs of technology), WQT may have more potential. This would be the necessary driver 
for WQT to work. This would likely create such a huge divergence in point versus nonpoint 
source control costs to overcome the risk, uncertainty, and overall reluctance by WWTPs to want 
to participate in WQT markets. 
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Appendix A - Field operations and enterprise budgets 
The following field operations and cropping budgets were assembled for each crop 
rotation and tillage system combination in both the Nebraska and Kansas side of the TCL 
watershed. Note that all cost values are in a dollars per acre basis. The field operations data were 
used in the SWAT model. The budgets presented here were not used in determining the costs of 
the BMPs. They are simply included as additional cropping information. 
Table A.1 Field operations for continuous corn 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
C
O
R
N
 
Chisel 5-Nov Chisel 5-Nov Herbicide application 10-Oct 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr 
Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 15-Apr 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 15-Apr Plant corn 16-Apr 
Herbicide application 15-Apr Plant corn 16-Apr Fertilizer application 16-Apr 
Plant corn 16-Apr Fertilizer application 16-Apr Herbicide application 20-May 
Fertilizer application 16-Apr Herbicide application 20-May Harvest corn 1-Oct 
Herbicide application 20-May Harvest corn 1-Oct   
Harvest corn 1-Oct     
  
Table A.2 Budget for continuous corn 
 CORN 
 Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre 110 110 110 
B. Price per bushel 4.21 4.21 4.21 
C. Net government payment 13.60 13.60 13.60 
D. Indemnity payments - - - 
E. Miscellaneous income - - - 
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 476.70 476.70 476.70 
    
COSTS PER ACRE    
 1. Seed  85.86 85.86 85.86 
 2. Herbicide 23.03 23.03 29.93 
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide - - - 
 4. Fertilizer and Lime 134.25 134.25 134.25 
 5. Crop Consulting - - - 
 6. Crop Insurance - - - 
 7. Drying - - - 
208 
 
 8. Miscellaneous 8.25 8.25 8.25 
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 131.53 119.72 99.03 
 10. Non-machinery Labor 9.49 9.49 9.49 
 11. Irrigation    
 a. Labor - - - 
 b. Fuel and Oil - - - 
 c. Repairs and Maintenance - - - 
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - 
 e. Interest on Equipment - - - 
 12. Land Charge / Rent 76.00 76.00 76.00 
G. SUB TOTAL 468.41 456.60 442.81 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs 13.73 13.32 12.84 
H. TOTAL COSTS 482.14 469.92 455.64 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H) (5.44) 6.78 21.06 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A) 4.38 4.27 4.14 
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST (I+13)/G 1.77% 4.40% 7.65% 
 
 
Table A.3 Field operations for corn-soybean rotation 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
C
O
R
N
 
Chisel 5-Nov Chisel 5-Nov Herbicide application 10-Oct 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr 
Knife anhydrous amm. 5-Apr Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 15-Apr 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 15-Apr Plant corn 16-Apr 
Herbicide application 15-Apr Plant corn 16-Apr Fertilizer application 16-Apr 
Plant corn 16-Apr Fertilizer application 16-Apr Herbicide application 20-May 
Fertilizer application 16-Apr Herbicide application 20-May Harvest corn 1-Oct 
Herbicide application 20-May Harvest corn 1-Oct    
Harvest corn 1-Oct         
S
O
Y
B
E
A
N
S
 
Chisel 5-Nov Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 30-Apr 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 5-May 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 5-May 
Field cultivate 14-May Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 1-Jun 
Plant soybeans 16-May Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct 
Fertilizer application 16-May Harvest soybeans 1-Oct    
Herbicide application 14-Jun      
Harvest soybeans 1-Oct         
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Table A.4 Budget for corn-soybean rotation 
 CORN SOYBEANS ROTATION 
 Tillage Type Tillage Type Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre 110 110 110 33 33 33    
B. Price per bushel 4.21 4.21 4.21 8.69 8.69 8.69    
C. Net government payment 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60    
D. Indemnity payments - - - - - -    
E. Miscellaneous income - - - - - -    
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 476.70 476.70 476.70 300.37 300.37 300.37 388.54 388.54 388.54 
          
COSTS PER ACRE          
 1. Seed  85.86 85.86 85.86 35.00 35.00 35.00    
 2. Herbicide 23.03 23.03 29.93 11.86 11.86 18.76    
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide - - - - - -    
 4. Fertilizer and Lime 117.15 117.15 117.15 36.61 36.61 36.61    
 5. Crop Consulting - - - - - -    
 6. Crop Insurance - - - - - -    
 7. Drying - - - - - -    
 8. Miscellaneous 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25    
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 131.53 119.72 99.03 101.89 75.21 58.78    
 10. Non-machinery Labor 9.49 9.49 9.49 6.37 6.37 6.37    
 11. Irrigation          
 a. Labor - - - - - -    
 b. Fuel and Oil - - - - - -    
 c. Repairs and Maintenance - - - - - -    
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - - - -    
 e. Interest on Equipment - - - - - -    
 12. Land Charge / Rent 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00    
G. SUB TOTAL 451.31 439.50 425.71 275.98 249.30 239.77 363.64 344.40 332.74 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs 13.14 12.72 12.24 7.00 6.07 5.73 10.07 9.39 8.99 
H. TOTAL COSTS 464.44 452.22 437.95 282.98 255.36 245.50 373.71 353.79 341.72 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H) 12.26 24.48 38.75 17.39 45.01 54.87 14.83 34.74 46.81 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A) 4.22 4.11 3.98 8.58 7.74 7.44    
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST 
(I+13)/G 
5.63% 8.47% 11.98% 8.84% 20.49% 25.28%    
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Table A.5 Field operations for grain sorghum-soybeans-wheat rotation 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
G
R
A
IN
 S
O
R
G
H
U
M
 
Chisel 1-Aug Chisel 15-Aug Herbicide application 10-Aug 
Tandem disk 1-Sep Herbicide application 15-Oct Herbicide application 15-Oct 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Knife anhydrous amm. 5-May Knife anhydrous amm. 5-May 
Knife anhydrous amm. 5-May Field cultivate 15-May Fertilizer application 25-May 
Field cultivate 15-May Fertilizer application 25-May Plant sorghum 25-May 
Fertilizer application 25-May Plant sorghum 25-May Herbicide application 25-May 
Plant sorghum 25-May Herbicide application 25-May Herbicide application 1-Jul 
Herbicide application 25-May Herbicide application 1-Jul Harvest sorghum 25-Sep 
Herbicide application 1-Jul Harvest sorghum 25-Sep    
Harvest sorghum 25-Sep         
S
O
Y
B
E
A
N
S
 
Chisel 5-Nov Chisel 5-Nov Herbicide application 30-Apr 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Field cultivate 15-Apr Plant soybeans 5-May 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Field cultivate 14-May Fertilizer application 5-May 
Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 16-May Herbicide application 1-Jun 
Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 1-Jul 
Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct 
Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct    
Harvest soybeans 1-Oct         
W
H
E
A
T
 Field cultivate 10-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct 
Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct 
Plant wheat 16-Oct Harvest wheat 1-Jul Harvest wheat 1-Jul 
Harvest wheat 1-Jul         
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Table A.6 Budget for grain sorghum-soybeans-wheat rotation 
  GRAIN SORGHUM SOYBEANS WHEAT ROTATION 
  Tillage Type Tillage Type Tillage Type Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE  Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre  76 76 76 33 33 33 50 50 50    
B. Price per bushel  4.33 4.33 4.33 8.69 8.69 8.69 6.24 6.24 6.24    
C. Net government payment  13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60    
D. Indemnity payments  - - - - - - - - -    
E. Miscellaneous income  - - - - - - - - -    
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 342.68 342.68 342.68 300.37 300.37 300.37 325.60 325.60 325.60 312.99 312.99 312.99 
              
COSTS PER ACRE              
 1. Seed   14.76 14.76 14.76 35.00 35.00 35.00 16.00 16.00 16.00    
 2. Herbicide  29.52 36.42 43.32 11.86 11.86 18.76 - - -    
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide  - - - - - - - - -    
 4. Fertilizer and Lime  77.92 77.92 77.92 36.61 36.61 36.61 84.82 84.82 84.82    
 5. Crop Consulting  - - - - - - - - -    
 6. Crop Insurance  - - - - - - - - -    
 7. Drying  - - - - - - - - -    
 8. Miscellaneous  8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25    
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 136.62 108.41 98.66 101.89 75.21 58.78 69.37 58.92 58.92    
 10. Non-machinery Labor  8.45 8.45 8.45 6.37 6.37 6.37 7.02 7.02 7.02    
 11. Irrigation              
 a. Labor  - - - - - - - - -    
 b. Fuel and Oil  - - - - - - - - -    
 c. Repairs and Maintenance  - - - - - - - - -    
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - - - - - - -    
 e. Interest on Equipment  - - - - - - - - -    
 12. Land Charge / Rent  76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00    
G. SUB TOTAL  351.51 330.20 327.35 275.98 249.30 239.77 261.46 251.01 251.01 268.72 250.16 245.39 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs  9.64 8.90 8.80 7.00 6.07 5.73 6.49 6.13 6.13 6.75 6.10 5.93 
H. TOTAL COSTS  361.16 339.10 336.15 282.98 255.36 245.50 267.95 257.14 257.14 275.47 256.25 251.32 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H)  (18.48) 3.58 6.53 17.39 45.01 54.87 57.65 68.46 68.46 37.52 56.73 61.67 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A)  4.75 4.46 4.42 8.58 7.74 7.44 5.36 5.14 5.14    
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST 
(I+13)/G 
-2.51% 3.78% 4.68% 8.84% 20.49% 25.28% 24.53% 29.71% 29.71%    
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Table A.7 Field operations for continuous soybeans 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
S
O
Y
B
E
A
N
S
 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 30-Apr 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 5-May 
Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 5-May 
Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 1-Jun 
Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct 
Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct    
Harvest soybeans 1-Oct      
Chisel 5-Nov         
 
Table A.8 Budget for continuous soybeans 
 SOYBEANS 
 Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre 33 33 33 
B. Price per bushel 8.69 8.69 8.69 
C. Net government payment 13.60 13.60 13.60 
D. Indemnity payments - - - 
E. Miscellaneous income - - - 
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 300.37 300.37 300.37 
    
COSTS PER ACRE    
 1. Seed  35.00 35.00 35.00 
 2. Herbicide 11.86 11.86 18.76 
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide - - - 
 4. Fertilizer and Lime 36.61 36.61 36.61 
 5. Crop Consulting - - - 
 6. Crop Insurance - - - 
 7. Drying - - - 
 8. Miscellaneous 8.25 8.25 8.25 
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 101.89 75.21 58.78 
 10. Non-machinery Labor 6.37 6.37 6.37 
 11. Irrigation    
 a. Labor - - - 
 b. Fuel and Oil - - - 
 c. Repairs and Maintenance - - - 
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - 
 e. Interest on Equipment - - - 
 12. Land Charge / Rent 76.00 76.00 76.00 
G. SUB TOTAL 275.98 249.30 239.77 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs 7.00 6.07 5.73 
H. TOTAL COSTS 282.98 255.36 245.50 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H) 17.39 45.01 54.87 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A) 8.58 7.74 7.44 
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST (I+13)/G 8.84% 20.49% 25.28% 
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Table A.9 Field operations for soybeans-wheat rotation 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
S
O
Y
B
E
A
N
S
 
Chisel 1-Aug Chisel 1-Aug Herbicide application 1-Aug 
Tandem disk 1-Sep Herbicide application 1-Sep Herbicide application 15-Oct 
Tandem disk 27-Mar Field cultivate 15-Apr Herbicide application 30-Apr 
Field cultivate 15-Apr Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 5-May 
Field cultivate 14-May Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 5-May 
Plant soybeans 16-May Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 1-Jun 
Fertilizer application 16-May Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct 
Herbicide application 14-Jun Harvest soybeans 1-Oct    
Harvest soybeans 1-Oct         
W
H
E
A
T
 Field cultivate 10-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct 
Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct 
Plant wheat 16-Oct Harvest wheat 1-Jul Harvest wheat 1-Jul 
Harvest wheat 1-Jul         
  
Table A.10 Budget for soybeans-wheat rotation 
 SOYBEANS WHEAT ROTATION 
 Tillage Type Tillage Type Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre 33 33 33 50 50 50    
B. Price per bushel 8.69 8.69 8.69 6.24 6.24 6.24    
C. Net government payment 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60    
D. Indemnity payments - - - - - -    
E. Miscellaneous income - - - - - -    
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 300.37 300.37 300.37 325.60 325.60 325.60 312.99 312.99 312.99 
          
COSTS PER ACRE          
 1. Seed  35.00 35.00 35.00 16.00 16.00 16.00    
 2. Herbicide 11.86 11.86 18.76 - - -    
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide - - - - - -    
 4. Fertilizer and Lime 36.61 36.61 36.61 84.82 84.82 84.82    
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 5. Crop Consulting - - - - - -    
 6. Crop Insurance - - - - - -    
 7. Drying - - - - - -    
 8. Miscellaneous 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25    
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 101.89 75.21 58.78 69.37 58.92 58.92    
 10. Non-machinery Labor 6.37 6.37 6.37 7.02 7.02 7.02    
 11. Irrigation          
 a. Labor - - - - - -    
 b. Fuel and Oil - - - - - -    
 c. Repairs and Maintenance - - - - - -    
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - - - -    
 e. Interest on Equipment - - - - - -    
 12. Land Charge / Rent 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 76.00    
G. SUB TOTAL 275.98 249.30 239.77 261.46 251.01 251.01 268.72 250.16 245.39 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs 7.00 6.07 5.73 6.49 6.13 6.13 6.75 6.10 5.93 
H. TOTAL COSTS 282.98 255.36 245.50 267.95 257.14 257.14 275.47 256.25 251.32 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H) 17.39 45.01 54.87 57.65 68.46 68.46 37.52 56.73 61.67 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A) 8.58 7.74 7.44 5.36 5.14 5.14    
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST (I+13)/G 8.84% 20.49% 25.28% 24.53% 29.71% 29.71%    
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Table A.11 Field operations for continuous wheat 
 Conventional Tillage Reduced Tillage No-Tillage 
W
H
E
A
T
 
Chisel 1-Aug Chisel 1-Aug Herbicide application 1-Aug 
Tandem disk 1-Sep Herbicide application 1-Sep Herbicide application 1-Sep 
Tandem disk 1-Oct Field cultivate 10-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct 
Field cultivate 10-Oct Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct 
Fertilizer appl. (preplant) 15-Oct Plant wheat 16-Oct Herbicide application 1-Mar 
Plant wheat 16-Oct Herbicide application 1-Mar Harvest wheat 1-Jul 
Herbicide application 1-Mar Harvest wheat 1-Jul    
Harvest wheat 1-Jul         
 
Table A.12 Budget for continuous wheat 
 WHEAT 
 Tillage Type 
INCOME PER ACRE Conv. Red. NT 
A. Yield per acre 50 50 50 
B. Price per bushel 6.24 6.24 6.24 
C. Net government payment 13.60 13.60 13.60 
D. Indemnity payments - - - 
E. Miscellaneous income - - - 
F. Returns/acre ((A x B) + C + D + E) 325.60 325.60 325.60 
    
COSTS PER ACRE    
 1. Seed  16.00 16.00 16.00 
 2. Herbicide 6.16 13.06 19.96 
 3. Insecticide / Fungicide - - - 
 4. Fertilizer and Lime 110.32 110.32 110.32 
 5. Crop Consulting - - - 
 6. Crop Insurance - - - 
 7. Drying - - - 
 8. Miscellaneous 8.25 8.25 8.25 
 9. Custom Hire / Machinery Expense 114.44 95.96 75.27 
 10. Non-machinery Labor 10.79 10.79 10.79 
 11. Irrigation    
 a. Labor - - - 
 b. Fuel and Oil - - - 
 c. Repairs and Maintenance - - - 
 d. Depreciation on Equipment / Well - - - 
 e. Interest on Equipment - - - 
 12. Land Charge / Rent 76.00 76.00 76.00 
G. SUB TOTAL 341.96 330.38 316.59 
 13. Interest on 1/2 Nonland Costs 9.31 8.90 8.42 
H. TOTAL COSTS 351.27 339.29 325.01 
I. RETURNS OVER COSTS (F - H) (25.67) (13.69) 0.59 
J. TOTAL COSTS/BUSHEL (H/A) 7.03 6.79 6.50 
K. RETURN TO ANNUAL COST (I+13)/G -4.78% -1.45% 2.85% 
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Appendix B - Example MATLAB Simulation Code for Chapter 2 
In order for the Chapter 2 code to work correctly, several “functions” are relied upon and 
the associated m.files need to be accessible (i.e., in the current directory in MATLAB). A 
list of these publicly available m.files are listed below: 
 keep3.m 
 officedoc.m (Note, this is not a free program. See the following link for more details 
regarding officedoc - http://undocumentedmatlab.com/OfficeDoc/) 
 randswap.m 
 unique_no_sort 
 
Example Code for Targeted BMP Implementation focusing on sediment and $50,000 
annual budget 
 
%Full information BMP implementation, Marginal Gains based implementation 
%Sediment Reduction 
  
clear %clears workspace; comment this out if using MasterRunFile 
clc %clears command window 
delete ('BestS_15yr_50K.xls') %deletes existing Excel spreadsheet output 
OutFile = 'C:\Documents and Settings\Craig Smith\My 
Documents\Ph.D\Cost_Effective_WS_Management\SimModel_6\BestS_15yr_50K.xls'; 
  
warning off MATLAB:divideByZero 
  
%What are the Sediment reduction goals and budget constraint and iterations? comment if 
%using MasterRunFile 
RedGoal = 100000000; 
Budget = 50000; 
xpercent = 0.25; %percent of farms to eliminate 
iterationsbest = 3000; %number of iterations (e.g., 1000 or more) 
  
%Load Cost and Quantity data 
WSdata = xlsread('Tuttle_Model_Data.xls', 'MATinput','A2:O1859'); 
TotFarms = size(WSdata,1); 
SubWS = WSdata(:,2); 
num_counties = 10; %number of counties 
num_BMPs = 3; %number of BMPs available 
seed_value = 31517; %seed value 
  
%Need to eliminate "xpercent" of the farms because we will assume that 
%xpercent of the farms have already adopted BMPs or will never adopt BMPs 
ineligiblefarms = round(xpercent*TotFarms); 
  
%--------------------------------- 
SubWS_percent = xlsread('BMPCosts_15yrs.xls','input','D3:AH12'); 
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%Create a matrix with max(SubWS) columns representing the subwatersheds 
%and the data in the rows represents which HRUs belong to each subwatershed 
SW = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); %preallocate a TotFarms by max(SubWS) matrix 
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 SW_a = find(SubWS==i); 
 SW_b = zeros(TotFarms - size(SW_a,1),1); %need to add a column vector of zeros to make each vector 
the same length 
 SW_c = cat(1,SW_a,SW_b); 
 SW(:,i) = SW_c; %SW is the resulting matrix 
end; 
  
%--------------------------------------- 
%need a 1 by num of SubWS's matrix with number of HRUs in each SubWS 
SW_count = zeros(1,max(SubWS)); %preallocate 
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 SW_count(1,i) = max(find(SW(:,i)>0)); %this is # of HRUs in each SubWS 
end; 
  
Co_SW_matrix = SubWS_percent(:,1:max(SubWS)); %this is % of SubWS in each county 
Co_SW_matrix_1 = zeros(num_counties,max(SubWS)); %preallocate 
  
for i = 1:num_counties 
 Co_SW_matrix_1(i,:) = round((Co_SW_matrix(i,:).*SW_count)-.05); %subtract .05 so that we don't get 
any negative #'s in 
 %the Co_SW_matrix_2 which is calculated next 
end; 
%---------------------------------------- 
%Need to make sure each column adds up to the correct number of HRUs 
Co_SW_matrix_2 = zeros(1,max(SubWS)); 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 Co_SW_matrix_2(1,i) = SW_count(1,i) - sum(Co_SW_matrix_1(1:9,i)); 
end; 
  
Co_SW_matrix_1(num_counties,:) = Co_SW_matrix_2; 
%---------------------------------------- 
  
BMP_ann_costs = SubWS_percent(:,29:31); 
BMP_cost_matrix = zeros(TotFarms,num_BMPs); %preallocate a matrix with TotFarms by 3 (# of 
BMPs) columns 
BMP_matrix1 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
BMP_matrix2 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
BMP_matrix3 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
  
for j = 1:max(SubWS) 
 A = 0; 
 for i = 1:num_counties 
 if Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j) == 0 
 continue 
 end 
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 BMP_matrix1(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,1); 
 BMP_matrix2(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,2); 
 BMP_matrix3(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,3); 
 A = Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A; 
 end; 
end; 
  
%---------------------------------------- 
%Subdivide matrix into column vectors cell arrays 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 y{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1);%preallocate 
 bmp1{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
 bmp2{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
 bmp3{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
end; 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 y{i} = SW(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp1{i} = BMP_matrix1(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp2{i} = BMP_matrix2(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp3{i} = BMP_matrix3(:,i); 
end 
%----------------------------------------- 
  
%Get rid of zeros in each column vector 
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 y_new{i} = y{1,i}(y{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp1_new{i} = bmp1{1,i}(bmp1{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp2_new{i} = bmp2{1,i}(bmp2{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp3_new{i} = bmp3{1,i}(bmp3{1,i}~=0); 
end 
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%---------------------------------------- 
  
%Combine common Subwatershed vectors, so the result will be 3 BMP cost 
%column vectors. We can then randomly pair these using the randswap function 
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 combined_bmpcosts{i} = cat(2,bmp1_new{1,i},bmp2_new{1,i},bmp3_new{1,i}); 
end 
rand('seed',seed_value); %set seed value 
  
%---------------------------------------- 
%Start simulating the BMP implementation scenarios. Note that this is the 
%outerloop 
  
for j = 1:iterationsbest 
 j 
 tic; 
 HRU_id = WSdata(:,1); 
 FarmArea = WSdata(:,3); 
 BaseNLoad = WSdata(:,4); 
 BMP1NLoad = WSdata(:,5); 
 BMP2NLoad = WSdata(:,6); 
 BMP3NLoad = WSdata(:,7); 
  
 BMP1NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP1NLoad; 
 BMP2NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP2NLoad; 
 BMP3NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP3NLoad; 
  
 BasePLoad = WSdata(:,8); 
 BMP1PLoad = WSdata(:,9); 
 BMP2PLoad = WSdata(:,10); 
 BMP3PLoad = WSdata(:,11); 
  
 BMP1PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP1PLoad; 
 BMP2PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP2PLoad; 
 BMP3PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP3PLoad; 
  
 BaseSLoad = WSdata(:,12); 
 BMP1SLoad = WSdata(:,13); 
 BMP2SLoad = WSdata(:,14); 
 BMP3SLoad = WSdata(:,15); 
  
 BMP1SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP1SLoad; 
 BMP2SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP2SLoad; 
 BMP3SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP3SLoad; 
  
 %Now randomly pair the combined BMP costs matrix with an HRU 
 for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 rand_bmpcosts = randswap(combined_bmpcosts{1,i}); 
 SW_bmpcosts{i} = cat(2,y_new{1,i},rand_bmpcosts); 
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 end 
  
 %Reshape and order the bmpcosts matrix in numerical order by the first 
 %column which is HRU id number 
 SW_bmpcosts = reshape(SW_bmpcosts,max(SubWS),1); 
 stacked_bmpcosts = cell2mat(SW_bmpcosts); 
 ordered_HRU_bmpcosts = sortrows(stacked_bmpcosts,1); 
  
 %Determine Total and Average BMP costs for each HRU for N,P, and S 
  
 %Nitrogen Costs 
 BMP1NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1NCost = BMP1NCost./BMP1NQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2NCost = BMP2NCost./BMP2NQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3NCost = BMP3NCost./BMP3NQuantity; 
  
 %Phosphorus Costs 
 BMP1PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1PCost = BMP1PCost./BMP1PQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2PCost = BMP2PCost./BMP2PQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3PCost = BMP3PCost./BMP3PQuantity; 
  
 %Sediment Costs 
 BMP1SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1SCost = BMP1SCost./BMP1SQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2SCost = BMP2SCost./BMP2SQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3SCost = BMP3SCost./BMP3SQuantity; 
  
 %Get rid of zeros and negatives in Average BMP cost matricies 
 BMPsAVGNCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1NCost,AVGBMP2NCost,AVGBMP3NCost); 
 findzerosN = find(BMPsAVGNCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGNCosts matrix 
 BMPsAVGNCosts(findzerosN) = nan; %replaces zeros and negatives with nan's which is need for this 
program 
  
 BMPsAVGPCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1PCost,AVGBMP2PCost,AVGBMP3PCost); 
 findzerosP = find(BMPsAVGPCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGPCosts matrix 
 BMPsAVGPCosts(findzerosP) = nan; %replaces zeros and negatives with nan's which is need for this 
program 
  
 BMPsAVGSCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1SCost,AVGBMP2SCost,AVGBMP3SCost); 
 findzerosS = find(BMPsAVGSCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGSCosts matrix 
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 BMPsAVGSCosts(findzerosS) = nan; %replaces zeros and negatives with nan's which is need for this 
program 
  
 %Get rid of the negatives and zeros 
 NReductions = cat(2, BMP1NQuantity, BMP2NQuantity, BMP3NQuantity); 
 PReductions = cat(2, BMP1PQuantity, BMP2PQuantity, BMP3PQuantity); 
 SReductions = cat(2, BMP1SQuantity, BMP2SQuantity, BMP3SQuantity); 
  
 % findreductionsN = find(NReductions<0); %finds negative values in N reductions data 
 % NReductions(findreductionsN) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 % findreductionsP = find(PReductions<0); %finds negative values in P reductions data 
 % PReductions(findreductionsP) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 findreductionsS = find(SReductions<0); %finds negative values in S reductions data 
 SReductions(findreductionsS) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 %Need to eliminate "xpercent" of the farms because we will assume that 
 %xpercent of the farms have already adopted BMPs or will never adopt 
 %BMPs. This is done by randomly selecting xpercent of the farms and 
 %setting the appropriate rows in the BMPsAVGSCosts to zero. Note that 
 %if we were trading in regards to another pollutant (N or P), then this 
 %code would need to be changed to the appropriate BMP Avg Cost matrix. 
 %If there are already more farms with negatives and zeros than 
 %ineligible farms, then this piece of code has no effect 
  
 num_of_zeros = size(find(SReductions(:,1) == 0),1); 
 while num_of_zeros < ineligiblefarms 
 eliminate_id = round(rand(1)*TotFarms); 
 if eliminate_id == 0 
 continue 
 end 
 SReductions(eliminate_id,1:3) = zeros(1,3); 
 num_of_zeros = size(find(SReductions(:,1) == 0),1); 
 end; 
 num_of_zeros = size(find(SReductions(:,1) == 0),1); 
  
 findreductionsS_zeros = find(SReductions == 0); 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(findreductionsS_zeros) = nan;%set corresponding cells in BMPAVG S Cost 
 %matrix to nan 
  
 CummNQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPNCost1 = 0; 
 CummPQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPPCost1 = 0; 
 CummSQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPSCost1 = 0; 
 zeromatrix = zeros(TotFarms,num_BMPs);%zeros matrix of dimension TotFarms x 3 which is # of 
BMPs 
 nanmatrix = nan(TotFarms,num_BMPs);%nan matrix of dimension TotFarms x 3 which is # of BMPs 
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 %This is the innerloop where the actual BMP implementation occurs 
 i = 0; 
 while (CummSQuantity < RedGoal) && (i < TotFarms) %loop while below reduction goal AND while 
the number of 
 %BMP projects implemented is less than or equal to the total number of farms (this is because each 
 %farm can only implement one BMP) 
  
 [FarmID,BMP] = find(min(min(BMPsAVGSCosts)) == BMPsAVGSCosts); %Find minimum avg PCost 
  
 if BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP) == nan %if there is zero SCost for BMP implementation 
 %set that Farm-BMP Combo to nan and the corresponding SReductions value to zero 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP) = nan; 
 SReductions(FarmID,BMP) = 0; 
 continue; %go back to the start of the while loop 
 end; 
  
 if SReductions == zeromatrix 
 break; end; 
  
% if BMPsAVGSCosts == nanmatrix %this can be commented out if the 
% budget and/or reduction goal are binding 
% break; end; 
  
 if size ([FarmID,BMP],1) > 1 %If there are BMPs (and/or Farms) with identical SCosts, pick the first one 
 FarmID = FarmID(1); 
 BMP = BMP(1); 
 end; 
  
 AVGPracticeSCost = BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP); 
 Area = FarmArea(FarmID,1); 
 NQuantity = NReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 PQuantity = PReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 SQuantity = SReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 TotPracticeSCost = AVGPracticeSCost*SQuantity; 
  
 if (TotPracticeSCost + TotBMPSCost1) > Budget 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP) = nan; 
 SReductions(FarmID,BMP) = 0; 
 continue; 
 end; %if implementing this BMP will exceed the budget, take that Farm-BMP Combo out of the market 
  
 SReductions(FarmID,BMP) = SReductions(FarmID,BMP) - SQuantity; %Update SReductions1 Matrix 
 i = i + 1; 
  
 if SReductions(FarmID,BMP) == 0 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,:) = nan; %If the previous BMP was fully implemented, take that farm out of 
the market 
 SReductions(FarmID,:) = 0; 
 end; 
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 if i == 1 %save data 
 Simout = [Area, FarmID, BMP, AVGPracticeSCost, SQuantity, TotPracticeSCost]; 
 OtherSimout = [NQuantity, PQuantity]; 
 else Simout = [Simout; Area, FarmID, BMP, AVGPracticeSCost, SQuantity, TotPracticeSCost]; 
 OtherSimout = [OtherSimout; NQuantity, PQuantity]; 
 end; 
  
 Count = (1:i)'; %this numbers the rows in the first column of output 
 TotArea = sum(Simout(:,1)); 
 CummSQuantity = sum(Simout(:,5)); 
 TotBMPSCost = sum(Simout(:,6)); 
 TotBMPSCost1 = TotBMPSCost + 0; 
 CummNQuantity = sum(OtherSimout(:,1)); 
 CummPQuantity = sum(OtherSimout(:,2)); 
 numofBMP1 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==1),1); %calculates # of BMP1 implemented 
 numofBMP2 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==2),1); %calculates # of BMP2 implemented 
 numofBMP3 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==3),1); %calculates # of BMP3 implemented 
 end; 
  
 a = nan(i-1,1); %nan matrix that is i-1 rows and 1 column 
 TotBMPnumOUT = cat(1,i,a); %the scalar value is inserted at top of a matrix to make 
 %a i x 1 matrix for output purposes - same procedure for next 5 
 %output variables 
 TotAreaOUT = cat(1,TotArea,a); 
 TotBMPSCostOUT = cat(1,TotBMPSCost,a); 
 RedGoalOUT = cat(1,RedGoal,a); 
 BudgetOUT = cat(1,Budget,a); 
 CummNQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummNQuantity,a); 
 CummPQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummPQuantity,a); 
 CummSQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummSQuantity,a); 
 numofBMP1OUT = cat(1,numofBMP1,a); 
 numofBMP2OUT = cat(1,numofBMP2,a); 
 numofBMP3OUT = cat(1,numofBMP3,a); 
  
 Output = cat(2,Count, Simout, OtherSimout, TotBMPnumOUT, TotAreaOUT, CummSQuantityOUT, 
TotBMPSCostOUT, RedGoalOUT,... 
 BudgetOUT, CummNQuantityOUT, CummPQuantityOUT, numofBMP1OUT, numofBMP2OUT, 
numofBMP3OUT); 
 % numericalOutput = num2cell(Output); %change the numerical array into a cell array 
  
 OUT{j} = {Output}; 
 toc 
 time2{j} = toc; 
end; 
  
disp ('Successfully finished the iterations!!') 
%------------------------------------------------ 
  
%Finds the maximum number of BMP projects implemented(rows) in the output data. Changes all 
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%matrices to have the same number of rows. Zeros are put in the rows that 
%are added.For more information, go to section 15.3 in the array manipulation 
%publication 
  
  
for j=1:iterationsbest 
 b(j) = max(OUT{1,j}{1,1}(:,1)); %finds total # of BMP projects implemented in each iteration 
end; 
  
m = mean(b); %finds average # of BMP projects implemented across all iterations 
m = round(m); %rounds the average # to nearest whole number 
% aa = a(:)'; %creates another matrix aa equal to a 
% aa = aa(ones(m,1),:); %transforms aa into an m by iterations matrix 
bb = (1:m)'; %creates bb which is a column vector going from 1 to m 
% bb = bb(:,ones(length(a), 1)); %transforms bb into a m by iterations matrix 
% %with each column going from 1 to m 
% b = bb .* (bb <= aa); %the dot indicates array multiplication (not the same 
% %as matrix multiplication. Arrays in bb are multiplied by an array of ones 
% %and zeros corresponding to the number of BMP projects implemented 
% M = mean(b,2); %sums across all rows of the b matrix resulting in a column vector 
  
for i = 1:iterationsbest %this loop equalizes number of rows (equal to mean # of BMP projects 
implemented) 
 %across all iterations so that the means can be calcualted 
 cc{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,2); %area 
 ee{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,6); %tons of soil reduction 
 ff{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,7); %total BMP cost 
 gg{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,8); %pounds of N reduction 
 hh{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,9); %pounds of P reduction 
 ii{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,10); %num of BMPs 
 jj{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,11); %total area 
 kk{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,12); %cummulative soil reduction 
 ll{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,13); %total BMP costs 
 mm{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,14); %soil reduction goal 
 nn{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,15); %budget 
 oo{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,16); %cummulative N reduction 
 pp{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,17); %cummulative P reduction 
 qq{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,18); %num of BMP1 implemented 
 rr{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,19); %num of BMP2 implemented 
 ss{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,20); %num of BMP3 implemented 
  
 [u,y] = size(cc{i}); 
 if u >= m 
 cc1{i} = cc{i}(1:m,:); 
 ee1{i} = ee{i}(1:m,:); 
 ff1{i} = ff{i}(1:m,:); 
 gg1{i} = gg{i}(1:m,:); 
 hh1{i} = hh{i}(1:m,:); 
 else v = m-u; 
 w = zeros(v,1); 
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 cc1{i} = cat(1,cc{i},w); 
 ee1{i} = cat(1,ee{i},w); 
 ff1{i} = cat(1,ff{i},w); 
 gg1{i} = cat(1,gg{i},w); 
 hh1{i} = cat(1,hh{i},w); 
 end; 
end; 
  
%convert cell array of matricies to single matrix 
ccc = cell2mat(cc1); 
eee = cell2mat(ee1); 
fff = cell2mat(ff1); 
ggg = cell2mat(gg1); 
hhh = cell2mat(hh1); 
iii = cell2mat(ii); 
jjj = cell2mat(jj); 
kkk = cell2mat(kk); 
lll = cell2mat(ll); 
mmm = cell2mat(mm); 
nnn = cell2mat(nn); 
ooo = cell2mat(oo); 
ppp = cell2mat(pp); 
qqq = cell2mat(qq); 
rrr = cell2mat(rr); 
sss = cell2mat(ss); 
ddd = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(eee,2)); %avg S reduction costs (total) 
ttt = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(ggg,2)); %avg N reduction costs (total) 
uuu = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(hhh,2)); %avg P reduction costs (total) 
  
%finds mean of rows 
mccc = mean(ccc,2); %area 
meee = mean(eee,2); %tons of soil reduction 
mfff = mean(fff,2); %total BMP cost 
mvvv = mfff./meee; %avg S reduction incremental costs 
mddd = cat(1,mean(ddd,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg S reduction costs (total) 
mggg = mean(ggg,2); %pounds of N reduction 
mwww = mfff./mggg; %avg N reduction incremental costs 
mttt = cat(1,mean(ttt,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg N reduction costs (total) 
mhhh = mean(hhh,2); %pounds of P reduction 
mxxx = mfff./mhhh; %avg P reduction incremental costs 
muuu = cat(1,mean(uuu,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg P reduction costs (total) 
miii = cat(1,mean(iii,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMPs 
mjjj = cat(1,sum(mccc),nan(m-1,1)); %total area 
mkkk = cat(1,sum(meee),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative soil reduction 
mlll = cat(1,sum(mfff),nan(m-1,1)); %total BMP costs 
mmmm = cat(1,mean(mmm,2),nan(m-1,1)); %soil reduction goal 
mnnn = cat(1,mean(nnn,2),nan(m-1,1)); %budget 
mooo = cat(1,sum(mggg),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative N reduction 
mppp = cat(1,sum(mhhh),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative P reduction 
mqqq = cat(1,mean(qqq,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP1 implemented 
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mrrr = cat(1,mean(rrr,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP2 implemented 
msss = cat(1,mean(sss,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP3 implemented 
  
SumOut = 
cat(2,bb,mccc,mfff,meee,mvvv,mddd,mggg,mwww,mttt,mhhh,mxxx,muuu,miii,mjjj,mlll,mmmm,mnnn,
mkkk,mooo,mppp,mqqq,mrrr,msss); 
SumOutcell = num2cell(SumOut); 
Headings = {'#' 'Area (ac)' 'TotBMPCost' 'S_Quantity (tons)' 'AVGincremCost_S (/ton)' 'AVGred_S_Cost 
(/ton)' 'N_Quantity (lbs)' 'AVGincremCost_N (/lb)'... 
 'AVGred_N_Cost (/lb)' 'P_Quantity (lbs)' 'AVGincremCost_P (/lb)' 'AVGred_P_Cost (/lb)' 
'TotBMPnum' 'Total Area (ac)' 'TotBMPCost'... 
 'S_RedGoal (tons)' 'Budget' 'Cumm_S_Quantity (tons)' 'Cumm_N_Quantity (lbs)' 'Cumm_P_Quantity 
(lbs)'... 
 '# of BMP1' '# of BMP2' '#of BMP3'}; 
  
allOutput = [Headings; SumOutcell]; 
xlswrite('BestS_15yr_50K.xls',allOutput,1,'A1'); 
  
%---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Run OfficeDoc to format Excel output 
% Open document in 'append' mode: 
[file,status,errMsg] = officedoc('BestS_15yr_50K.xls', 'open', 'mode','append'); 
  
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'A1:W1', 'bold','on','WrapText',1); 
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'D:D,E:E,F2,H:H,I2,K:K,L2', 
'NumberFormat','$#,##0.00'); 
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'D:D,G:G,J:J,U2,V2,W2', 'NumberFormat','#,##0.00'); 
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'C:C,O2,Q2', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0'); 
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'B:B, M2,N2,P2,R2,S2,T2', 'NumberFormat','#,##0'); 
status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', 1, 'Range', 'A:W', 'ColAutoFit',1); 
  
% Close the document, deleting standard sheets and releasing COM server: 
status = officedoc(file, 'close', 'release',1,'delStd','off'); 
toc 
% Re-display document; file is no longer valid so we must use file name: 
%officedoc('BestS_15yr_50K.xls', 'display'); 
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Example Code for Random BMP Implementation focusing on sediment and $50,000 
annual budget 
 
%Random BMP implementation 
%Sediment Reduction 
  
clear %clears workspace; comment this out if using MasterRunFile 
clc %clears command window 
delete ('RandS_15yr_50K.xls') %deletes existing Excel spreadsheet output 
OutFile = 'C:\Documents and Settings\Craig Smith\My 
Documents\Ph.D\Cost_Effective_WS_Management\SimModel_6\RandS_15yr_50K.xls'; 
  
warning off MATLAB:divideByZero 
  
%What are the Sediment reduction goals and budget constraint and iterations? comment if 
%using MasterRunFile 
RedGoal = 100000000; 
Budget = 50000; 
xpercent = .25; %percent of farms to eliminate 
iterations = 3150; %number of iterations (e.g., 1000 or more ** note: increase by roughly 5%) 
  
%Load Cost and Quantity data 
WSdata = xlsread('Tuttle_Model_Data.xls', 'MATinput','A2:O1859'); 
TotFarms = size(WSdata,1); 
SubWS = WSdata(:,2); 
num_counties = 10; %number of counties 
num_BMPs = 3; %number of BMPs available 
seed_value = 31517; %seed value 
  
%Need to eliminate "xpercent" of the farms because we will assume that 
%xpercent of the farms have already adopted BMPs or will never adopt BMPs 
ineligiblefarms = round(xpercent*TotFarms); 
  
%--------------------------------- 
SubWS_percent = xlsread('BMPCosts_15yrs.xls','input','D3:AH12'); 
  
%Create a matrix with max(SubWS) columns representing the subwatersheds 
%and the data in the rows represents which HRUs belong to each subwatershed 
SW = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); %preallocate a TotFarms by max(SubWS) matrix 
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 SW_a = find(SubWS==i); 
 SW_b = zeros(TotFarms - size(SW_a,1),1); %need to add a column vector of zeros to make each vector 
the same length 
 SW_c = cat(1,SW_a,SW_b); 
 SW(:,i) = SW_c; %SW is the resulting matrix 
end; 
  
%--------------------------------------- 
%need a 1 by num of SubWS's matrix with number of HRUs in each SubWS 
SW_count = zeros(1,max(SubWS)); %preallocate 
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for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 SW_count(1,i) = max(find(SW(:,i)>0)); %this is # of HRUs in each SubWS 
end; 
  
Co_SW_matrix = SubWS_percent(:,1:max(SubWS)); %this is % of SubWS in each county 
Co_SW_matrix_1 = zeros(num_counties,max(SubWS)); %preallocate 
  
for i = 1:num_counties 
 Co_SW_matrix_1(i,:) = round((Co_SW_matrix(i,:).*SW_count)-.05); %subtract .05 so that we don't get 
any negative #'s in 
 %the Co_SW_matrix_2 which is calculated next 
end; 
%---------------------------------------- 
%Need to make sure each column adds up to the correct number of HRUs 
Co_SW_matrix_2 = zeros(1,max(SubWS)); 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 Co_SW_matrix_2(1,i) = SW_count(1,i) - sum(Co_SW_matrix_1(1:9,i)); 
end; 
  
Co_SW_matrix_1(num_counties,:) = Co_SW_matrix_2; 
%---------------------------------------- 
  
BMP_ann_costs = SubWS_percent(:,29:31); 
BMP_cost_matrix = zeros(TotFarms,num_BMPs); %preallocate a matrix with TotFarms by 3 (# of 
BMPs) columns 
BMP_matrix1 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
BMP_matrix2 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
BMP_matrix3 = zeros(TotFarms,max(SubWS)); 
  
for j = 1:max(SubWS) 
 A = 0; 
 for i = 1:num_counties 
 if Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j) == 0 
 continue 
 end 
 BMP_matrix1(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,1); 
 BMP_matrix2(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,2); 
 BMP_matrix3(A+1:Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A,j) = BMP_ann_costs(i,3); 
 A = Co_SW_matrix_1(i,j)+A; 
 end; 
end; 
  
%---------------------------------------- 
%Subdivide matrix into column vectors cell arrays 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 y{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1);%preallocate 
 bmp1{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
 bmp2{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
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 bmp3{i} = zeros(TotFarms,1); 
end; 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 y{i} = SW(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp1{i} = BMP_matrix1(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp2{i} = BMP_matrix2(:,i); 
end 
  
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp3{i} = BMP_matrix3(:,i); 
end 
%----------------------------------------- 
  
%Get rid of zeros in each column vector 
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 y_new{i} = y{1,i}(y{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp1_new{i} = bmp1{1,i}(bmp1{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp2_new{i} = bmp2{1,i}(bmp2{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
for i=1:max(SubWS) 
 bmp3_new{i} = bmp3{1,i}(bmp3{1,i}~=0); 
end 
  
%---------------------------------------- 
  
%Combine common Subwatershed vectors, so the result will be 3 BMP cost 
%column vectors. We can then randomly pair these using the randswap function 
for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 combined_bmpcosts{i} = cat(2,bmp1_new{1,i},bmp2_new{1,i},bmp3_new{1,i}); 
end 
  
%----------------------------------------- 
%Outer loop for testing purposes 
% for k=1:1 
%keep3 function is a complement to the clear fcn. in that it clears all 
%variables except the ones listed 
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keep3 combined_bmpcosts RedGoal Budget xpercent iterations WSdata TotFarms SubWS num_counties 
num_BMPs ineligiblefarms OutFile y_new seed_value 
rand('seed',seed_value);%set seed value 
OUT = cell(1,iterations); 
%---------------------------------------- 
%Start simulating the BMP implementation scenarios. Note that this is the 
%outerloop 
for j = 1:iterations 
 j 
 tic; 
 HRU_id = WSdata(:,1); 
 FarmArea = WSdata(:,3); 
 BaseNLoad = WSdata(:,4); 
 BMP1NLoad = WSdata(:,5); 
 BMP2NLoad = WSdata(:,6); 
 BMP3NLoad = WSdata(:,7); 
  
 BMP1NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP1NLoad; 
 BMP2NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP2NLoad; 
 BMP3NQuantity = BaseNLoad - BMP3NLoad; 
  
 BasePLoad = WSdata(:,8); 
 BMP1PLoad = WSdata(:,9); 
 BMP2PLoad = WSdata(:,10); 
 BMP3PLoad = WSdata(:,11); 
  
 BMP1PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP1PLoad; 
 BMP2PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP2PLoad; 
 BMP3PQuantity = BasePLoad - BMP3PLoad; 
  
 BaseSLoad = WSdata(:,12); 
 BMP1SLoad = WSdata(:,13); 
 BMP2SLoad = WSdata(:,14); 
 BMP3SLoad = WSdata(:,15); 
  
 BMP1SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP1SLoad; 
 BMP2SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP2SLoad; 
 BMP3SQuantity = BaseSLoad - BMP3SLoad; 
  
 %Now randomly pair the combined BMP costs matrix with an HRU 
 for i = 1:max(SubWS) 
 rand_bmpcosts = randswap(combined_bmpcosts{1,i}); 
 SW_bmpcosts{i} = cat(2,y_new{1,i},rand_bmpcosts); 
 end 
  
 %Reshape and order the bmpcosts matrix in numerical order by the first 
 %column which is HRU id number 
 SW_bmpcosts = reshape(SW_bmpcosts,max(SubWS),1); 
 stacked_bmpcosts = cell2mat(SW_bmpcosts); 
 ordered_HRU_bmpcosts = sortrows(stacked_bmpcosts,1); 
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 %Determine Total and Average BMP costs for each HRU for N,P, and S 
  
 %Nitrogen Costs 
 BMP1NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3NCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1NCost = BMP1NCost./BMP1NQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2NCost = BMP2NCost./BMP2NQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3NCost = BMP3NCost./BMP3NQuantity; 
  
 AVGBMP1NCost(isinf(AVGBMP1NCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP2NCost(isinf(AVGBMP2NCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP3NCost(isinf(AVGBMP3NCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
  
 %Phosphorus Costs 
 BMP1PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3PCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1PCost = BMP1PCost./BMP1PQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2PCost = BMP2PCost./BMP2PQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3PCost = BMP3PCost./BMP3PQuantity; 
  
 AVGBMP1PCost(isinf(AVGBMP1PCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP2PCost(isinf(AVGBMP2PCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP3PCost(isinf(AVGBMP3PCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
  
 %Sediment Costs 
 BMP1SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,2).*FarmArea; 
 BMP2SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,3).*FarmArea; 
 BMP3SCost = ordered_HRU_bmpcosts(:,4).*FarmArea; 
  
 AVGBMP1SCost = BMP1SCost./BMP1SQuantity; 
 AVGBMP2SCost = BMP2SCost./BMP2SQuantity; 
 AVGBMP3SCost = BMP3SCost./BMP3SQuantity; 
  
 AVGBMP1SCost(isinf(AVGBMP1SCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP2SCost(isinf(AVGBMP2SCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
 AVGBMP3SCost(isinf(AVGBMP3SCost)) = 0; %replace infinity values with zeros 
  
 %Get rid of zeros and negatives in Average BMP cost matricies 
 BMPsAVGNCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1NCost,AVGBMP2NCost,AVGBMP3NCost); 
 findzerosN = find(BMPsAVGNCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGNCosts matrix 
 BMPsAVGNCosts(findzerosN) = 0; %replaces zeros and negatives with 0's which is need for this 
program 
  
 BMPsAVGPCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1PCost,AVGBMP2PCost,AVGBMP3PCost); 
 findzerosP = find(BMPsAVGPCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGPCosts matrix 
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 BMPsAVGPCosts(findzerosP) = 0; %replaces zeros and negatives with 0's which is need for this 
program 
  
 BMPsAVGSCosts = cat(2,AVGBMP1SCost,AVGBMP2SCost,AVGBMP3SCost); 
 findzerosS = find(BMPsAVGSCosts<=0); %finds zeros and negatives in BMPsAVGSCosts matrix 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(findzerosS) = 0; %replaces zeros and negatives with 0's which is need for this 
program 
  
 %Need to eliminate "xpercent" of the farms because we will assume that 
 %xpercent of the farms have already adopted BMPs or will never adopt 
 %BMPs. This is done by randomly selecting xpercent of the farms and 
 %setting the appropriate rows in the BMPsAVGSCosts to zero. Note that 
 %if we were addressing another pollutant (N or P), then this 
 %code would need to be changed to the appropriate BMP Avg Cost matrix. 
 %If there are already more farms with negatives and zeros than 
 %ineligible farms, then this piece of code has no effect 
  
 num_of_zeros = size(find(BMPsAVGSCosts(:,1) == 0),1); 
 while num_of_zeros < ineligiblefarms 
 eliminate_id = round(rand(1)*TotFarms); 
 if eliminate_id == 0 
 continue 
 end 
 BMPsAVGSCosts(eliminate_id,1:3) = zeros(1,3); 
 num_of_zeros = size(find(BMPsAVGSCosts(:,1) == 0),1); 
 end; 
 num_of_zeros = size(find(BMPsAVGSCosts(:,1) == 0),1); 
  
 %Get rid of the negatives and zeros 
 NReductions = cat(2, BMP1NQuantity, BMP2NQuantity, BMP3NQuantity); 
 PReductions = cat(2, BMP1PQuantity, BMP2PQuantity, BMP3PQuantity); 
 SReductions = cat(2, BMP1SQuantity, BMP2SQuantity, BMP3SQuantity); 
  
 % findreductionsN = find(NReductions<0); %finds negative values in N reductions data 
 % NReductions(findreductionsN) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 % findreductionsP = find(PReductions<0); %finds negative values in P reductions data 
 % PReductions(findreductionsP) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 findreductionsS = find(SReductions<0); %finds negative values in S reductions data 
 SReductions(findreductionsS) = 0; %replaces negatives with zeros 
  
 CummNQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPNCost1 = 0; 
 CummPQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPPCost1 = 0; 
 CummSQuantity = 0; 
 TotBMPSCost1 = 0; 
 zeromatrix = zeros(TotFarms,num_BMPs);%zeros matrix of dimension TotFarms x 3 which is # of 
BMPs 
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 %This is the innerloop where the actual BMP implementation occurs 
 i = 1; 
 S = [1:TotFarms.*num_BMPs]'; 
 findzerocosts = find(BMPsAVGSCosts == 0); 
 S([findzerocosts]) = [0]; % Replace some of the elements of S with zero if they have already been ruled 
ineligble 
 S_rand = S(randperm(size(S,1)),:); %randomize the S matrix 
  
 %This piece of code moves all zeros to the bottom of the column vector 
 S_randsort=[]; 
 [m,n]=size(S_rand); 
 for col=1:n, 
 a=zeros(m,1); 
 a(1:sum(S_rand(:,col)>0))=S_rand(find(S_rand(:,col)>0),col); 
 S_randsort=[S_randsort a]; 
 end 
  
 mat_size = [TotFarms,num_BMPs]; 
 [FarmID_1,BMP_1] = ind2sub(mat_size,S_randsort); %The ind2sub command determines the equivalent 
subscript values corresponding 
 %to a single index into an array 
  
 %need to eliminate duplicates from FarmID_1 and the 
 %corresponding elements in BMP_1 vector. This is because only one 
 %BMP can be implemented on a farm 
 [FarmID_2,BMP_position] = unique_no_sort(FarmID_1); %this is a specially made function which is 
similar to "unique" 
 %function except that it does not sort 
 FarmID_2 = (FarmID_2(1:length(FarmID_2)-1))'; 
 BMP_position = (BMP_position(1:length(BMP_position)-1))'; 
  
 %This loop creates the corresponding BMP_2 matrix to match the FARMID_2 
 %vector created earlier 
 for i = 1:length(BMP_position) 
 BMP_2(i,1) = BMP_1(BMP_position(i,1),1); 
 end; 
  
 i=0; 
 while (CummSQuantity < RedGoal) && (sum(sum(single(SReductions)))>0) %loop while below 
reduction goal AND 
 %while there are still BMPs available 
 i = i+1; 
  
 if i > length(BMP_position) 
 break; end; 
  
 FarmID = FarmID_2(i); 
 BMP = BMP_2(i); 
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 if FarmID == 0 
 break; end; 
  
 if BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP)>0 && SReductions(FarmID,BMP)>0 
 AVGPracticeSCost = BMPsAVGSCosts(FarmID,BMP); 
 Area = FarmArea(FarmID,1); 
 NQuantity = NReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 PQuantity = PReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 SQuantity = SReductions(FarmID,BMP); 
 TotPracticeSCost = AVGPracticeSCost*SQuantity; 
 else 
 continue; 
 end; 
  
 if (TotPracticeSCost + TotBMPSCost1) > Budget 
 continue; 
 end; 
  
 %SReductions(FarmID,BMP) = SReductions(FarmID,BMP) - SQuantity; %Update Reductions Matrix 
 SReductions(FarmID,:) = zeros(1,num_BMPs); %after a BMP is implemented, zero out the row so that 
farm is eliminated 
 %from further consideration 
  
 if i == 1 %save data 
 Simout = [Area, FarmID, BMP, AVGPracticeSCost, SQuantity, TotPracticeSCost]; 
 OtherSimout = [NQuantity, PQuantity]; 
 else Simout = [Simout; Area, FarmID, BMP, AVGPracticeSCost, SQuantity, TotPracticeSCost]; 
 OtherSimout = [OtherSimout; NQuantity, PQuantity]; 
 end; 
  
 TotArea = sum(Simout(:,1)); 
 CummSQuantity = sum(Simout(:,5)); 
 TotBMPSCost = sum(Simout(:,6)); 
 TotBMPSCost1 = TotBMPSCost + 0; 
 CummNQuantity = sum(OtherSimout(:,1)); 
 CummPQuantity = sum(OtherSimout(:,2)); 
 numofBMP1 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==1),1); %calculates # of BMP1 implemented 
 numofBMP2 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==2),1); %calculates # of BMP2 implemented 
 numofBMP3 = size(find(Simout(:,3)==3),1); %calculates # of BMP3 implemented 
 end; 
  
 num_of_BMPs = size(Simout,1); 
 Count = (1:num_of_BMPs)'; %this numbers the rows in the first column of output 
 a = nan(num_of_BMPs-1,1); %nan matrix that is # of BMPs rows and 1 column 
 TotBMPnumOUT = cat(1,num_of_BMPs,a); %the scalar value is inserted at top of a matrix to make 
 %a # of BMPs x 1 matrix for output purposes - same procedure for next 5 
 %output variables 
 TotAreaOUT = cat(1,TotArea,a); 
 TotBMPSCostOUT = cat(1,TotBMPSCost,a); 
 RedGoalOUT = cat(1,RedGoal,a); 
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 BudgetOUT = cat(1,Budget,a); 
 CummNQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummNQuantity,a); 
 CummPQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummPQuantity,a); 
 CummSQuantityOUT = cat(1,CummSQuantity,a); 
 numofBMP1OUT = cat(1,numofBMP1,a); 
 numofBMP2OUT = cat(1,numofBMP2,a); 
 numofBMP3OUT = cat(1,numofBMP3,a); 
  
 Output = cat(2,Count, Simout, OtherSimout, TotBMPnumOUT, TotAreaOUT, CummSQuantityOUT, 
TotBMPSCostOUT, RedGoalOUT,... 
 BudgetOUT, CummNQuantityOUT, CummPQuantityOUT, numofBMP1OUT, numofBMP2OUT, 
numofBMP3OUT); 
 % numericalOutput = num2cell(Output); %change the numerical array into a cell array 
  
 OUT{j} = {Output}; 
 toc 
 time2{j} = toc; 
end; 
  
disp ('Successfully finished the iterations!!') 
%------------------------------------------------ 
  
%The rest of the code is for organizing and summarizing all of the output and 
%reporting it in a neat formatted fashion 
  
%Delete the cases where the budget constraint was exceeded (this somehow 
%occurs in approximately 4% of the cases). So, increase the number of 
%iterations by 4%. i.e., if you want 1000 good simulations, run 1040 
  
for j=1:iterations 
 costs(j,1) = OUT{1,j}{1,1}(1,13); %finds the TotBMPCost for each iteration 
end; 
  
delete_bad = find(costs > Budget) 
size_delete = length(delete_bad) 
  
for j=delete_bad 
 OUT(j) = []; 
end; 
  
%Finds the maximum number of BMP projects implemented(rows) in the output data. Changes all 
%matrices to have the same number of rows. Zeros are put in the rows that 
%are added.For more information, go to section 15.3 in the array manipulation 
%publication 
  
iterations = iterations - size_delete; 
  
for j=1:iterations 
 b(j) = max(OUT{1,j}{1,1}(:,1)); %finds total # of BMP projects implemented in each iteration 
end; 
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m = mean(b); %finds average # of BMP projects implemented across all iterations 
m = round(m); %rounds the average # to nearest whole number 
% aa = a(:)'; %creates another matrix aa equal to a 
% aa = aa(ones(m,1),:); %transforms aa into an m by iterations matrix 
bb = (1:m)'; %creates bb which is a column vector going from 1 to m 
% bb = bb(:,ones(length(a), 1)); %transforms bb into a m by iterations matrix 
% %with each column going from 1 to m 
% b = bb .* (bb <= aa); %the dot indicates array multiplication (not the same 
% %as matrix multiplication. Arrays in bb are multiplied by an array of ones 
% %and zeros corresponding to the number of BMP projects implemented 
% M = mean(b,2); %sums across all rows of the b matrix resulting in a column vector 
  
for i = 1:iterations %this loop equalizes number of rows (equal to mean # of BMP projects implemented) 
 %across all iterations so that the means can be calcualted 
 cc{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,2); %area 
 ee{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,6); %tons of soil reduction 
 ff{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,7); %total BMP cost 
 gg{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,8); %pounds of N reduction 
 hh{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,9); %pounds of P reduction 
 ii{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,10); %num of BMPs 
 jj{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,11); %total area 
 kk{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,12); %cummulative soil reduction 
 ll{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,13); %total BMP costs 
 mm{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,14); %soil reduction goal 
 nn{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,15); %budget 
 oo{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,16); %cummulative N reduction 
 pp{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,17); %cummulative P reduction 
 qq{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,18); %num of BMP1 implemented 
 rr{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,19); %num of BMP2 implemented 
 ss{i} = OUT{i}{1}(1,20); %num of BMP3 implemented 
  
 [u,y] = size(cc{i}); 
 if u >= m 
 cc1{i} = cc{i}(1:m,:); 
 ee1{i} = ee{i}(1:m,:); 
 ff1{i} = ff{i}(1:m,:); 
 gg1{i} = gg{i}(1:m,:); 
 hh1{i} = hh{i}(1:m,:); 
 else v = m-u; 
 w = zeros(v,1); 
 cc1{i} = cat(1,cc{i},w); 
 ee1{i} = cat(1,ee{i},w); 
 ff1{i} = cat(1,ff{i},w); 
 gg1{i} = cat(1,gg{i},w); 
 hh1{i} = cat(1,hh{i},w); 
 end; 
end; 
  
%convert cell array of matricies to single matrix 
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ccc = cell2mat(cc1); 
eee = cell2mat(ee1); 
fff = cell2mat(ff1); 
ggg = cell2mat(gg1); 
hhh = cell2mat(hh1); 
iii = cell2mat(ii); 
jjj = cell2mat(jj); 
kkk = cell2mat(kk); 
lll = cell2mat(ll); 
mmm = cell2mat(mm); 
nnn = cell2mat(nn); 
ooo = cell2mat(oo); 
ppp = cell2mat(pp); 
qqq = cell2mat(qq); 
rrr = cell2mat(rr); 
sss = cell2mat(ss); 
ddd = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(eee,2)); %avg S reduction costs (total) 
ttt = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(ggg,2)); %avg N reduction costs (total) 
uuu = sum(mean(fff,2))/sum(mean(hhh,2)); %avg P reduction costs (total) 
  
%finds mean of rows 
mccc = mean(ccc,2); %area 
meee = mean(eee,2); %tons of soil reduction 
mfff = mean(fff,2); %total BMP cost 
mvvv = mfff./meee; %avg S reduction incremental costs 
mddd = cat(1,mean(ddd,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg S reduction costs (total) 
mggg = mean(ggg,2); %pounds of N reduction 
mwww = mfff./mggg; %avg N reduction incremental costs 
mttt = cat(1,mean(ttt,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg N reduction costs (total) 
mhhh = mean(hhh,2); %pounds of P reduction 
mxxx = mfff./mhhh; %avg P reduction incremental costs 
muuu = cat(1,mean(uuu,2),nan(m-1,1)); %avg P reduction costs (total) 
miii = cat(1,mean(iii,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMPs 
mjjj = cat(1,sum(mccc),nan(m-1,1)); %total area 
mkkk = cat(1,sum(meee),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative soil reduction 
mlll = cat(1,sum(mfff),nan(m-1,1)); %total BMP costs 
mmmm = cat(1,mean(mmm,2),nan(m-1,1)); %soil reduction goal 
mnnn = cat(1,mean(nnn,2),nan(m-1,1)); %budget 
mooo = cat(1,sum(mggg),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative N reduction 
mppp = cat(1,sum(mhhh),nan(m-1,1)); %cummulative P reduction 
mqqq = cat(1,mean(qqq,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP1 implemented 
mrrr = cat(1,mean(rrr,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP2 implemented 
msss = cat(1,mean(sss,2),nan(m-1,1)); %num of BMP3 implemented 
  
SumOut = 
cat(2,bb,mccc,mfff,meee,mvvv,mddd,mggg,mwww,mttt,mhhh,mxxx,muuu,miii,mjjj,mlll,mmmm,mnnn,
mkkk,mooo,mppp,mqqq,mrrr,msss); 
SumOutcell = num2cell(SumOut); 
Headings = {'#' 'Area (ac)' 'TotBMPCost' 'S_Quantity (tons)' 'AVGincremCost_S (/ton)' 'AVGred_S_Cost 
(/ton)' 'N_Quantity (lbs)' 'AVGincremCost_N (/lb)'... 
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 'AVGred_N_Cost (/lb)' 'P_Quantity (lbs)' 'AVGincremCost_P (/lb)' 'AVGred_P_Cost (/lb)' 
'TotBMPnum' 'Total Area (ac)' 'TotBMPCost'... 
 'S_RedGoal (tons)' 'Budget' 'Cumm_S_Quantity (tons)' 'Cumm_N_Quantity (lbs)' 'Cumm_P_Quantity 
(lbs)'... 
 '# of BMP1' '# of BMP2' '#of BMP3'}; 
  
allOutput = [Headings; SumOutcell]; 
xlswrite('RandS_15yr_50K.xls',allOutput,1,'A1'); 
%end; 
  
%---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
%------------------------------ 
%This code erases any empty sheets in an excel workbook 
%Open the output xls file 
  
excelObj = actxserver('Excel.Application'); 
%opens up an excel object 
excelWorkbook = excelObj.workbooks.Open(OutFile); 
worksheets = excelObj.sheets; 
%total number of sheets in workbook 
numSheets = worksheets.count; 
  
count=1; 
for j=1:numSheets 
 %stores the current number of sheets in the workbook 
 %this number will change if sheets are deleted 
 temp = worksheets.count; 
  
 %if there's only one sheet left, we must leave it or else 
 %there will be an error. 
 if (temp == 1) 
 break; 
 end 
  
 %this command will only delete the sheet if it is empty 
 worksheets.Item(count).Delete; 
  
 %if a sheet was not deleted, we move on to the next one 
 %by incrementing the count variable 
 if (temp == worksheets.count) 
 count = count + 1; 
 end 
end 
excelWorkbook.Save; 
excelWorkbook.Close(false); 
excelObj.Quit; 
delete(excelObj); 
  
% Run OfficeDoc to format Excel output 
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% Open document in 'append' mode: 
[file,status,errMsg] = officedoc('RandS_15yr_50K.xls', 'open', 'mode','append'); 
  
for z=1:1 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A1:W1', 'bold','on','WrapText',1); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'D:D,E:E,F2,H:H,I2,K:K,L2', 
'NumberFormat','$#,##0.00'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'D:D,G:G,J:J,U2,V2,W2', 'NumberFormat','#,##0.00'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'C:C,O2,Q2', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'B:B, M2,N2,P2,R2,S2,T2', 'NumberFormat','#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A:W', 'ColAutoFit',1); 
end 
  
% Close the document, deleting standard sheets and releasing COM server: 
status = officedoc(file, 'close', 'release',1,'delStd','off'); 
  
% Re-display document; file is no longer valid so we must use file name: 
%officedoc('RandS_15yr_50K.xls', 'display'); 
  
toc 
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Appendix C - Additional targeting maps for the original cost 
scenarios based on Table 2.18 
 
Figure C.1 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under original costs with filter strips 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$1.36 - $1.81
$1.82 - $2.52
$2.53 - $3.43
$3.44 - $16.69
Original cost scenario with filter strips.
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Figure C.2 Spatial average nitrogen reduction costs under original costs with filter strips 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$0.20 - $0.30
$0.31 - $0.34
$0.35 - $0.38
$0.39 - $1.16
Original cost scenario with filter strips.
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Figure C.3 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under original costs with filter 
strips 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$0.93 - $1.23
$1.24 - $1.41
$1.42 - $1.61
$1.62 - $4.79
Original cost scenario with filter strips.
243 
 
Figure C.4 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under original costs with no-till 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$11.15 - $15.20
$15.21 - $22.81
$22.82 - $32.84
$32.85 - $158.06
Original cost scenario with no-till.
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Figure C.5 Spatial average nitrogen reduction costs under original costs with no-till 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$1.08 - $2.56
$2.57 - $3.22
$3.23 - $4.25
$4.26 - $16.36
Original cost scenario with no-till.
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Figure C.6 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under original costs with no-till 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$7.67 - $16.49
$16.50 - $23.21
$23.22 - $28.40
$28.41 - $161.36
Original cost scenario with no-till.
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Figure C.7 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under original costs with permanent 
vegetation 
  
  
Economic Priority Areas
Sediment Reduction Costs ($/ton/yr)
$19.86 - $26.34
$26.35 - $35.31
$35.32 - $49.93
$49.94 - $238.95
Original cost scenario with permanent 
vegetation.
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Figure C.8 Spatial average sediment reduction costs under original costs with permanent 
vegetation 
  
Economic Priority Areas
Nitrogen Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$3.27 - $4.64
$4.65 - $5.23
$5.24 - $5.95
$5.96 - $23.35
Original cost scenario with permanent 
vegetation.
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Figure C.9 Spatial average phosphorus reduction costs under original costs with 
permanent vegetation 
 
   
Economic Priority Areas
Phosphorous Reduction Costs ($/lb/yr)
$13.90 - $18.64
$18.65 - $21.07
$21.08 - $23.24
$23.25 - $71.24
Original cost scenario with permanent 
vegetation.
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Appendix D - Example MATLAB Simulation Code for Chapter 3 
Example Code for Targeted for WQT trading under Full Information 
 
%Simulation 1: Full information trading 
%Full information: highest Marginal Gains element is picked first 
  
clear 
clc 
tic 
  
outFile = 'C:\Documents and Settings\Craig Smith\My 
Documents\Ph.D\WQT_Simulation\Simulations\WQT_1.xls'; 
delete(outFile) %deletes existing Excel spreadsheet output 
  
  
%Parameters 
tratio = 3; %starting value for trading ratio 
trloops = 0; %this should be set to 0 - it counts the number of times through the tratio loop 
trcosts = 0; 
PSintcost = 0; 
NPSintcost = 0; 
iterations = 100; 
%loops = 1; %should should be set to 1 in most cases, this was initially used to test for appropriate 
number of simulations to get stable statistics 
  
p = 10; %number of PS's 
n = 500; %number of farms 
  
%trading ratio parameters 
trmax = 3; %max trading ratio to consider 
trstep = 0.5; %step length for trading ratio 
  
while tratio <= trmax 
 tratio 
 trloops; 
  
 %keep3 function is a complement to the clear fcn. in that it clears all 
 %variables except the ones listed 
  
 keep3 tratio trloops trcosts PSintcost NPSintcost iterations outFile p n trmax trstep 
  
 for j=1:iterations 
 j 
  
 %Code to generate a lognormal distribution of PS's. Particularly, log 
 %normal distributions of reductions and cost/lb values. This serves as 
 %NPS input into the simulations. The logn_rnd function must be in current 
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 %directory 
  
 PSmeanred = 5000; %mean of reductions 
 PSvarred = 1562500; %variance of reductions 
 PSmeancost = 20; %mean of costs 
 PSvarcost = 225; %variance of costs 
  
 a = log(PSmeanred)-.5*log(1+(PSvarred/PSmeanred^2)); 
 b = log(1+(PSvarred/PSmeanred^2)); 
  
 PSlognTotPred = logn_rnd(a,b,p,1); 
  
 c = log(PSmeancost)-.5*log(1+(PSvarcost/PSmeancost^2)); 
 d = log(1+(PSvarcost/PSmeancost^2)); 
  
 PSlognTotPcost = logn_rnd(c,d,p,1); 
  
 PSdata = cat(2,PSlognTotPred, PSlognTotPcost); 
 PSnum = size(PSdata,1); 
 PSwtp = PSdata(:,2) - PSintcost*ones(PSnum,1); 
 PSqbuy = PSdata(:,1); 
  
 %Code to generate a lognormal distribution of farms. Particularly, log 
 %normal distributions of reductions and cost/lb values. This serves as 
 %NPS input into the simulations. The logn_rnd function must be in current 
 %directory 
  
 meanred = 200; %mean of reductions 
 varred = 2500; %variance of reductions 
 meancost = 12; %mean of costs 
 varcost = 64; %variance of costs 
  
 a = log(meanred)-.5*log(1+(varred/meanred^2)); 
 b = log(1+(varred/meanred^2)); 
  
 lognTotPred = logn_rnd(a,b,n,1); 
  
 c = log(meancost)-.5*log(1+(varcost/meancost^2)); 
 d = log(1+(varcost/meancost^2)); 
  
 lognTotPcost = logn_rnd(c,d,n,1); 
  
 NPSdata = cat(2,lognTotPred, lognTotPcost); 
 NPSnum = size(NPSdata,1); 
 NPSqsold = NPSdata(:,1)/tratio; 
 NPSwta = tratio*(NPSdata(:,2) + NPSintcost*ones(NPSnum,1)); 
 PSwtp1 = PSwtp; 
 PSqbuy1 = PSqbuy; 
 NPSqsold1 = NPSqsold; 
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 %Marginal Gains matrix 
 mar.gains = PSwtp*ones(1,NPSnum) - ones(PSnum,1)*NPSwta' - trcosts*ones(PSnum,NPSnum); 
  
 i = 0; 
 while max(max(mar.gains)) > 0 
 i = i + 1; 
 [PSid, NPSid] = find(max(max(mar.gains)) == mar.gains); %Find max mar.gains element 
 if size([PSid, NPSid], 1) > 1 %If PS (NPS) have identical wtp (wta), pick the first one 
 PSid = PSid(1); 
 NPSid = NPSid(1); 
 end; 
  
 %Make sure current PS is a feasible trader: it must have sufficient 
 %supply to meet its demand and have credits left to buy. If either 
 %of these conditions is not met, a new PS is found that meets both. 
 PSok = 0; 
 while PSok == 0 
 Sellers = (mar.gains(PSid,:) > 0); 
 Supply = Sellers*NPSqsold1; 
 if Supply >= PSqbuy1(PSid) && PSqbuy1(PSid) > 0, PSok=1; break; end; 
 mar.gains(PSid,:) = 0; 
 PSwtp1(PSid) = 0; 
 if max(max(mar.gains)) <= 0, PSok=-1; break; end; 
 PSid = find(max(PSwtp1) == PSwtp1); %find PS with maximum WTP 
 if size(PSid,1)>1 %If PS have identical wtp, pick the first one 
 PSid = PSid(1); 
 end; 
 end; 
  
 %if no PS is a feasbile trading partner, then exit the trading loop 
 if PSok == -1 
 %disp('Trading stopped because no feasible PS traders exist.'); 
 break; 
 end; 
  
 PSprice = (NPSwta(NPSid) + PSwtp1(PSid))/2 + trcosts/2; 
 NPSprice = (NPSwta(NPSid) + PSwtp1(PSid))/2 - trcosts/2; 
 Quantity = min(PSqbuy1(PSid), NPSqsold1(NPSid)); 
  
 if i == 1 %save data 
 Simout = [i, tratio, PSid, NPSid, PSprice, PSwtp1(PSid), NPSwta(NPSid), Quantity, ... 
 mar.gains(PSid,NPSid), mar.gains(PSid,NPSid)*Quantity]; 
 else Simout = [Simout; i, tratio, PSid, NPSid, PSprice, PSwtp1(PSid), NPSwta(NPSid), ... 
 Quantity, mar.gains(PSid,NPSid), mar.gains(PSid,NPSid)*Quantity]; 
 end; 
  
 PSqbuy1(PSid) = PSqbuy1(PSid) - Quantity; 
  
 NPSqsold1(NPSid) = NPSqsold1(NPSid) - Quantity; 
 if NPSqsold1(NPSid) == 0 
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 mar.gains(:,NPSid) = 0; 
 end; 
 end; 
 %This writes trades to a cell array 
 OUT{j} = {Simout}; %store output from each iteration in a cell array 
 end; 
  
 disp ('successfully finished the trading iterations!') 
  
 %Finds the maximum number of trades(rows) in the output data. Changes all 
 %matrices to have the same number of rows. Zeros are put in the rows that 
 %are added.For more information, go to section 15.3 in the array manipulation 
 %publication 
  
 for j=1:iterations 
 a(j) = max(OUT{1,j}{1,1}(:,1)); %finds total # of trades in each iteration 
 end; 
 m = mean(a); %finds average # of trades across all iterations 
 m = round(m); %rounds the average # to nearest whole number 
 % aa = a(:)'; %creates another matrix aa equal to a 
 % aa = aa(ones(m,1),:); %transforms aa into an m by iterations matrix 
 bb = (1:m)'; %creates bb which is a column vector going from 1 to m 
 % bb = bb(:,ones(length(a), 1)); %transforms bb into a m by iterations matrix 
 % %with each column going from 1 to m 
 % b = bb .* (bb <= aa); %the dot indicates array multiplication (not the same 
 % %as matrix multiplication. Arrays in bb are multiplied by an array of ones 
 % %and zeros corresponding to the number of trades 
 % M = mean(b,2); %sums across all rows of the b matrix resulting in a column vector 
  
 for i = 1:iterations %this loop equalizes number of rows (equal to mean # of trades) 
 %across all iterations so that the means can be calcualted 
 cc{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,6); 
 dd{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,7); 
 ee{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,8); 
 ff{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,9); 
 gg{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,10); 
 [u,y] = size(cc{i}); 
 if u >= m 
 cc1{i} = cc{i}(1:m,:); 
 dd1{i} = dd{i}(1:m,:); 
 ee1{i} = ee{i}(1:m,:); 
 ff1{i} = ff{i}(1:m,:); 
 gg1{i} = gg{i}(1:m,:); 
 else v = m-u; 
 w = zeros(v,1); 
 cc1{i} = cat(1,cc{i},w); 
 dd1{i} = cat(1,dd{i},w); 
 ee1{i} = cat(1,ee{i},w); 
 ff1{i} = cat(1,ff{i},w); 
 gg1{i} = cat(1,gg{i},w); 
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 end; 
 end; 
  
 ccc = cell2mat(cc1); %converts cell array of matricies to single matrix 
 ddd = cell2mat(dd1); 
 eee = cell2mat(ee1); 
 fff = cell2mat(ff1); 
 ggg = cell2mat(gg1); 
 mccc = mean(ccc,2); %finds mean of rows 
 mddd = mean(ddd,2); 
 meee = mean(eee,2); 
 mfff = mean(fff,2); 
 mggg = mean(ggg,2); 
 mhhh = cumsum(mggg);%calculates running total of gains 
 SumOut = cat(2,bb,mccc,mddd,meee,mfff,mggg,mhhh); 
  
 % This writes the Cummulative Output to an Excel Spreadsheet (all in a single sheet) 
 Headings1 = {'Trade#' 'PSwtp' 'NPSwta' 'Quantity' 'Mar. Gains' 'Gains' 'Cum. Gains'}; 
 numericalOutput1 = num2cell(SumOut);%converts back into cell array 
 allOutput1 = [Headings1; numericalOutput1]; 
 xlswrite(outFile,allOutput1,int2str(trloops+1),'A1'); 
  
 tratio = tratio + trstep; %assign the next tratio to simulate 
 trloops = trloops+1; 
end; 
  
%------------------------------ 
%This code erases any empty sheets in an excel workbook 
%Open the output xls file 
  
excelObj = actxserver('Excel.Application'); 
%opens up an excel object 
excelWorkbook = excelObj.workbooks.Open(outFile); 
worksheets = excelObj.sheets; 
%total number of sheets in workbook 
numSheets = worksheets.Count; 
  
count=1; 
for j=1:numSheets 
 %stores the current number of sheets in the workbook 
 %this number will change if sheets are deleted 
 temp = worksheets.count; 
  
 %if there's only one sheet left, we must leave it or else 
 %there will be an error. 
 if (temp == 1) 
 break; 
 end 
  
 %this command will only delete the sheet if it is empty 
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 worksheets.Item(count).Delete; 
  
 %if a sheet was not deleted, we move on to the next one 
 %by incrementing the count variable 
 if (temp == worksheets.count) 
 count = count + 1; 
 end 
end 
excelWorkbook.Save; 
excelWorkbook.Close(false); 
excelObj.Quit; 
delete(excelObj); 
  
%---------------------------------- 
% Run OfficeDoc to format Excel output 
% Open document in 'append' mode: 
[file,status,errMsg] = officedoc(outFile, 'open', 'mode','append'); 
disp('Formatting Excel Output...') 
  
for z = 1:trloops 
 % Format Output in Excel: 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A1:G1', 'bold','on','WrapText',1); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A:A, D:D', 'NumberFormat','#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'B:B, C:C, E:E', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0.00'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'F:F, G:G', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A1:G1050', 'ColAutoFit',1); 
end 
  
% Close the document, deleting standard sheets and releasing COM server: 
status = officedoc(file, 'close', 'release',1,'delStd','off'); 
toc 
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Example Code for Targeted for WQT trading under Zero Information 
 
%Simulation 2: No information trading 
%Low information: PS and NPS picked at random 
  
clear 
clc 
tic 
  
outFile = 'C:\Documents and Settings\Craig Smith\My 
Documents\Ph.D\WQT_Simulation\Simulations\WQT_2.xls'; 
delete(outFile) %deletes existing Excel spreadsheet output 
  
  
%Parameters 
tratio = 3; %starting value for trading ratio 
trloops = 0; %this should be set to 0 - it counts the number of times through the tratio loop 
trcosts = 0; 
PSintcost = 0; 
NPSintcost = 0; 
iterations = 100; 
%loops = 1; %should should be set to 1 in most cases, this was initially used to test for appropriate 
number of simulations to get stable statistics 
  
p = 10; %number of PS's 
n = 500; %number of farms 
  
%trading ratio parameters 
trmax = 3; %max trading ratio to consider 
trstep = 0.5; %step length for trading ratio 
  
while tratio <= trmax 
 tratio 
 trloops; 
  
 %keep3 function is a complement to the clear fcn. in that it clears all 
 %variables except the ones listed 
  
 keep3 tratio trloops trcosts PSintcost NPSintcost iterations outFile p n trmax trstep 
  
 for j=1:iterations 
 j 
  
 %Code to generate a lognormal distribution of PS's. Particularly, log 
 %normal distributions of reductions and cost/lb values. This serves as 
 %NPS input into the simulations. The logn_rnd function must be in current 
 %directory 
  
 PSmeanred = 5000; %mean of reductions 
 PSvarred = 1562500; %variance of reductions 
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 PSmeancost = 20; %mean of costs 
 PSvarcost = 225; %variance of costs 
  
 a = log(PSmeanred)-.5*log(1+(PSvarred/PSmeanred^2)); 
 b = log(1+(PSvarred/PSmeanred^2)); 
  
 PSlognTotPred = logn_rnd(a,b,p,1); 
  
 c = log(PSmeancost)-.5*log(1+(PSvarcost/PSmeancost^2)); 
 d = log(1+(PSvarcost/PSmeancost^2)); 
  
 PSlognTotPcost = logn_rnd(c,d,p,1); 
  
 PSdata = cat(2,PSlognTotPred, PSlognTotPcost); 
 PSnum = size(PSdata,1); 
 PSwtp = PSdata(:,2) - PSintcost*ones(PSnum,1); 
 PSqbuy = PSdata(:,1); 
  
 %Code to generate a lognormal distribution of farms. Particularly, log 
 %normal distributions of reductions and cost/lb values. This serves as 
 %NPS input into the simulations. The logn_rnd function must be in current 
 %directory 
  
 meanred = 200; %mean of reductions 
 varred = 2500; %variance of reductions 
 meancost = 12; %mean of costs 
 varcost = 64; %variance of costs 
  
 a = log(meanred)-.5*log(1+(varred/meanred^2)); 
 b = log(1+(varred/meanred^2)); 
  
 lognTotPred = logn_rnd(a,b,n,1); 
  
 c = log(meancost)-.5*log(1+(varcost/meancost^2)); 
 d = log(1+(varcost/meancost^2)); 
  
 lognTotPcost = logn_rnd(c,d,n,1); 
  
 NPSdata = cat(2,lognTotPred, lognTotPcost); 
 NPSnum = size(NPSdata,1); 
 NPSqsold = NPSdata(:,1)/tratio; 
 NPSwta = tratio*(NPSdata(:,2) + NPSintcost*ones(NPSnum,1)); 
 PSwtp1 = PSwtp; 
 PSqbuy1 = PSqbuy; 
 NPSqsold1 = NPSqsold; 
  
 %Marginal Gains matrix 
 mar.gains = PSwtp*ones(1,NPSnum) - ones(PSnum,1)*NPSwta' - trcosts*ones(PSnum,NPSnum); 
  
 i=0; 
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 while max(max(mar.gains)) > 0 
  
 %Pick trial PS and NPS for first iteration 
 if i == 0 
 PSid = double(int16((PSnum-0.01)*rand+0.5)); 
 NPSid = double(int16((NPSnum-0.01)*rand+0.5)); 
 end; 
  
 %Make sure current PS is a feasible trader: it must have sufficient 
 %supply to meet its demand and have credits left to buy. If either 
 %of these conditions is not met, a new PS is found that meets both. 
 PSok = 0; 
 while PSok == 0 
 Sellers = (mar.gains(PSid,:) > 0); 
 Supply = Sellers*NPSqsold1; 
 if Supply >= PSqbuy1(PSid) && PSqbuy1(PSid) > 0, PSok=1; break; end; 
 mar.gains(PSid,:) = 0; 
 if max(max(mar.gains)) <= 0, PSok=-1; break; end; 
 PSid = double(int16((PSnum-0.01)*rand+0.5)); 
 end; 
  
 %if no PS is a feasbile trading partner, then exit the trading loop 
 if PSok == -1 
 %disp('Trading stopped because no feasible PS traders exist.'); 
 break; 
 end; 
  
 %if current NPS is "sold out" or has no gainful trading partners, 
 %then set its mar.gains to zero pick a new NPS 
 if (NPSqsold1(NPSid) == 0) || (max(mar.gains(:,NPSid)) <=0) 
 mar.gains(:,NPSid) = 0; 
 NPSid=double(int16((NPSnum-0.01)*rand+0.5)); 
 end; 
  
 %if mar.gains for current (PS, NPS) pair is nonpositive, pick a new NPS 
 if mar.gains(PSid, NPSid) <= 0 
 NPSid=double(int16((NPSnum-0.01)*rand+0.5)); 
  
 %otherwise (i.e., if mar.gains are positive) execute trade and save data 
 else 
 i = i + 1; 
 PSprice = (NPSwta(NPSid) + PSwtp(PSid))/2 + trcosts/2; 
 NPSprice = (NPSwta(NPSid) + PSwtp(PSid))/2 - trcosts/2; 
 Quantity = min(PSqbuy1(PSid), NPSqsold1(NPSid)); 
 PSqbuy1(PSid) = PSqbuy1(PSid) - Quantity; 
 NPSqsold1(NPSid) = NPSqsold1(NPSid) - Quantity; 
  
 if i == 1 %save data 
 Simout = [i, tratio, PSid, NPSid, PSprice, PSwtp(PSid), NPSwta(NPSid), Quantity, ... 
 mar.gains(PSid,NPSid), mar.gains(PSid,NPSid)*Quantity]; 
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 else Simout = [Simout; i, tratio, PSid, NPSid, PSprice, PSwtp(PSid), NPSwta(NPSid), ... 
 Quantity, mar.gains(PSid,NPSid), mar.gains(PSid,NPSid)*Quantity]; 
 end; 
  
 end; 
 end; 
  
 %This writes trades to a cell array 
 OUT{j} = {Simout}; %store output from each iteration in a cell array 
  
 end; 
  
 % %Close ActiveX Server input 
 % invoke(Excel.ActiveWorkbook,'Save'); 
 % Excel.Quit 
 % Excel.delete 
 % clear Excel 
  
 disp ('successfully finished the trading iterations!') 
  
 %Finds the maximum number of trades(rows) in the output data. Changes all 
 %matrices to have the same number of rows. Zeros are put in the rows that 
 %are added.For more information, go to section 15.3 in the array manipulation 
 %publication 
  
 for j=1:iterations 
 a(j) = max(OUT{1,j}{1,1}(:,1)); %finds total # of trades in each iteration 
 end; 
 m = mean(a); %finds average # of trades across all iterations 
 m = round(m); %rounds the average # to nearest whole number 
 % aa = a(:)'; %creates another matrix aa equal to a 
 % aa = aa(ones(m,1),:); %transforms aa into an m by iterations matrix 
 bb = (1:m)'; %creates bb which is a column vector going from 1 to m 
 % bb = bb(:,ones(length(a), 1)); %transforms bb into a m by iterations matrix 
 % %with each column going from 1 to m 
 % b = bb .* (bb <= aa); %the dot indicates array multiplication (not the same 
 % %as matrix multiplication. Arrays in bb are multiplied by an array of ones 
 % %and zeros corresponding to the number of trades 
 % M = mean(b,2); %sums across all rows of the b matrix resulting in a column vector 
  
 for i = 1:iterations %this loop equalizes number of rows (equal to mean # of trades) 
 %across all iterations so that the means can be calcualted 
 cc{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,6); 
 dd{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,7); 
 ee{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,8); 
 ff{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,9); 
 gg{i} = OUT{i}{1}(:,10); 
 [u,y] = size(cc{i}); 
 if u >= m 
 cc1{i} = cc{i}(1:m,:); 
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 dd1{i} = dd{i}(1:m,:); 
 ee1{i} = ee{i}(1:m,:); 
 ff1{i} = ff{i}(1:m,:); 
 gg1{i} = gg{i}(1:m,:); 
 else v = m-u; 
 w = zeros(v,1); 
 cc1{i} = cat(1,cc{i},w); 
 dd1{i} = cat(1,dd{i},w); 
 ee1{i} = cat(1,ee{i},w); 
 ff1{i} = cat(1,ff{i},w); 
 gg1{i} = cat(1,gg{i},w); 
 end; 
 end; 
  
 ccc = cell2mat(cc1); %converts cell array of matricies to single matrix 
 ddd = cell2mat(dd1); 
 eee = cell2mat(ee1); 
 fff = cell2mat(ff1); 
 ggg = cell2mat(gg1); 
 mccc = mean(ccc,2); %finds mean of rows 
 mddd = mean(ddd,2); 
 meee = mean(eee,2); 
 mfff = mean(fff,2); 
 mggg = mean(ggg,2); 
 mhhh = cumsum(mggg);%calculates running total of gains 
 SumOut = cat(2,bb,mccc,mddd,meee,mfff,mggg,mhhh); 
  
 % This writes the Cummulative Output to an Excel Spreadsheet (all in a single sheet) 
 Headings1 = {'Trade#' 'PSwtp' 'NPSwta' 'Quantity' 'Mar. Gains' 'Gains' 'Cum. Gains'}; 
 numericalOutput1 = num2cell(SumOut);%converts back into cell array 
 allOutput1 = [Headings1; numericalOutput1]; 
 xlswrite(outFile,allOutput1,int2str(trloops+1),'A1'); 
  
 tratio = tratio + trstep; %assign the next tratio to simulate 
 trloops = trloops+1; 
end; 
  
%------------------------------ 
%This code erases any empty sheets in an excel workbook 
%Open the output xls file 
  
excelObj = actxserver('Excel.Application'); 
%opens up an excel object 
excelWorkbook = excelObj.workbooks.Open(outFile); 
worksheets = excelObj.sheets; 
%total number of sheets in workbook 
numSheets = worksheets.count; 
  
count=1; 
for j=1:numSheets 
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 %stores the current number of sheets in the workbook 
 %this number will change if sheets are deleted 
 temp = worksheets.count; 
  
 %if there's only one sheet left, we must leave it or else 
 %there will be an error. 
 if (temp == 1) 
 break; 
 end 
  
 %this command will only delete the sheet if it is empty 
 worksheets.Item(count).Delete; 
  
 %if a sheet was not deleted, we move on to the next one 
 %by incrementing the count variable 
 if (temp == worksheets.count) 
 count = count + 1; 
 end 
end 
excelWorkbook.Save; 
excelWorkbook.Close(false); 
excelObj.Quit; 
delete(excelObj); 
  
%---------------------------------- 
% Run OfficeDoc to format Excel output 
% Open document in 'append' mode: 
[file,status,errMsg] = officedoc(outFile, 'open', 'mode','append'); 
disp('Formatting Excel Output...') 
  
for z = 1:trloops 
 % Format Output in Excel: 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A1:G1', 'bold','on','WrapText',1); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A:A, D:D', 'NumberFormat','#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'B:B, C:C, E:E', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0.00'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'F:F, G:G', 'NumberFormat','$#,##0'); 
 status = officedoc(file, 'format', 'sheet', z, 'Range', 'A1:G1050', 'ColAutoFit',1); 
end 
  
% Close the document, deleting standard sheets and releasing COM server: 
status = officedoc(file, 'close', 'release',1,'delStd','off'); 
toc 
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Appendix E - Additional WQT output from Chapter 4 
Table E.1 Simulation results considering all trades occur 
 
 
 
Scenario 
Trading 
Ratio 
Volume Traded Cost Savings Final Costs 
# of 
Trades 
Base 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Loading 
Reduction 
by PS 
(lbs) 
Additional 
Loading 
Reduction 
by NPS 
(lbs) 
Total 
Loading 
Reduction 
(lbs) Total ($) 
Percent 
(%) Total ($) 
Avg. 
($/lb) 
1a 0.5 134 24,088 1,823 - 25,912 701,703 70.2 298,297 11.51 
1b 1.0 227 40,816 9,184 - 50,000 497,161 49.7 502,839 10.06 
1c 1.5 224 26,396 23,604 13,198 63,198 319,788 32.0 680,212 10.76 
1d 2.0 188 16,210 33,790 16,210 66,210 205,138 20.5 794,862 12.01 
1e 2.5 151 9,993 40,007 14,990 64,990 134,540 13.5 865,460 13.32 
1f 3.0 121 6,386 43,614 12,772 62,772 90,824 9.1 909,176 14.48 
2a 0.5 134 24,112 1,777 - 25,888 597,226 59.7 402,774 15.56 
2b 1.0 255 47,156 2,844 - 50,000 392,259 39.2 607,741 12.15 
2c 1.5 301 36,035 13,965 18,017 68,017 234,861 23.5 765,139 11.25 
2d 2.0 258 22,515 27,485 22,515 72,515 142,475 14.2 857,525 11.83 
2e 2.5 203 13,613 36,387 20,419 70,419 90,259 9.0 909,741 12.92 
2f 3.0 154 8,356 41,644 16,712 66,712 59,869 6.0 940,131 14.09 
3a 0.5 134 24,108 1,785 - 25,892 602,482 60.2 397,518 15.35 
3b 1.0 252 46,330 3,670 - 50,000 406,054 40.6 593,946 11.88 
3c 1.5 273 32,630 17,370 16,315 66,315 262,055 26.2 737,945 11.13 
3d 2.0 228 19,860 30,140 19,860 69,860 161,605 16.2 838,395 12.00 
3e 2.5 181 12,261 37,739 18,392 68,392 101,590 10.2 898,410 13.14 
3f 3.0 141 7,700 42,300 15,401 65,401 65,051 6.5 934,949 14.30 
4a 0.5 134 24,098 1,804 - 25,902 699,950 70.0 300,050 11.58 
4b 1.0 243 43,916 6,084 - 50,000 479,847 48.0 520,153 10.40 
4c 1.5 266 31,444 18,556 15,722 65,722 293,180 29.3 706,820 10.75 
4d 2.0 232 19,951 30,049 19,951 69,951 180,392 18.0 819,608 11.72 
4e 2.5 185 12,388 37,612 18,581 68,581 116,491 11.6 883,509 12.88 
4f 3.0 147 7,988 42,012 15,976 65,976 81,077 8.1 918,923 13.93 
           
